Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood

464 U.S. 548

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1984-01-18
Topic
bankruptcy

Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor join, concurring. I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the plaintiffs had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most eases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court’s holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in excep*557tional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.

Citator

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Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor join,

concurring.

I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the plaintiffs had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most eases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court’s holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in excep *557 tional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 215-216 (1982); id., at 221-224 (O’Connor, J., concurring).