Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck
297 U.S. 266
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1936-02-10
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- citation 5 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507–12 (1981
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UpLaw has not yet analyzed Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
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MAYFLOWER FARMSv. TEN EYCK,297 U.S. 266(1936)
56 S.Ct. 457
MAYFLOWER FARMS, INC.v. TEN EYCK, COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE MARKETS OF NEW YORK, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
No. 349.
Argued January 15, 1936.
Decided February 10, 1936.
APPEAL from a judgment upholding an order denying the
appellant a license to sell milk. For reports of the case in the
275 N.Y.S. 669. Compare the case next preceding in this volume.
Page 267
The purpose of the time limitation is to create a monopoly, by preventing new dealers from entering the field. It was not intended to prevent new and injurious competition; such competition was and is directly and effectively prevented by § 258-c of the Act, which the court below overlooked. It was not enacted to preserve thestatus quoof the milk dealers in business on April 10, 1933, or upon the ground that the well-advertised dealers would form unadvertised subsidiaries; or on emergency grounds.
It cannot be supported as a legitimate exercise of police power.Lawtonv.Steele,152 U.S. 133,137;Colonv.Lisk,153 N.Y. 188,196;Wrightv.Hart,182 N.Y. 330.
To prescribe different qualifications for entrance into the business, or to prescribe regulations covering the different classes, is entirely different from proscribing, in effect, the right to engage in such business altogether.
This case is likeConnollyv.Union Sewer Pipe Co.,184 U.S. 540;Truaxv.Corrigan,257 U.S. 312. The limitation is not based on any factual situation. It is an unusual legislative expedient and its approval will establish a most dangerous precedent.
To concede the validity of the time limitation would be to concede the power of the legislature, in the guise of regulation, to destroy a lawful business — a power which this Court has declared in many cases does not exist.Burns Baking Co. v.Bryan,264 U.S. 504,513. See alsoMeyerv.Nebraska,262 U.S. 390,399-400;Norfolk Ry. Co. v.Public Service Comm'n,265 U.S. 70,74;Piercev.Society of Sisters,268 U.S. 510,534-535;Weaverv.Palmer Bros.,270 U.S. 402,412-415;Fairmont Co. v.Minnesota,274 U.S. 1,9-11;Liggett Co. v.Baldridge,278 U.S. 105,113.
On the other hand, a decision conceding this appellant a license which it deserves and has qualified for, will notPage 268disrupt, but will promote, the working of the milk control system of the State.
Appellant falls naturally into the class of unadvertised dealers in New York City for whose benefit the price differential provision was enacted and, as a member of such class, is entitled to that benefit.Standard Oil Co. v.Charlottesville,42 F.2d 88;Statev.Whitcom,122 Wis. 110;Chicago, M. St.P. Ry. Co. v.Westby, 178 F. 619;Fountain Park Co. v.Hensler,199 Ind. 95;U.S. Automobile Service Clubv.Winkle,128 Or. 274;Ex parte Wacholder,1 Cal.App.2d 260;Cook Coffee Co. v.Flushing,267 Mich. 131;Statev.Hinman,65 N.H. 103;Johnsonv.Milwaukee,88 Wis. 383,390-392;State ex rel. Reschv.Trustees,121 Wis. 44,54;Servonitzv.State,133 Wis. 231,238;Borgnisv.FalkCo.,147 Wis. 327,353,354;Nicholsv.Walter,37 Minn. 264,271;Davis Construction Co. v.Board,192 Ind. 144;Louisville N.R. Co. v.Railroad Commissioner, 19 F.2d 679, 695;Tugmanv.Chicago,78 Ill. 405;Alexanderv.Elizabeth,56 N.J.L. 71. For other cases in New Jersey condemning arbitrary time limitations, seeStatev.Post,55 N.J.L. 264;State ex rel. Piersonv.O'Connor,54 N.J.L. 36;Pavonia Horse R. Co. v.Jersey City,45 N.J.L. 297;Stahlv.Trenton,54 N.J.L. 444.Suttonv.State,96 Tenn. 696;Pabst Corporationv.Milwaukee,190 Wis. 349;NorthwesternNational Ins. Co. v.Fishback,130 Wn. 490;Hauserv.N.B. M. Insurance Co.,206 N.Y. 455;Peoplev.Ringe,197 N.Y. 143;Southeastern Electric Co. v.Atlanta,179 Ga. 514.
The time limitation is separable.Mr. Henry S. Manley, with whomMr. John J. Bennett, Jr., Attorney General of New York, andMr. Henry Epstein, Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellees.
There was good reason for limiting the privilege of selling at the "unadvertised" price to dealers who were inPage 269business on April 10, 1933, when the original Milk Control Law was enacted. The classification is not unconstitutional.
For the purpose of testing the narrow question of constitutionality involved in this case, it is necessary to examine the facts underlying the statute. The legislature did not wish to increase and intensify the lower-price competition against the "advertised" dealers by permitting new dealers to join it; and if persons and corporations wanted to make investments in the milk business after April 10, 1933, they were required to attach themselves to the higher-price group.
New legislation frequently makes important distinctions with relation to its effective date, and such classification, far from being arbitrary and unfair, often is necessary to protect from an unfair burden those who began business before the statute was contemplated.Sperry Hutchinson Co. v.Rhodes,220 U.S. 502,505;Buckv.Bell,274 U.S. 200,208;Watsonv.Maryland,218 U.S. 173;Peoplev.Griswold,213 N.Y. 92,97;Cooperv.Rollins,152 Ga. 588;Peoplev.Logan,284 Ill. 83;Criswellv.State,126 Md. 103;Commonwealthv.Ward,136 Ky. 146;Sammarcov.Boysa,193 Wis. 642;Manheimv.Harrison,164 La. 564;Aurorav.Burns,319 Ill. 84;Spectorv.Building Inspector,250 Mass. 63;Standard Oil Co. v.Charlottesville,42 F.2d 88;Nortonv.Hutson,142 Kan. 305;New York Cityv.Kelsey,158 A.D. 183. See, to the same effect,Baylisv.Van Nostrand,176 A.D. 396;Moritzv.United Brethren Church,269 N.Y. 125;Commonwealthv.Charity Hospital,198 Pa. 270;Commonwealth ex rel. Elkinv.Charity Hospital,199 Pa. 119.
Even if the time limitation is unconstitutional, appellant is not entitled to any relief in this proceeding. This Court will not exercise "judicial surgery" for the purposePage 270of extending to the appellant and other new dealers the benefit of the "unadvertised differential" provision.
The legislature was moved by the anticipated hardship of an even price, upon dealers whose existing businesses depended upon continuing sales at a lower price, to make them a concession which this Court has said is "novel, if not unique."Borden'sFarm Products Co. v.Baldwin,293 U.S. 194,203. The legislature made the concession only to the extent that it was needed. It intended merely to save existing business done on the lower price level; it had no intention of encouraging new dealers to come in on that basis.
The statute now under consideration contains a separability clause; but we do not understand that such a clause is conclusive upon all questions of separability. Such a clause is "but an aid to interpretation and not an inexorable command."Dorchyv.Kansas,264 U.S. 286,290;Williamsv.Standard Oil Co.,278 U.S. 235,242;Utah Power Light Co. v.Pfost,286 U.S. 165,184;Champlin Refining Co. v.Commission,286 U.S. 210,235.
The general rule as to separability has been stated and applied many times. See, for examples,Spraguev.Thompson,118 U.S. 90,94-95;Connollyv.Union Sewer Pipe Co.,184 U.S. 540,565;Lynchv.United States,292 U.S. 571,586. The rule applied by the highest court of New York State is the same.People ex rel. Cement Co. v.Knapp,230 N.Y. 48,60;CityBank F.T. Co. v.New York Central R. Co.,253 N.Y. 49,55-57;Peoplev.Mancuso,255 N.Y. 463,472-474.
The Milk Control Act of 1933,1authorized a board to fix minimum prices for sales of fluid milk in bottles by dealers to stores in cities of more than one million inhabitants, with a differential of one cent per quart in favor of dealers "not having a well advertised trade name."2The term of the act was one year. An amended act, effective April 1, 1934,3which placed milk control under the jurisdiction of a division of the Department of Agriculture and Markets, contained a similar provision with respect to the differential. The pertinent section, as it stood at the time of the appellant's application for a license, follows; the words in brackets having been in the original act, but eliminated when the statute was revised in 1934, those in italics having been added by the later act:
"It shall not be unlawful for any milk dealer who [at the time this act shall take effect is]since April tenth, nineteenhundred thirty-three has beenengagedcontinuouslyin the business of purchasing and handling milk not having a well advertised trade name in a city of more than one million inhabitants to sell fluid milk in bottles to stores in such city at a price not more than one cent per quart below the price of such milk sold to stores underPage 272a well advertised trade name,and such lower price shall alsoapply on sales from stores to consumers;provided that in no event shall the price of such milk not having a well advertised trade name, be more than one cent per quart below the minimum price fixed [by the board] for such sales to stores in such a city."4
The appellant had not a well-advertised trade name. The reason for refusing it a license was that though it had not been continuously in the business of dealing in milk since April 10, 1933 it had sold and was selling to stores milk at a price a cent below the established minimum price. The question is whether the provision denying the benefit of the differential to all who embark in the business after April 10, 1933, works a discrimination which has no foundation in the circumstances of those engaging in the milk business in New York City, and is therefore so unreasonable as to deny appellant the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The record discloses no reason for the discrimination. The report of the committee, pursuant to which the Milk Control Act was adopted, is silent on the subject. While the legislative history indicates that the differential provision was intended to preserve competitive conditions affecting the store trade in milk, it affords no clue to the genesis of the clause denying the benefit of the differential to those entering the business after April 10, 1933.
The Court of Appeals thought a possible reason for the time limitation might be that, without it, the companies having well advertised names could, through subsidiaries, sell milk not bearing their names in competition with unadvertised dealers and thus drive some of the latterPage 273out of the field with consequent injury to the farmers who sell them milk. This view ignores the fact that the purchase price to the farmer is fixed and that the introduction of new unadvertised brands of bottled milk would not reduce the total demand for fluid milk in the metropolitan area. The appellees do not attempt now to support the provision on this ground.
Another suggested reason for the discrimination is that the legislature believed an equal price basis for all dealers would cause most of the business of selling milk through stores to pass into the hands of the large and well known dealers; the differential provision was designed to prevent this result, and save existing businesses of the independent dealers, but was limited in its scope by the reason for it; the legislature did not wish to increase the lower price competition against well advertised dealers by permitting new independent dealers to go into the business, and so required persons or corporations desiring to make investments in the milk business after April 10, 1933 to attach themselves to the higher price group. This is but another way of saying the legislature determined that during the life of the law no person or corporation might enter the business of a milk dealer in New York City. The very reason for the differential was the belief that no one could successfully market an unadvertised brand on an even price basis with the seller of a well advertised brand. One coming fresh into the field would not possess such a brand and clearly could not meet the competition of those having an established trade name and good will, unless he were allowed the same differential as others in his class. By denying him this advantage the law effectually barred him from the business.
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutesPage 274licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughter houses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law.
At the argument we were asked to hold that if the time limitation be bad, it is severable, and the provision for the differential, shorn of it, remains in force; and we were referred to a section of the act claimed to show the legislature so intended. While we have jurisdiction to decide the question, it is one which may appropriately be left for adjudication by the courts of New York,Dorchyv.Kansas,264 U.S. 286,290,291;Fox Film Corp. v.Muller,296 U.S. 207,209,210.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.Reversed.
A minimum price for fluid milk was fixed by law in April, 1933. At that time, "independents" were under-selling their competitors, the dealers in well-advertised brands, by approximately a cent a quart. There was reason to believe that unless that differential was preserved, they would be driven out of business. To give them an opportunity to survive, the lawmakers maintained the differential in the City of New York, the field of keenest competition. We have learned from the opinion in Borden's case that this might lawfully be done.
The problem was then forced upon the lawmakers, what were to be the privileges of independents who came upon the scene thereafter? Were they to have the benefit of a differential though they had not invested a dollar in the milk business at the passage of the act, or were they to take the chances of defeat by rivals stronger than themselves, as they would have to do in other callings? "The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect a business against the hazards of competition."Hegeman FarmsCorp. v.Baldwin,293 U.S. 163,170;Public Service Comm'nv.Great Northern Utilities Co.,289 U.S. 130,135. To concede the differential to newcomers might mean an indefinite extension of an artificial preference, thereby aggravating the handicap, the factitious barrier to expansion, for owners of established brands. There was danger that the preference would become so general as to occupy an unfair proportion of the field, the statutory norm being thus disrupted altogether. On the other hand, to refuse the differential might mean that newcomers would be deterred from putting capital and labor at the risk of such a business, and, even if they chose to do so, would wage a losing fight.
Hardships, great or little, were inevitable, whether the field of the differential was narrowed or enlarged. The legislature, and not the court, has been charged with the duty of determining their comparative extent. To some minds an expansion of the field might seem the course ofPage 276wisdom and even that of duty; to others wisdom and duty might seem to point the other way. The judicial function is discharged when it appears from a survey of the scene that the lawmakers did not play the part of arbitrary despots in choosing as they did.Standard Oil Co. v.Marysville,279 U.S. 582,586,587. When a line or point has to be fixed, and "there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark." Holmes, J., inLouisville GasElectric Co. v.Coleman,277 U.S. 32,41. Cf.Dominion Hotelv.Arizona,249 U.S. 265,268,269. The judgment of the court commits us to a larger role. In declaring the equities of newcomers to be not inferior to those of others, the judgment makes a choice between competing considerations of policy and fairness, however emphatic its professions that it applies a rule of law.
For the situation was one to tax the wisdom of the wisest. At the very least it was a situation where thoughtful and honest men might see their duty differently. The statute upheld by this court inNebbiav.New York,291 U.S. 502, was an experiment, and a novel one, in that form of business enterprise. Relations between groups had grown up and crystallized under cover of the regime of unrestricted competition. They were threatened with disruption by a system of regulated prices which might crowd the little dealers out and leave the strong and the rich in possession of the field. If there was to be dislocation of the price structure by the action of the state, there was a duty, or so the lawmakers might believe, to spread the consequences among the groups with a minimum of change and hence a minimum of hardship. But the position of men in business at the beginning of the change was very different from those who might go into the business afterwards. Those already there would lose something more than an opportunity for a choice between one business and another. They would lose capitalPage 277already ventured; they would lose experience already bought; they would suffer the pains incidental to the sudden and enforced abandonment of an accustomed way of life. A newcomer could not pretend that he was exposed to those afflictions. Then, too, the ephemeral character of the project counted heavily in favor of the older dealers, and little in favor of a newcomer, or rather, indeed, against him. The system of regulation had been set up as a temporary one, to tide producers over the rigors of the great depression. If independents already in the field could have their business saved from ruin, it might come back to them intact when the statute was no longer needed. Those who went into the system later would have to count the cost.
Considerations akin to these have seemed sufficient to other legislatures for drawing a distinction between an old business and a new one. They have seemed sufficient to this court in determining the validity of other acts of legislation not different in principle.Stanleyv.Public Utilities Comm'n,295 U.S. 76,78;Continental Baking Co. v.Woodring,286 U.S. 352,370,371;Sperry Hutchinson Co. v.Rhodes,220 U.S. 502,505;Watsonv.Maryland,218 U.S. 173,177,178; cf.Spectorv.Building Inspector,250 Mass. 63,70,71;145 N.E. 265. Independents who were in business when the statute was adopted would not have suffered a denial of a constitutional right or privilege if they had been refused a differential, though the refusal might have condemned them to a foreordained and hopeless struggle with advertised competitors stronger than themselves. For the same reason, independents starting afterwards must submit to the same chances unless their equities are as commanding as those of dealers on the scene before. It is juggling with words to say that all the independents make up a single "class," and by reason of that fact must be subjected to a single rule. Whether the class is divisible into sub-classes is the very question to be answered. There mayPage 278be division and subdivision unless separation can be found to be so void of rationality as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment. "We have no right," it is now said, "to conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination." The court has taught a different doctrine in its earlier decisions. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v.Brownell,294 U.S. 580,584;Rastv.Van Deman Lewis Co.,240 U.S. 342,357;O'Gorman Youngv.Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,282 U.S. 251,257;Williamsv.Mayor,289 U.S. 36,42. On this occasion, happily, the facts are not obscure. Big dealers and little ones, newcomers in the trade and veterans, were clamorously asserting to the legislature their title to its favor. I have not seen the judicial scales so delicately poised and so accurately graduated as to balance and record the subtleties of all these rival equities, and make them ponderable and legible beyond a reasonable doubt.
To say that the statute is not void beyond a reasonable doubt is to say that it is valid.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS and MR. JUSTICE STONE join in this opinion.
- Page 271 Laws of 1933 (N.Y.) c. 158. SeeNebbiav.New York,291 U.S. 502. ↩
- Page 271Ibid., § 317(c). ↩
- Page 271 Laws of 1934 (N.Y.) c. 126. ↩
- Page 272 Laws of 1933 N.Y., c. 158, § 317(c); Article 21-A, § 258(q) of the Agriculture and Markets Law of the State of New York; Laws of 1934 (N.Y.) 580. ↩