Moore v. Arizona

recognizing that actionable “prejudice to a defendant caused by delay ... is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense” | holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker | concluding that defendant was prejudiced by delay where, among other things, “[h]e was unable to participate in prison work programs and other rehabilitation” | holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker | emphasizing that no single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a constitutional speedy trial violation | noting that “Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial” | stating that courts should inquire whether the state "discharge[d] its `constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring [the defendant to trial]'" (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 384, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969)) | noting that “Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial” | stating that courts should inquire whether the state “discharge[d] its ‘constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring [the defendant to trial]’ ” (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 384, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969)) | stating that courts should inquire whether the state “diseharge[d] its ‘constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring [the defendant to trial]’ ” (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 384, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969)) | stating that a delay may interfere with a defendant’s liberty “whether he is free on bail or not” since it “may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, [and] curtail his associations” (quotation marks omitted) | rejecting "notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial" | stating that courts should inquire whether the state “discharged its ‘constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring [the defendant to trial]’ ” (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 384, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969)) | declining to find that a defendant had a right to be tried on a 1974 charge prior to being tried on a 1972 charge in another county | finding an Article 10, UCMJ, violation even though the accused suffered no “obvious prejudice” | pending charges may affect defendant’s chances for "parole and meaningful rehabilitation” | "Barker v, Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy triall-]” | "no court should overlook the possible impact pending charges might have on his prospects for parole" | “Moreover, prejudice to the defendant caused by delay ... is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense.... Inordinate delay ... may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty....” | “[T]he right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.” | “We have held: '[W]hen the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial, the burden of persuasion is on the state to show that the delay did not prejudice the defendant.' ” | Barker factors may carry "different weight where a defendant is incarcerated after conviction" | Barker factors may carry “different weight where a defendant is incarcerated after conviction” | eighteen months after defendant was charged, one of two key witnesses was deported | “Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” | "Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a de