Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

McDonald v. Mabee

243 U.S. 90

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1917-03-06
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • suggesting that service upon the defendant’s family at his last and usual place of abode would satisfy due process
  • holding statute impairing corporation’s right to discharge employees at will violated liberty of contract protected by both federal and state Constitutions
  • finding that a civil judgment issued by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant was void
  • holding that federal Due Process Clause was violated
  • noting that, in “exten[ding] . . . the means of acquiring [personal] jurisdiction,” “great caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact”
  • reversing a judgment of the Supreme court of appeals denied. 311 S.W.3d 1. We granted AG's Court of Texas
  • "[A]n ordinary personal judgment for money, invalid for want of service amounting to due process of law, is as ineffective in the State as it is outside of it"
  • suggestion that delivery of notice to last usual place of abode after the defendant has left for another state may be constitutional

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed McDonald v. Mabee. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
322 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Due Process Service by publication in a local newspaper is not sufficient notice to bind a person who has left the state intending not to return, and a personal judgment for money rendered against such a person on the basis of that service alone is absolutely void under the Fourteenth Amendment. 243 U.S. 90 (1917)
  2. Civil Procedure — Choice of Law An ordinary personal judgment for money, invalid for want of service amounting to due process of law, is as ineffective in the state of its rendition as it is elsewhere. 243 U.S. 90 (1917)
  3. Civil Procedure — Reciprocal Obligations The obligations of a judgment are reciprocal; a judgment that is void when sued upon by the plaintiff is likewise void when interposed by the defendant as a bar to the original cause of action. 243 U.S. 90 (1917)
McDONALDv. MABEE,243 U.S. 90(1917)
37 S.Ct. 343
McDONALDv. MABEE.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.
No. 135.
Submitted January 31, 1917.
Decided March 6, 1917.
A person domiciled in Texas left the State intending to make his home elsewhere, his family residing there meanwhile. During his absence an action for money was begun against him in a Texas court. After returning and remaining for a short time, he departed finally and established a domicile in another State. The only service in the action was by publication in a newspaper after his final departure. Based on this service, a personal judgment for money was rendered against him which was sustained under the laws of Texas by the Supreme Court of the State.Held, that the judgment was absolutely void under the Fourteenth Amendment.Quaere:Whether the judgment would have been good if a summons had been left at his last and usual place of abode in Texas while the family was in that State and before the new domicile was acquired? An ordinary personal judgment for money, invalid for want of service amounting to due process of law, is as ineffective in the State of its rendition as it is elsewhere. Since judgments are of reciprocal obligation, a judgment void if sued on by the plaintiff is void also when interposed by the defendant as a bar to the original cause of action.175 S.W. 676, reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Henry D. McDonald, pro se, andMr. A.P. Parkfor plaintiff in error.Mr. Joseph W. Baileyfor defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit upon a promissory note. The only defence now material is that the plaintiff had recovered a judgmentPage 91upon the same note in a previous suit in Texas which purported to bind the defendant personally as well as to foreclose a lien by which the note was secured. When the former suit was begun the defendant, Mabee, was domiciled in Texas but had left the State with intent to establish a home elsewhere, his family, however, still residing there. He subsequently returned to Texas for a short time and later established his domicile in Missouri. The only service upon him was by publication in a newspaper once a week for four successive weeks after his final departure from the State, and he did not appear in the suit. The Supreme Court of the State held that this satisfied the Texas statutes and that the judgment was a good personal judgment, overruling the plaintiff's contention that to give it that effect was to deny the constitutional right to due process of law.175 S.W. 676.

The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain that power throughout proceedings properly begun, and although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place of service upon the person.Michigan Trust Co. v.Ferry,228 U.S. 346,353.Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v.Gold Issue Mining MillingCo., decided to-day,post, 93. No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond service or appearance, but the foundation should be borne in mind. Subject to its conception of sovereignty even the common law required a judgment not to be contrary to natural justice.Douglasv.Forrest, 4 Bing. 686, 700, 701.Becquetv.MacCarthy, 2 B. Ad. 951, 959.Maubourquetv.Wyse(1867), 1 Ir. Rep. C.L. 471, 481. And in States bound together by a Constitution and subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.Bakerv.Baker, Eccles Co.,242 U.S. 394.Page 92

There is no dispute that service by publication does not warrant a personal judgment against a non-resident.Pennoyerv.Neff,95 U.S. 714.Riverside Dan River Cotton Millsv.Menefee,237 U.S. 189. Some language ofPennoyerv.Neffwould justify the extension of the same principle to absent parties, but we shall go no farther than the precise facts of this case require. When the former suit was begun Mabee, although technically domiciled in Texas, had left the State intending to establish his home elsewhere. Perhaps in view of his technical position and the actual presence of his family in the State a summons left at his last and usual place of abode would have been enough. But it appears to us that an advertisement in a local newspaper is not sufficient notice to bind a person who has left a State intending not to return. To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done. We repeat also that the ground for giving subsequent effect to a judgment is that the court rendering it had acquired power to carry it out; and that it is going to the extreme to hold such power gained even by service at the last and usual place of abode.

Whatever may be the rule with regard to decrees concerning status or its incidents,Haddockv.Haddock,201 U.S. 562,569,632, an ordinary personal judgment for money, invalid for want of service amounting to due process of law, is as ineffective in the State as it is outside of it.201 U.S. 567,568. If the former judgment had been sued upon in another State by the plaintiff we think that the better opinion would justify a denial of its effect. If so, it was no more effective in Texas.De la Montanyav.De la Montanya,112 Cal. 101.Boringv.Penniman,134 Cal. 514.

The usual occasion for testing the principle to be applied would be such as we have supposed, where the defendantPage 93was denying the validity of the judgment against him. But the obligations of the judgment are reciprocal and the fact that here the defendant is asserting and the plaintiff denying its personal effect does not alter the case.Whittierv.Wendell,7 N.H. 257.Rangelyv.Webster,11 N.H. 299.Middlesex Bankv.Butman,29 Me. 19. The personal judgment was not merely voidable, as was assumed in the slightly different case ofHendersonv.Staniford,105 Mass. 504, but was void. SeeNeedhamv.Thayer,147 Mass. 536. InHendersonv.Stanifordthe absent defendant intended to return to his State.Judgment reversed.