Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
McBoyle v. United States
283 U.S. 25
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1931-03-09
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- holding that “any other self-propelled vehicle,” when preceded by “automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, and motorcycle” did not include aircraft
- observing that judicial statutory construction cannot proceed "upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used"
- applying rule of lenity to civil forfeiture provisions that are punitive and quasi-criminal in nature
- exploring problems facing courts when asked to apply statutes to disputes the nuances of which were not contemplated by the enacting legislators
- refusing to expand a criminal statute's reach without "a fair warning ... given to the world in language the common world will understand"
- utilizing the ejusdem generis principle in determining that “automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails” did not apply to an airplane
- adopting 13 See 1989 OED, available at https://oed.com/oed2/00164865 (same). the meaning assigned to a word “in everyday speech,” even though “[n]o doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify” something else
- declining “to read words that so carefully enumerate the different forms of motor vehicles” that are subject to the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act as including airplanes where the statute contains “no reference of any kind to aircraft”
Citator
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- Cited by
- 513 opinions
Headnotes
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Statutory Interpretation The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, which defines "motor vehicle" to include "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails," does not apply to aircraft, because the word "vehicle" in everyday speech connotes a thing moving on land, and the statutory enumeration of motor vehicles contains no reference to aircraft. 283 U.S. at 26
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Rule of Lenity and Fair Warning A criminal statute should not be extended beyond the meaning its words convey to the common understanding merely because a similar policy might seem to apply or because broader words might have been used had the legislature thought of the situation; fair warning requires that the line of prohibited conduct be clear in language the common world will understand. 283 U.S. at 26
McBOYLEv. UNITED STATES,283 U.S. 25(1931)
51 S.Ct. 340
McBOYLEv. UNITED STATES.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.
No. 552.
Argued February 26, 27, 1931.
Decided March 9, 1931.
CERTIORARI,282 U.S. 835, to review a judgment affirming a
conviction under the Motor Vehicle Theft Act.
Section 2 defines the motor vehicles of which the transportation in interstate commerce is punished in § 3. The question is the meaning of the word `vehicle' in the phrase "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails." No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance working on land, water or air, and sometimes legislation extends the use in that direction, e.g., land and air, water being separately provided for, in the Tariff Act, September 22, 1922, c. 356, § 401(b),42 Stat. 858, 948. But in everyday speech `vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing moving on land. Thus in Rev. Stats. § 4, intended, the Government suggests, rather to enlarge than to restrict the definition, vehicle includes every contrivance capable of being used "as a means of transportation on land." And this is repeated, expressly excluding aircraft, in the Tariff Act, June 17, 1930, c. 997, § 401(b);46 Stat. 590, 708. So here, the phrase under discussion calls up the popular picture. For after including automobile truck, automobile wagon and motor cycle, the words "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" still indicate that a vehicle in the popular sense, that is a vehicle running on land, is the theme. It is a vehicle that runs, not something, not commonly called a vehicle, that flies. Airplanes were well known in 1919, when this statute was passed; but it is admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or in the debates in Congress.Page 27It is impossible to read words that so carefully enumerate the different forms of motor vehicles and have no reference of any kind to aircraft, as including airplanes under a term that usage more and more precisely confines to a different class. The counsel for the petitioner have shown that the phraseology of the statute as to motor vehicles follows that of earlier statutes of Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio, Michigan and Missouri, not to mention the late Regulations of Traffic for the District of Columbia, Title 6, c. 9, § 242, none of which can be supposed to leave the earth.
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used.United Statesv.Thind,261 U.S. 204,209.Judgment reversed.