Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Morse v. United States
46 S. Ct. 241
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1926-03-01
- Topic
- general
holding that second application for leave to file motion for new trial did not suspend the finality of the lower court’s judgment | holding that second application for leave to file motion for new trial did not suspend the finality of the lower court's judgment | motion for new trial suspends the running of time for taking an appeal
Citator
- Cited by
- 43 opinions
MORSEv. UNITED STATES,270 U.S. 151(1926)
46 S.Ct. 241
MORSEv. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 201.
Motion to dismiss submitted February 1, 1926.
Decided March 1, 1926.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Claims denying a salary
claim.
Rule 90 of the Court of Claims provides as follows:
"Whenever it is desired to question the correctness or the sufficiency of the court's findings of fact or its conclusions or to amend the same, the complaining party shall file a motion which shall be known and may be considered as a motion for a new trial. All grounds relied upon for any or all of said objects shall be included in one motion. After the court has announced its decision upon such motion no other motion by the same party shall be filed unless by leave of court. Motions for new trial, except as provided by Section 1088 of the Revised Statutes (Sec. 175 of the Judicial Code) shall be filed within sixty days from the time the judgment of the court is announced."
Section 243 of the Judicial Code, which was in force at the time the appeal herein was taken, but which was later repealed by the Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229,43 Stat. 936, provided as follows:
"All appeals from the Court of Claims shall be taken within ninety days after the judgment is rendered, and shall be allowed under such regulations as the Supreme Court may direct."
It is clear from the sequence of dates above given that more than ninety days elapsed between the overruling of the motion for a new trial and application for appeal by the appellant. The appellant contends that the motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, on June 9, 1924, prevented the beginning of the period of limitation within which application for an appeal could be made from the judgment of the Court of Claims, and therefore that the appeal taken on the 5th of September was within the statutory ninety days.
There is no doubt under the decisions and practice in this Court that where a motion for a new trial in a court of law, or a petition for a rehearing in a court of equity, is duly and seasonably filed, it suspends the running of the time for taking a writ of error or an appeal, and that the time within which the proceeding to review must bePage 154initiated begins from the date of the denial of either the motion or petition.Brockettv.Brockett, 2 How. 238, 241;RailroadCompanyv.Bradleys, 7 Wall. 575, 578;Memphisv.Brown,94 U.S. 715,718;Texas Pacific Railwayv.Murphy,111 U.S. 488,489;Aspen Mining and Smelting Co. v.Billings,150 U.S. 31,36;Kingmanv.Western Manufacturing Co.170 U.S. 675,678;United Statesv.Ellicott,223 U.S. 524,539;Andrewsv.Virginian Railway,248 U.S. 272;Chicago, Great WesternRailwayv.Basham,249 U.S. 164,167. The suspension of the running of the period limited for the allowance of an appeal, after a judgment has been entered, depends upon the due and seasonable filing of the motion for a new trial or the petition for rehearing. In this case after the first motion for a new trial had been overruled, on May 4, 1924, no motion for a new trial could be duly and seasonably filed under Rule 90 of the Court of Claims, except upon leave of the Court of Claims. This leave, though applied for twice, was not granted. Applications for leave did not suspend the running of the ninety days after the denial of the motion for a new trial within which the application for appeal must have been made. For that reason, the motion of the Government to dismiss the appeal as not in time, and so for lack of jurisdiction, must be granted.Appeal dismissed.