Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Lynde v. Lynde; Lynde v. Lynde
Lynde v. Lynde; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1900)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1900-11-05
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- alimony award for a fixed sum already due held recoverable in a federal court of another state, while future alimony not recoverable in federal court
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Lynde v. Lynde; Lynde v. Lynde. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 110 opinions
Headnotes
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Full Faith and Credit — Scope of Review Where the highest court of a State gives full faith and credit to a sister-State decree for alimony, its judgment deciding in favor of the credit claimed under the Constitution and laws of the United States presents no question reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error; review lies only where such credit has been denied. 181 U.S. 183 (opinion of Gray, J.)
- Constitutional Law — Due Process A defendant who has appeared generally and been heard in a proceeding for alimony cannot complain that he was deprived of his property without due process of law; and where he made no such objection in the state courts, the contention affords no basis for review. 181 U.S. 183
- Civil Procedure — Sister-State Judgments — Nature and Effect Under the constitutional and statutory command of full faith and credit, a judgment of a sister State is made a debt of record not examinable upon its merits, but it does not carry into another State the efficacy of a judgment upon property or persons to be enforced by execution; to give it the force of a judgment in another State, it must be made a judgment there, and can be executed only as the laws of the latter State permit. 181 U.S. 183 (quoting McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325)
- Civil Procedure — Finality — Alimony Decrees A decree awarding alimony in futuro, being subject to the discretion of the court that entered it and liable to alteration at any time, is not a final judgment for a fixed sum and will not support enforcement in a sister State, whereas a decree for a fixed sum of alimony already due may be enforced. 181 U.S. 183
- Civil Procedure — Enforcement — Equitable Remedies Provisions of an alimony decree for a bond, sequestration, a receiver, and an injunction are in the nature of execution rather than judgment and can have no extraterritorial operation; a sister State's action in granting such remedies depends on its own local statutes and practice and involves no Federal question. 181 U.S. 183
LYNDEv. LYNDE,181 U.S. 183(1901)
21 S.Ct. 555
LYNDEv. LYNDE.
LYNDEv. LYNDE.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
Nos. 305, 369.
Submitted November 5, 1900.
Decided April 15, 1901.
THIS was an action brought May 26, 1898, in the Supreme Court
for the county and State of New York, on a decree of the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey of December 28, 1897, by which it was
ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the
defendant the sum of $7840 for alimony at the rate of $80 per
week from February 11, 1896, to the date of the decree, and the
further sum of $80 per week permanent alimony from the date of
the decree, the said weekly payments to be valid liens on the
defendant's real estate; that the defendant give bond to the
plaintiff in the sum of $10,000 to secure the
Page 184
payment of the sums of money directed to be paid; and to pay
costs, taxed at $136.07, and a counsel fee of $1000; and that on
his default to pay any of the "foregoing sums of money" or to
give bond, application might be made for the issue of a writ of
sequestration against him, or for an order appointing a receiver
of his property, and enjoining his transfer thereof. The record
showed the following material facts:
On November 18, 1892, the plaintiff in this action filed her
bill for a divorce in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey,
setting forth her marriage with the present defendant on March
25, 1884, in New Jersey, where she has since resided; and praying
for a divorce from the bond of matrimony for desertion for two
years, and for reasonable alimony. The defendant was not served
with process other than by publication, and did not appear or
answer the bill. On August 7, 1893, a decree of divorce was
entered, not mentioning alimony.
On February 10, 1896, the plaintiff, alleging that this decree
was incomplete through the neglect of her counsel, filed a
petition in that court, praying for an opening and amendment of
the decree by allowing reasonable alimony. Upon this petition, a
rule to show cause was entered, and it was ordered that copies of
the petition and affidavits accompanying it be served on the
defendant.
In answer to the rule, the defendant appeared generally, and
filed an affidavit, declaring that he was a resident of New York,
"that this defendant was by the decree of this court divorced
from said petitioner" on August 7, 1893, "and since that time has
been married again to another woman," "that the decree for
divorce in said cause was purposely drawn without providing for
or reserving any alimony;" and "that he is financially unable to
pay alimony."
On October 26, 1896, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey
amended the decree of August 7, 1893, by ordering that the
petitioner "have the right to apply to this court at any time
hereafter, at the foot of this decree, for reasonable alimony,
and for such other relief in the premises touching alimony as may
be equitable and just; and this court reserves the power to make
such order or decree as may be necessary to allow and
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compel the payment of alimony to the petitioner by defendant, or
to refuse to allow alimony." 6 Dickinson (54 N.J. Eq.) 473. On
appeal this order was affirmed by the New Jersey Court of Errors
and Appeals. 10 Dickinson (55 N.J. Eq.) 591. Thereupon an order
of reference, based on all prior proceedings, and on notice to
the solicitor for the defendant, was made by the Court of
Chancery to a master to find the amount of alimony, if any, due
to the plaintiff. Neither the defendant nor his solicitor
appeared at the hearing before the master; and on December 28,
1897, the Court of Chancery, confirming the master's report, made
the decree now sued on.
That court, on its being made to appear that a certified copy
of this decree was personally served on the defendant, and that
he refused to comply with said decree, ordered that a receiver be
appointed to take possession of all the defendant's real and
personal property in New Jersey to apply it to the payment of the
plaintiff's claim. The receiver, however, was "unable to obtain
possession of any property or assets of said defendant in the
State of New Jersey;" nor had the defendant "complied with said
decree in any respect."
The Supreme Court of New York decreed that the plaintiff was
"entitled to a judgment against the defendant, enforcing against
said defendant the decree of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey,
dated December 28, 1897," and the order appointing a receiver,
and enjoining the defendant from transferring his property; also
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment that the defendant
pay her $8976.07, "being alimony, counsel fee and costs, due
under said decree," and interest thereon from its date; also the
"sum of $4400, being the amount of weekly alimony which has
accrued since said decree in accordance with the terms thereof,"
and interest thereon; also $80 a week from the date of this
decision "as and for permanent alimony," bearing interest until
paid; that he give bond" in the sum of $100,000 to secure payment
of the several sums of money aforesaid;" and that, if the
defendant fail to comply with this decision, "a receiver be
appointed, ancillary to the receiver heretofore appointed by the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey
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as aforesaid, of the real and personal property of the defendant
within the State of New York."
On appeal by the defendant to the Appellate Division, the
decree was modified so as to allow the plaintiff to recover only
$8840 alimony, the amount declared by the New Jersey court as due
and payable at the date of its decree. Thus modified, the
judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed.41 A.D. 280.
From the judgment of the Appellate Division both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of
the Appellate Division.162 N.Y. 405. Each party sued out a writ
of error from this court.
By the Constitution and the act of Congress, requiring the faith and credit to be given to a judgment of the court of anotherPage 187State that it has in the State where it was rendered, it was long ago declared by this court: "The judgment is made a debt of record, not examinable upon its merits; but it does not carry with it, into another State, the efficacy of a judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by execution. To give it the force of a judgment in another State, it must be made a judgment there; and can only be executed in the latter as its laws may permit."McElmoylev.Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325;Thompsonv.Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 463;Wisconsinv.Pelican Ins. Co.,127 U.S. 265,292;Bullockv.Bullock, 6 Dickinson (51 N.J. Eq.) 444, and 7 Dickinson (52 N.J. Eq.) 561.
The decree of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, on which this suit is brought, provides, first, for the payment of $7840 for alimony already due, and $1000 counsel fee; second, for the payment of alimony since the date of the decree at the rate of $80 per week; and third, for the giving of a bond to secure the payment of these sums, and, on default of payment or of giving bond, for leave to apply for a writ of sequestration, or a receiver and injunction.
The decree for the payment of $8840 was for a fixed sum already due, and the judgment of the court below was properly restricted to that. The provision of the payment for alimony in the future was subject to the discretion of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, which might at any time alter it, and was not a final judgment for a fixed sum. The provisions for bond, sequestration, receiver and injunction, being in the nature of execution, and not of judgment, could have no extra-territorial operation; but the action of the courts of New York in these respects depended on the local statutes and practice of the State, and involved no Federal question.
On the writ of error of the wife, therefore,The judgment is affirmed.Page 188