Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1984-01-18
Topic
bankruptcy

Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor join, concurring. I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the plaintiffs had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most eases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court’s holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in excep*557tional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.

Citator

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Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor join,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the plaintiffs had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most eases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court’s holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in excep *557 tional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 215-216 (1982); id., at 221-224 (O’Connor, J., concurring).