Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals

506 U.S. 1

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1992-11-02
Topic
bankruptcy

observing that every frivolous paper filed causes some drain on the court’s limited resources | observing that every frivolous paper filed causes some drain on the court’s limited resources | inaugurating the Supreme Court’s current practice of requiring pestiferous litigants to prepay all fees and print their petitions for certiorari | requiring James Martin to pay docketing fees for petitions for certiorari in noncriminal matters after filing 45 petitions within ten years | requiring petitioner to pay docketing fees for petitions for certiorari in noncriminal matters after filing 45 petitions within 10 years | limiting petitioner’s sanction to noncriminal cases because petitioner’s abuse of the writ of certiorari occurred solely in noncriminal eases | requiring petitioner to pay docketing fees for petitions for certiorari in noncriminal matters after filing 45 petitions within 10 years | requiring district courts to provide notice and invite response when sua sponte enjoining future filing under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) | denying a petitioner’s re- quest to proceed in forma pauperis due to voluminous and abusive filing history | denying informa pauperis application of “a notorious abuser of this Court’s certiorari process,” who had filed 11 petitions which were frivolous, with the arguable exception of one | denying informa pauperis application of “a notorious abuser of this Court’s certiorari process,” who had filed 11 petitions which were frivolous, with the arguable exception of one | denying informa pauperis application of “a notorious abuser of this Court’s certiorari process,” who had filed 11 petitions which were frivolous, with the arguable exception of one | recognizing the court's inherent authority to sanction vexatious litigants | recognizing a court's inherent authority to sanction vexatious litigants | denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis based on history of frivolous filing | sanctioning a petitioner for fil- ing a frivolous petition for certiorari because the petitioner had filed ten frivolous petitions in one year, and the Court had previously warned him that “[f]uture similar filings” would “merit additional measures.” | sanctioning a petitioner for fil- ing a frivolous petition for certiorari because the petitioner had filed ten frivolous petitions in one year, and the Court had previously warned him that “[f]uture similar filings” would “merit additional measures.” | sanctioning a petitioner for fil- ing a frivolous petition for certiorari because the petitioner had filed ten frivolous petitions in one year, and the Court had previously warned him that “[f]uture similar filings” would “merit additional measures.” | sanctioning a petitioner for fil- ing a frivolous petition for certiorari because the petitioner had filed ten frivolous petitions in one year, and the Court had previously warned him that “[f]uture similar filings” would “merit additional measures.” | “A district court has power . . . to enjoin litigants who abuse the court system by harassing their opponents” | inaugurat- ing the Supreme Court’s current practice of requiring pestiferous litigants to prepay all fees and print their petitions for certiorari | “permission to 2 proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of privilege and not right; denial of in forma pauperis 3 status does not violate the applicant’s right to due process” | “permission to 2 proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of privilege and not right; denial of in forma pauperis 3 status does not violate the applicant’s right to due process” | “permission to 2 proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of privilege and not right; denial of in forma pauperis 3 status does not violate the applicant’s right to due process” | first citing Denton v. Hernandez, 505 U.S. 25, 33–34 (1992 | imposing filing restrictions for frivolous requests for relief | extending to petitions for certiorari

Citator

Cited by
530 opinions
MARTIN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS,506 U.S. 1(1992)
MARTINv. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
ON MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
No. 92-5584
Decided November 2, 1992fn*
PER CURIAM.
Pro sepetitioner James L. Martin requests leave to proceedin formapauperisunder Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to our Rule 39.8. Martin is allowed until November 23, 1992, withinPage 2which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Martin in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.

Martin is a notorious abuser of this Court's certiorari process. We first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Martinin forma pauperisstatus last November. SeeZatkov.California,502 U.S. 16(1991) (per curiam). At that time, we noted that Martin had filed 45 petitions in the past 10 years, and 15 in the preceding 2 years alone. Although Martin was grantedin forma pauperisstatus to file these petitions, all of these petitions were denied without recorded dissent. In invoking Rule 39.8, we observed that Martin is "unique — not merely among those who seek to filein forma pauperis, but also among those who have paid the required filing fees — because he has repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court's limited resources."Id. at 18. Unfortunately, Martin has continued in his accustomed ways.

Since we first denied himin forma pauperisstatus last year, he has filed nine petitions for certiorari with this Court. We denied Martin leave to proceedin forma pauperisunder Rule 39.8 of this Court with respect to four of these petitions,1and denied the remaining five petitions outright.2Two additional petitions for certiorari are before us today, bringing the total number of petitions Martin hasPage 3filed in the past year to 11. With the arguable exception of one of these petitions, seeMartinv.Knox,502 U.S. 999(1991) (STEVENS J., joined by BLACKMUN J., respecting in denial of certiorari), all of Martin's filings, including those before us today, have been demonstrably frivolous.

InZatko, we warned that "[f]uture similar filings from [Martin] will merit additional measures."502 U.S. at 18. As we have recognized, "[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice."In re McDonald,489 U.S. 180,184(1989) (per curiam). Consideration of Martin's repetitious and frivolous petitions for certiorari does not promote this end.

We have entered orders similar to the present one on two previous occasions to preventpro sepetitioners from filing repetitious and frivolous requests for extraordinary relief. SeeIn re Sindram,498 U.S. 177(1991)(per curiam); Inre McDonald, supra. Although this case does not involve abuse of an extraordinary writ, but rather the writ of certiorari, Martin's pattern of abuse has had a similarly deleterious effect on this Court's "fair allocation of judicial resources." SeeIn re Sindram,supra, at 180. As a result, the same concerns which led us to enter the orders barring prospective filings inSindramandMcDonaldrequire such action here.

We regret the necessity of taking this step, but Martin's refusal to heed our earlier warning leaves us no choice. His abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will therefore not prevent Martin from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. But it will free this Court's limited resources to consider thePage 4claims of those petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.
In my opinion, the judicial resources of the Court could be used more effectively by simply denying Martin's petitions than by drafting, entering, and policing the order the Court enters today. The theoretical administrative benefit the Court may derive from an order of this kind is far outweighed by the shadow it casts on the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court's history prior to its unprecedented decisions inIn re McDonald,489 U.S. 180(1989) (per curiam), andIn re Sindram,498 U.S. 177(1991) (per curiam). I continue to adhere to the views expressed in the dissenting opinions filed in those cases, and in the dissenting opinion I filed inZatkoCalifornia,502 U.S. 16,18(1991) (per curiam). See alsoTalaminiv.Allstate Ins. Co.,470 U.S. 1067(1985),appeal dism'd(STEVENS J., concurring).Page 5
  1. Together with No. 92-5618,Martin v. McDermott et al.,also on motion of petitioner for leave to proceedin forma pauperis. ↩
  2. Page 2Martinv.Smith,post, p. 810;Martinv.Delaware,post, p. 810;Martinv.Sparks,post, p. 810;Martinv.Delaware,505 U.S. 1203(1992). ↩
  3. Page 2Martinv.Delaware Law School of Widener Univ., Inc.,post, p. 841;Martinv.Delaware, post, p. 886;Martinv.Knox,502 U.S. 999(1991);Martinv.Knox,502 U.S. 1015(1991);Martinv.MedicalCenter of Delaware,502 U.S. 991(1991). ↩