Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley

Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1908-11-16
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that federal issues interposed as a defense generally do not create a cause of action “arising under” federal law
  • holding that complaint may not invoke federal jurisdiction by embodying a reply to an anticipated federal defense
  • holding that subject-matter jurisdiction must exist in the plaintiffs original cause of action, regardless of the likelihood that a federal question will arise in the course of litigation
  • holding that “plaintiffs statement of his own cause of action” is what determines jurisdiction
  • holding that subject-matter jurisdiction must exist in the plaintiff's original cause of action, regardless of the likelihood that a federal question will arise during litigation
  • holding that anticipation of a federal defense may not be used to invoke this court’s general federal question jurisdiction
  • holding that federal question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is necessarily raised on the face of a well-pleaded complaint
  • holding that a federal question must appear in “the plaintiffs statement of his own cause of action” rather than “some anticipated defense to his cause of action”

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
1822 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States is defined and limited by statute, and a federal court must, on its own motion and even where neither party questions it, ensure that its jurisdiction is not exceeded.
  2. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Federal Question Jurisdiction A suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, so as to confer federal question jurisdiction on a circuit court, only when the plaintiff's own statement of his cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.
  3. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Federal Question Jurisdiction Federal question jurisdiction cannot be based on an anticipated defense that the defendant may set up and that the plaintiff alleges to be invalid under the Constitution or laws of the United States; allegations that a federal question will likely arise in the course of litigation do not establish that the plaintiff's original cause of action arises under the Constitution.
  4. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Pleading — Statement of Cause of Action A plaintiff must in the first instance confine his pleading to a statement of his own cause of action, leaving to the defendant to plead his defenses by answer; the plaintiff's assertion of and reply to defenses the defendant has not yet pleaded is inconsistent with pleading rules and cannot confer federal jurisdiction.
  5. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Federal Question Jurisdiction Where the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the suit did not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States and there was no diversity of citizenship, the proper practice is to reverse the judgment and remand the case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction.
LOUISVILLE NASHVILLE R.R.v. MOTTLEY,211 U.S. 149(1908)
29 S.Ct. 42
LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANYv. MOTTLEY.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF KENTUCKY.
No. 37.
Argued October 13, 1908.
Decided November 16, 1908.
The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is defined and limited by statute; and, even if not questioned by either party, this court will, of its own motion, see to it that such jurisdiction is not exceeded. A suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, so as to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction on that ground, only when plaintiff's statement of his own cause is based thereon; that jurisdiction cannot be based on an alleged anticipated defense which mayPage 150be set up and which is invalid under some law, or provision, of the Constitution of the United States. The Circuit Court has no jurisdiction, in the absence of diverse citizenship, of a suit brought against a railroad corporation to enforce an alleged contract for an annual pass because, as stated in the bill, the refusal is based solely on the anti-pass provisions of the Hepburn Interstate Commerce Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591,34 Stat. 584. The practice in such cases is to reverse the judgment and remit the case to the Circuit Court with instructions to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction.
THE appellees (husband and wife), being residents and citizens
of Kentucky, brought this suit in equity in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Western District of Kentucky against
the appellant, a railroad company and a citizen of the same
State. The object of the suit was to compel the specific
performance of the following contract:
"Louisville, Ky., Oct.2d 1871.
"The Louisville Nashville Railroad Company in consideration
that E.L. Mottley and wife, Annie E. Mottley, have this day
released Company from all damages or claims for damages for
injuries received by them on the 7th of September, 1871, in
consequence of a collision of trains on the railroad of said
Company at Randolph's Station, Jefferson County, Ky., hereby
agrees to issue free passes on said Railroad and branches now
existing or to exist, to said E.L. Annie E. Mottley for the
remainder of the present year, and thereafter, to renew said
passes annually during the lives of said Mottley and wife or
either of them."
The bill alleged that in September, 1871, plaintiffs, while
passengers upon the defendant railroad, were injured by the
defendant's negligence, and released their respective claims for
damages in consideration of the agreement for transportation
during their lives, expressed in the contract. It is alleged that
the contract was performed by the defendant up to January 1,
1907, when the defendant declined to renew the passes. The bill
then alleges that the refusal to comply with the contract
Page 151
was based solely upon that part of the act of Congress of June
29, 1906,34 Stat. 584, which forbids the giving of free passes
or free transportation. The bill further alleges: First, that the
act of Congress referred to does not prohibit the giving of
passes under the circumstances of this case; and, second, that if
the law is to be construed as prohibiting such passes, it is in
conflict with the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, because it
deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due process of
law. The defendant demurred to the bill. The judge of the Circuit
Court overruled the demurrer, entered a decree for the relief
prayed for, and the defendant appealed directly to this court.
Mr. Henry Lane Stonefor appellant.Mr. Lewis McQuownandMr. Clarence U. McElroyfor appellees.

By leave of court,Mr. L.A. Shaver, in behalf of The Interstate Commerce Commission, submitted a brief asamicuscurioe.
MR. JUSTICE MOODY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
Two questions of law were raised by the demurrer to the bill, were brought here by appeal, and have been argued before us. They are, first, whether that part of the act of Congress of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 584), which forbids the giving of free passes or the collection of any different compensation for transportation of passengers than that specified in the tariff filed, makes it unlawful to perform a contract for transportation of persons, who in good faith, before the passage of the act, had accepted such contract in satisfaction of a valid cause of action against the railroad; and, second, whether the statute, if it should be construed to render such a contract unlawful, is inPage 152violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. We do not deem it necessary, however, to consider either of these questions, because, in our opinion, the court below was without jurisdiction of the cause. Neither party has questioned that jurisdiction, but it is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded. This duty we have frequently performed of our own motion.Mansfield, c.Railway Companyv.Swan,111 U.S. 379,382;King BridgeCompanyv.Otoe County,120 U.S. 225;Blacklockv.Small,127 U.S. 96,105;Cameronv.Hodges,127 U.S. 322,326;Metcalfv.Watertown,128 U.S. 586,587;ContinentalNational Bankv.Buford,191 U.S. 119.

There was no diversity of citizenship and it is not and cannot be suggested that there was any ground of jurisdiction, except that the case was a "suit . . . arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866,25 Stat. 433, 434. It is the settled interpretation of these words, as used in this statute, conferring jurisdiction, that a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although such allegations show that very likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the Constitution. InTennesseev.Union Planters' Bank,152 U.S. 454, the plaintiff, the State of Tennessee, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States to recover from the defendant certain taxes alleged to be due under the laws of the State. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant claimed an immunity from the taxation by virtue of its charter, and that therefore the tax was void, because in violation of the provision of the Constitution of the UnitedPage 153States, which forbids any State from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts. The cause was held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the court saying, by Mr. Justice Gray (p. 464), "a suggestion of one party, that the other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or those laws." Again, inBoston MontanaConsolidated Copper Silver Mining Companyv.Montana OrePurchasing Company,188 U.S. 632, the plaintiff brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the conversion of copper ore and for an injunction against its continuance. The plaintiff then alleged, for the purpose of showing jurisdiction, in substance, that the defendant would set up in defense certain laws of the United States. The cause was held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the court saying, by Mr. Justice Peckham (pp. 638, 639).

"It would be wholly unnecessary and improper in order to prove complainant's cause of action to go into any matters of defence which the defendants might possibly set up and then attempt to reply to such defence, and thus, if possible, to show that a Federal question might or probably would arise in the course of the trial of the case. To allege such defence and then make an answer to it before the defendant has the opportunity to itself plead or prove its own defence is inconsistent with any known rule of pleading so far as we are aware, and is improper.

"The rule is a reasonable and just one that the complainant in the first instance shall be confined to a statement of its cause of action, leaving to the defendant to set up in his answer what his defence is and, if anything more than a denial of complainant's cause of action, imposing upon the defendant the burden of proving such defence.

"Conforming itself to that rule the complainant would not, in the assertion or proof of its cause of action, bring up a single Federal question. The presentation of its cause of action would not show that it was one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.Page 154

"The only way in which it might be claimed that a Federal question was presented would be in the complainant's statement of what the defence of defendants would be and complainant's answer to such defence. Under these circumstances the case is brought within the rule laid down inTennesseev.Union Planters'Bank,152 U.S. 454. That case has been cited and approved many times since, . . ."

The interpretation of the act which we have stated was first announced inMetcalfv.Watertown,128 U.S. 586, and has since been repeated and applied inColorado Central ConsolidatedMining Companyv.Turck,150 U.S. 138,142;Tennesseev.Union Planters' Bank,152 U.S. 454,459;Chappellv.Waterworth,155 U.S. 102,107;Postal Telegraph Cable Companyv.Alabama,155 U.S. 482,487;Oregon Short Line UtahNorthern Railway Companyv.Skottowe,162 U.S. 490,494;Walkerv.Collins,167 U.S. 57,59;Musev.ArlingtonHotel Company,168 U.S. 430,436;Galveston c. Railwayv.Texas,170 U.S. 226,236;Third Street Suburban RailwayCompanyv.Lewis,173 U.S. 457,460;Florida CentralPeninsular Railroad Companyv.Bell,176 U.S. 321,327;Houston Texas Central Railroad Companyv.Texas,177 U.S. 66,78;Arkansasv.Kansas Texas Coal Company SanFrancisco Railroad,183 U.S. 185,188;Vicksburg WaterworksCompanyv.Vicksburg,185 U.S. 65,68;Boston MontanaConsolidated Copper Silver Mining Companyv.Montana OrePurchasing Company,188 U.S. 632,639;Minnesotav.NorthernSecurities Company,194 U.S. 48,63;Joyv.City of St.Louis,201 U.S. 332,340;Devinev.Los Angeles,202 U.S. 313,334. The application of this rule to the case at bar is decisive against the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

It is ordered that theJudgment be reversed and the case remitted to the CircuitCourt with instructions to dismiss the suit for want ofjurisdiction.Page 155