Nardone v. United States

recognizing that unconstitutionally obtained evidence can "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" | recognizing that unconstitutionally obtained evidence can "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” | holding that evidence which must be excluded as result of illegal search includes not only direct product of government misconduct but also “fruit of the poisonous tree” | holding the exclusionary rule applies to evidence discovered and found to be derivative of an illegal search and seizure, or “fruit of the poisonous tree” | stating that exclusionary rule may apply to evidence later discovered and found derivative of an illegality, or “fruit of the poisonous tree” | finding that attenuation can purge evidence of the taint of government illegality | holding once a defendant proves a government search is illegal, the government may avail itself of an opportunity to demonstrate the information came from an independent source and was not a product of the tainted search | stating that “claims that taint attaches to any portion of the Government’s case” should be addressed at trial only when “the accused could not at an earlier stage have had adequate knowledge to make this claim” | stating defendant must satisfy district court that evidence could not have been discovered before or at trial | noting connection between illegal conduct and evidence “may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” | requiring exclusion because the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence did not "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" | stating that the exclusionary rule prohibits evidence that is derivative “of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” | derivative-evidence rules should be grounded on the "learning, good sense, fairness and courage" of lower-court judges | derivative-evidence rules should be grounded on the “learning, good sense, fairness and courage” of lower-court judges | non-owner driver, when owner is driving in car, has no possessory interest in vehicle and no attendant legitimate expectation of privacy | “[T]he knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it simply because it is used derivatively.” | "[T]he knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it simply because it is used derivatively." | evidence obtained in violation of statutory restrictions on wiretapping and any fruits of that violation must be suppressed | A hearing cannot be used as “a means of eliciting what is in the Government’s possession before its submission to the jury.” | evidence obtained in violation of statutory restrictions on wiretapping and any fruits of that violation must be suppressed | “The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court’s satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed.” | “The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court’s satisfaction that wiretapping was unlawfully employed.” | factual allegations that are general or conclusory are insufficient because “claims that taint attaches to any portion of the Government’s case must satisfy the trial court with their solidity” | “[E]vidence is not to be excluded if the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is ‘so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’ ” | prosecutor may use neither evidence improperly obtained nor the fruits of the poisonous tree | prosecutor may use neither evidence improperly obtained nor the fruits of the poisonous tree | first employing the now ubiquitous phrase “fruit of the poisonous tree” to describe evidence derived from an unlaw- ful search and seizure | suppression required only when “causal connection exists between a con