MOLZOF v. UNITED STATES, 502 U.S. 301 (1992)

1. Section 2674 — under which "[t]he United States shall be liable [on] tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,but shall not be liable . . . forpunitive damages"(emphasis added) — bars the recovery only of what are legally considered "punitive damages" under traditional common law principles;i.e., those whose recoverability depends upon proof that the defendant has engaged in intentional or egregious misconduct, and whose purpose is to punish. Pp. 304-312.

(a) This reading is consistent with the above-quoted language of § 2674, which makes clear that the extent of FTCA liability is generally determined by reference to state law, under which "punitive damages" is a legal term of art that has a widely accepted common law meaning, of which Congress was presumably aware when it adopted the Act. In contrast, the Government's view that "punitive damages" must be defined as those "that are in excess of, or bear no relation to, compensation" is contrary to the statutory language, which suggests that, to the extent that a plaintiff may be entitled to damages that are not legally considered "punitive damages," but which are for some reason above and beyond ordinary notions of compensation, the United States is liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual." Pp. 304-308.

(b) The reading adopted here is also consistent with the Act's structure, and provides courts with a workable standard for determining when a plaintiff is improperly seeking "punitive damages." The Government's argument that a congressional intent to define punitivePage 302damages by contrasting them with "actual or compensatory damages" is demonstrated by § 2674's second clause — which limits governmental liability in States permitting only punitive damages in wrongful death actions to "actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from . . . death" — is unpersuasive, since it is undermined both by the well -established common law meaning of "punitive damages" and by the Government's concession that the "pecuniary injuries" standard does not apply in determining compensatory damages in non-wrongful-death tort suits. Moreover, the Government's interpretation of "punitive damages" would be difficult and impractical to apply, creating enormous problems in determining the actual loss suffered in particular kinds of cases. Furthermore, the fact that this Court has not relied on the common law in interpreting some of § 2680's exceptions to FTCA liability is not persuasive evidence that it should do the same here, since many of those exceptions —e.g., § 2680(a)'s exception for claims based on the performance of a "discretionary function" — simply have no common law antecedent, while others serve a qualitatively different purpose than § 2674's bar on "punitive damages," having been designed to protect from disruption certain important governmentalfunctions—e.g., the handling of mail under § 2680(b). Pp. 7-10.

(c) The Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the FTCA barred Mrs. Molzof from recovering damages for her husband's future medical expenses and his loss of enjoyment of life. It is undisputed that those claims are based solely on a simple negligence theory. Thus, the damages sought are not "punitive damages" under the FTCA, because they do not fall within the common law meaning of that term. P. 10-11.

2. However, the case must be remanded for the lower courts to resolve in the first instance whether the damages sought are recoverable as compensatory damages under the law of Wisconsin, the State in which Mr. Molzof's injuries occurred. P. 11.