Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 29 S. Ct. 42 (1908)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1908-11-16
- Topic
- general
holding that federal issues interposed as a defense generally do not create a cause of action “arising under” federal law | holding that complaint may not invoke federal jurisdiction by embodying a reply to an anticipated federal defense | holding that subject-matter jurisdiction must exist in the plaintiffs original cause of action, regardless of the likelihood that a federal question will arise in the course of litigation | holding that “plaintiffs statement of his own cause of action” is what determines jurisdiction | holding that subject-matter jurisdiction must exist in the plaintiff's original cause of action, regardless of the likelihood that a federal question will arise during litigation | holding that anticipation of a federal defense may not be used to invoke this court’s general federal question jurisdiction | holding that federal question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is necessarily raised on the face of a well-pleaded complaint | holding that a federal question must appear in “the plaintiffs statement of his own cause of action” rather than “some anticipated defense to his cause of action” | holding that a cause of 18 action does not “arise under” under federal law because of an anticipated federal defense, in the 19 context of federal question jurisdiction | holding that subject-matter jurisdiction must exist in the plaintiff's original cause of action, regardless of the likelihood that a federal question will arise in the course of litigation | holding that subject-matter jurisdiction must exist in the plaintiff’s original cause of action, regardless of the likelihood that a federal question will arise in the course of litigation | holding that a plaintiff seeking to enforce a contract could not create federal question jurisdiction by alleging that a federal statute, which might invalidate the contract, was unconstitutional | holding that “plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action” is what determines jurisdiction | holding that federal jurisdiction must arise from the face of a well-pleaded complaint | holding a federal law defense to a state law claim does not confer federal question jurisdiction | noting that it is the duty of a federal court to ensure 23 that its jurisdiction granted by statute is not exceeded | noting that it is the duty of a 11 federal court to ensure that its jurisdiction granted by statute is not exceeded | noting that it is the duty of a federal court to ensure 4 that its jurisdiction granted by statute is not exceeded | noting that courts must “see to it” that the boundaries of jurisdiction are not exceeded | noting that courts have a duty to ensure that "jurisdiction ... defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded" | stating that Plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action must show that it is based upon [federal law] | noting that it is the duty of a federal court to ensure that its jurisdiction granted by statute 20 is not exceeded | noting that the question of jurisdiction may be raised on the court’s own motion | explaining that a federal question exists only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon the Constitution or laws of the United States | announcing the “well-pleaded complaint” rule: plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by presenting only state law claims, even if defense raises federal question | ordering case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction despite absence of objection from either party to trial court’s previous adjudication of merits | observing that “a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon” federal law | establishing the well-pleaded complaint rule by which jurisdiction under the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is determined by reference to the plaintiffs complaint alone | denying federal jurisdiction where the “Federal question” was m
Citator
- Cited by
- 858 opinions
By leave of court,Mr. L.A. Shaver, in behalf of The Interstate Commerce Commission, submitted a brief asamicuscurioe.
There was no diversity of citizenship and it is not and cannot be suggested that there was any ground of jurisdiction, except that the case was a "suit . . . arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866,25 Stat. 433, 434. It is the settled interpretation of these words, as used in this statute, conferring jurisdiction, that a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although such allegations show that very likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the Constitution. InTennesseev.Union Planters' Bank,152 U.S. 454, the plaintiff, the State of Tennessee, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States to recover from the defendant certain taxes alleged to be due under the laws of the State. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant claimed an immunity from the taxation by virtue of its charter, and that therefore the tax was void, because in violation of the provision of the Constitution of the UnitedPage 153States, which forbids any State from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts. The cause was held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the court saying, by Mr. Justice Gray (p. 464), "a suggestion of one party, that the other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or those laws." Again, inBoston MontanaConsolidated Copper Silver Mining Companyv.Montana OrePurchasing Company,188 U.S. 632, the plaintiff brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the conversion of copper ore and for an injunction against its continuance. The plaintiff then alleged, for the purpose of showing jurisdiction, in substance, that the defendant would set up in defense certain laws of the United States. The cause was held to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the court saying, by Mr. Justice Peckham (pp. 638, 639).
"It would be wholly unnecessary and improper in order to prove complainant's cause of action to go into any matters of defence which the defendants might possibly set up and then attempt to reply to such defence, and thus, if possible, to show that a Federal question might or probably would arise in the course of the trial of the case. To allege such defence and then make an answer to it before the defendant has the opportunity to itself plead or prove its own defence is inconsistent with any known rule of pleading so far as we are aware, and is improper.
"The rule is a reasonable and just one that the complainant in the first instance shall be confined to a statement of its cause of action, leaving to the defendant to set up in his answer what his defence is and, if anything more than a denial of complainant's cause of action, imposing upon the defendant the burden of proving such defence.
"Conforming itself to that rule the complainant would not, in the assertion or proof of its cause of action, bring up a single Federal question. The presentation of its cause of action would not show that it was one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.Page 154
"The only way in which it might be claimed that a Federal question was presented would be in the complainant's statement of what the defence of defendants would be and complainant's answer to such defence. Under these circumstances the case is brought within the rule laid down inTennesseev.Union Planters'Bank,152 U.S. 454. That case has been cited and approved many times since, . . ."
The interpretation of the act which we have stated was first announced inMetcalfv.Watertown,128 U.S. 586, and has since been repeated and applied inColorado Central ConsolidatedMining Companyv.Turck,150 U.S. 138,142;Tennesseev.Union Planters' Bank,152 U.S. 454,459;Chappellv.Waterworth,155 U.S. 102,107;Postal Telegraph Cable Companyv.Alabama,155 U.S. 482,487;Oregon Short Line UtahNorthern Railway Companyv.Skottowe,162 U.S. 490,494;Walkerv.Collins,167 U.S. 57,59;Musev.ArlingtonHotel Company,168 U.S. 430,436;Galveston c. Railwayv.Texas,170 U.S. 226,236;Third Street Suburban RailwayCompanyv.Lewis,173 U.S. 457,460;Florida CentralPeninsular Railroad Companyv.Bell,176 U.S. 321,327;Houston Texas Central Railroad Companyv.Texas,177 U.S. 66,78;Arkansasv.Kansas Texas Coal Company SanFrancisco Railroad,183 U.S. 185,188;Vicksburg WaterworksCompanyv.Vicksburg,185 U.S. 65,68;Boston MontanaConsolidated Copper Silver Mining Companyv.Montana OrePurchasing Company,188 U.S. 632,639;Minnesotav.NorthernSecurities Company,194 U.S. 48,63;Joyv.City of St.Louis,201 U.S. 332,340;Devinev.Los Angeles,202 U.S. 313,334. The application of this rule to the case at bar is decisive against the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.
It is ordered that theJudgment be reversed and the case remitted to the CircuitCourt with instructions to dismiss the suit for want ofjurisdiction.Page 155