Murdaugh v. Livingston

holding that non-resident defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy in apartment in which they briefly conducted drug-dealing activities | holding that defendants lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy because they did not have a relationship with the home owner, but rather were “simply permitted on the premises” | holding that expectation of privacy in commercial premises is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in individual’s home | holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host's home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable | recognizing that legal protections inure to residents of a home “even when they merely occupy it rent free — so long as they actually live there” | holding that individuals present in home merely to engage in drug trafficking activity have no reasonable expectation of privacy | holding that defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy in, and thus could not challenge the search of, another’s dwelling which they had visited only for the commercial purpose of bagging cocaine | holding that defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy in, and thus could not challenge the search of, another's dwelling which they had visited only for the commercial purpose of bagging cocaine | holding that guests in apartment for cocaine transaction lacked standing to contest search of apartment on Fourth Amendment grounds | holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host’s home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable | holding that a person who is present in another’s home for a drug-related business purpose has no reasonable expectation of privacy | holding that the "`capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place'" | holding that a guest lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s apartment because there was nothing “similar to the overnight guest relationship in Olson to suggest a degree of acceptance into the household” (emphasis supplied) | holding that defendants lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy because they did not have a relationship with the home owner, but rather were "simply permitted on the premises" | holding that defendants lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy because they did not have a relationship with the home owner, but rather were “simply permitted on the premises” | noting that the Fourth Amendment’s language “indicates that [it] is a personal right that must be invoked by an individual” | holding individual present in mother's home only to conduct business transaction, including one involving illicit drugs, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the home | acknowledging that “in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else” | acknowledging that "in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else" | holding that the “ ‘capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place’ ” | holding that a defendant’s expectation of privacy must have “a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society” | reasoning that facts indicating a "degree of acceptance into the household” are necessary to establish reasonable expectation of privacy | noting that the Court in Rakas “expressly rejected” analyzing Fourth Amendment rights “under the rubric of 'standing' doctrine” | explaining that the aggrieved “must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonabl