Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Michigan v. Thomas

73 L. Ed. 2d 750

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1982-06-28
Topic
general

holding that police lawfully searched an impounded vehicle when they had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband | holding that the automobile exception applies even after the occupants of the vehicle are arrested and the vehicle is immobilized and in police custody | holding that the automobile exception applies even after the occupants of the vehicle are arrested and the vehicle is immobilized and in police custody | holding that “the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not ... depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away” | noting that finding of exigent circumstances is not required to uphold inventory search of vehicle in police custody | noting that “the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized” | noting that “the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized” | noting that “the justification to conduct . . . a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized” | explaining that officers may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile even after the vehicle is impounded and in police custody | explaining that officers may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile even after the vehicle is impounded and in police custody | suggesting that discovery of contraband during a valid inventory search can give police officers probable cause to search the rest of the car | explaining that evidence seized during an inventory search of a vehicle can provide probable cause to search elsewhere in the vehicle for additional contraband | noting that the degree of control that police have over a car, its driver, and any passengers does not affect the application of the automobile exception | reiterating probable cause supporting a warrantless search when a vehicle is stopped does not vanish after it has been impounded and is in police custody | upholding a roadside vehicle inventory search where the driver was no longer present pursuant to the automobile exception | reiterating probable cause supporting a warrantless search when a vehicle is stopped does not vanish after it has been impounded and is in police custody | upholding probable cause where a drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the car | discussing the irrelevance of handcuffing in light of the exception’s bright-line rule | exigent circumstances are not required for a warrantless search based on probable cause of a vehicle lawfully in police custody | application of the exception does not depend on the likelihood in each particular case that the automobile would have been driven away | application of the exception does not depend on the likelihood in each particular case that the automobile would have been driven away | “It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized.” | “the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized” | “justification to conduct . . . a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized” | application of the exception does not depend on the likelihood in each particular case that the automobile would have been driven away | "It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized." | “[T]he automobile exception does not require an immediate search; the police may lawfully seize the car, and then search it later.” | “It is thus clear that the justification to conduct ... a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized....” | “It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized.” | warrantless search of car was permissible if search fell within the automobile exception even where the

Citator

Cited by
175 opinions
Per Curiam.

While respondent was the front-seat passenger in an automobile, the car was stopped for failing to signal a left turn. As two police officers approached the vehicle, they saw respondent bend forward so that his head was at or below the level of the dashboard. The officers then observed an open bottle of malt liquor standing upright on the floorboard between respondent’s feet, and placed respondent under arrest for possession of open intoxicants in a motor vehicle. The 14-year-old driver was issued a citation for not having a driver’s license. Respondent claimed ownership of the car.

*260 Respondent and the driver were taken to the patrol car, and a truck was called to tow respondent’s automobile. One of the officers searched the vehicle, pursuant to a departmental policy that impounded vehicles be searched prior to being towed. The officer found two bags of marihuana in the unlocked glove compartment.. The second officer then searched the car more thoroughly, checking under the front seat, under the dashboard, and inside the locked trunk. Opening the air vents under the dashboard, the officer discovered a loaded, .38-caliber revolver inside.

Respondent was convicted of possession of a concealed weapon. He moved for a new trial, contending that the revolver was taken from his car pursuant to an illegal search and seizure; the trial court denied the motion.

The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the warrantless search of respondent’s automobile violated the Fourth Amendment. 106 Mich. App. 601, 308 N. W. 2d 170 (1981). The court acknowledged that in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), this Court upheld the validity of warrantless inventory searches of impounded motor vehicles. Moreover, the court found that, since respondent had been placed under arrest and the other occupant of the car was too young to legally drive, it was proper for the officers to impound the vehicle and to conduct an inventory search prior to its being towed. However, in the view of the Court of Appeals, the search conducted in this case was “unreasonable in scope,” because it extended to the air vents which, unlike the glove compartment or the trunk, were not a likely place for the storage of valuables or personal possessions. 106 Mich. App., at 606, 308 N. W. 2d, at 172.

The Court of Appeals also rejected the State’s contention that the scope of the inventory search was properly expanded when the officers discovered contraband in the glove compartment. The court concluded that, because both the car and its occupants were already in police custody, there were *261 no “exigent circumstances” justifying a warrantless search for contraband. 1

We reverse. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), we held that when police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody. We firmly reiterated this holding in Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67 (1975). See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 807, n. 9 (1982). It is thus clear that the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant. 2 See ibid.

Here, the Court of Appeals recognized that the officers were justified in conducting an inventory search of the car’s *262 glove compartment, which led to the discovery of contraband. Without attempting to refute the State’s contention that this discovery gave the officers probable cause to believe there was contraband elsewhere in the vehicle, the Court of Appeals held that the absence of “exigent circumstances” precluded a warrantless search. This holding is plainly inconsistent with our decisions in Chambers and Texas v. White.

The petition for certiorari and the motion of respondent to proceed informa pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
1

The Court of Appeals did not directly address the State’s contention that the discovery of marihuana in the glove compartment provided probable cause to believe there was contraband hidden elsewhere in the vehicle. However, the court apparently assumed that the officers possessed information sufficient to support issuance of a warrant to search the automobile; the court’s holding was that the officers were required to obtain such a warrant, and could not search on the basis of probable cause alone. See 106 Mich. App., at 606-608, 308 N. W. 2d, at 172-173.

2

Even were some demonstrable “exigency” a necessary predicate to such a search, we would find somewhat curious the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that no “exigent circumstances” were present in this case. Unlike the searches involved in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), and Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67 (1975) — which were conducted at the station house — the search at issue here was conducted on the roadside, before the car had been towed. As pointed out by Judge Deneweth, in dissent, “there was a clear possibility that the occupants of the vehicle could have had unknown confederates who would return to remove the secreted contraband.” 106 Mich. App., at 609, 308 N. W. 2d, at 174.