Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Miller v. Albright

Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1998-04-22
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • recognizing that child born out of wedlock may be "legitimated" by father [internal quotation marks omitted]
  • recognizing that child bom out of wedlock may be “legitimated” by father [internal quotation marks omitted]
  • recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be "legitimated” by father, strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic
  • suggesting that venue was improper under § 1391(e) after the district court dismissed the plaintiff residing in the venue for lack of standing
  • reviewing the constitutionality of a statute which imposed requirements on children bom out of wedlock seeking citizenship through their parent’s status
  • rejecting an equal protection claim 22 TOVAR V. ZUCHOWSKI because the challenged classes (unwed mothers and fathers) were not “similarly situated”
  • noting petitioner had not shown “substantial hindrance” or “genuine obstacle” to„third party’s ability to assert own claim
  • rejecting an equal protection claim because the challenged classes (unwed mothers and fathers) were not “similarly situated”

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Miller v. Albright. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
232 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Immigration — Naturalization A child born out of wedlock outside the United States to an alien mother and an American citizen father acquires citizenship only if the child is legitimated before age 18 (or paternity is established by written acknowledgment under oath or adjudication by a competent court by that age), whereas the foreign-born, out-of-wedlock child of a citizen mother acquires citizenship at birth, subject to the mother's prior physical presence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4), (c)
  2. Immigration — Naturalization There are only two sources of citizenship, birth and naturalization; a person not born in the United States acquires citizenship at birth only as provided by Acts of Congress, and absent a congressional enactment granting citizenship, the person remains an alien. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-703
  3. Constitutional Law — Standing A petitioner who contests the Government's refusal to register and treat her as a citizen has standing, because a judgment in her favor would confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than grant her rights she does not now possess.
  4. Constitutional Law — Standing The presumption against third-party standing may be rebutted only where the litigant has suffered injury in fact, has a close relationship to the third party, and some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests exists; inconvenience in the normal course of litigation does not amount to such a hindrance. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113, 116
  5. Constitutional Law — Standing A litigant may assert her own constitutional rights even where she cannot invoke a third party's claim.
  6. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection A party challenging a statute on equal protection grounds must show not only that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures her but also that she is within the class of persons with respect to whom the statute is unconstitutional. Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123
  7. Constitutional Law — Judicial Review Judicial review of congressional and executive decisions in the areas of immigration and naturalization is extremely limited, reflecting deference to the political branches, whose power over the admission and exclusion of aliens is a fundamental sovereign attribute largely immune from judicial control; Congress regularly makes rules in this field that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80
  8. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Power to Confer Citizenship Only Congress may set the requirements for acquiring citizenship by persons not born within the United States, and a court may not confer citizenship in violation of statutory limitations, whether through estoppel, equitable powers, or any other means; once it is determined that a person does not qualify for citizenship, the court has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant it. INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884-885
  9. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Remedy for Equal Protection Violation Even if the different treatment of the out-of-wedlock children of citizen fathers and citizen mothers were unconstitutional, a court could not remedy the infirmity by declaring the petitioner a citizen or ordering approval of her citizenship application. INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884
  10. Constitutional Law — Gender-Based Classifications A gender-based classification carries a strong presumption of invalidity and is permissible only upon an exceedingly persuasive justification: the distinction must further important governmental objectives and the discriminatory means must be substantially related to achieving those objectives, and the justification must be genuine rather than hypothesized post hoc and must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-533; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152
  11. Constitutional Law — Gender-Based Classifications A classification that is merely the product of an outmoded stereotype, or the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about members of either sex, is invalid. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
  12. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection The biological differences between single men and single women with respect to the birth and custody of children provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to transmit citizenship to children born out of wedlock abroad, and an impartial analysis of those differences may rebut the presumption that gender-based legal distinctions are suspect.
  13. Immigration — Justification for § 1409 Requirements The requirements imposed on the foreign-born, out-of-wedlock child of a citizen father but not on such a child of a citizen mother are justified by important governmental interests: ensuring reliable proof of a blood relationship between the child and the citizen parent, encouraging the development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child during the child's minority, and fostering ties between the child and the United States; these interests cannot be fairly characterized as an accidental byproduct of traditional thinking about either sex. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)
  14. Immigration — Proof of Paternity The blood relationship between a child and its birth mother is immediately obvious and typically documented by hospital records and birth certificates, whereas the relationship to an unmarried father is often undisclosed and unrecorded in any contemporary public record, so requiring an affirmative formal act to establish paternity—legitimation, written acknowledgment under oath, or court adjudication before age 18—is well tailored to the differing circumstances of male and female parents of foreign-born, out-of-wedlock children. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)
  15. Immigration — Alternative Methods of Compliance Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, it is necessary only to uphold the least onerous of the three alternative methods of establishing paternity in order to sustain the provision.
  16. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection The requirement that children born out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not to citizen mothers, obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18 is substantially related to important governmental objectives even assuming heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination applies, and does not violate the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-534; 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)
  17. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Severance of Unconstitutional Provisions A court may sever an unconstitutional provision from the remainder of a statute only if it determines that Congress would have enacted the remaining provisions without the invalidated one; the power to sever is incompatible with the plenary congressional authority over immigration and naturalization where severance would require judges to speculate as to what Congress would have enacted had it not enacted the provision it did. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186
  18. Statutory Interpretation — Severability An express severability provision preserves the remainder of an Act and the application of an invalid provision to other persons or circumstances when any particular provision or its application is held invalid. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note ("Separability")
  19. Statutory Interpretation — Construction Statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation, as if other provisions in the same Act do not exist, and a specific statutory provision governs over a general one. King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 221; Morales v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-385
  20. Immigration — Naturalization A person may be naturalized as a citizen of the United States only in the manner and under the conditions prescribed by Congress, and not otherwise; naturalization means the conferring of nationality upon a person after birth, and does not include the conferral of citizenship at birth, so the restriction on naturalization to the prescribed manner and conditions does not apply to citizenship conferred at birth. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(d), 1101(a)(23)