Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
23 S. Ct. 216
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1903-01-05
- Topic
- general
stating that “Congress possess[es] paramount power over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests” | holding that Congress could terminate a reservation unilaterally | validating congressional allotment in conflict with treaty between the United States and Kiowa and Comanche Tribes | upholding statute ceding Indian land without tribe’s consent and in abrogation of treaty | “When ⅛ * * treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Congress.” | “Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government” | “Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government” | “Congress possesse[s] a paramount power over the property of the Indians” | “Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.” | “It is to be pre‐ sumed that in this matter the United States would be gov‐ erned by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and de‐ pendent race.” | “It is to be pre‐ sumed that in this matter the United States would be gov‐ erned by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and de‐ pendent race.” | “Congress possesse[s] a paramount power over the property of the Indians” | “Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the. government.” | relying on Kaga-ma’s race-based plenary power theory | relying on Kagama’s race-based plenary power theory | relying on Kagama’s race-based plenary power theory
Citator
- Cited by
- 243 opinions
LONE WOLFv. HITCHCOCK,187 U.S. 553(1903)
23 S.Ct. 216
LONE WOLFv. HITCHCOCK.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 275.
Argued October 23, 1902.
Decided January 5, 1903.
IN 1867 a treaty was concluded with the Kiowa and Comanche
tribes of Indians, and such other friendly tribes as might be
united with them, setting apart a reservation for the use of such
Indians. By a separate treaty the Apache tribe of Indians was
incorporated with the two former-named, and became entitled to
share in the benefits of the reservation.15 Stat. 581, 589.
The first named treaty is usually called the Medicine Lodge
treaty. By the sixth article thereof it was provided that heads
of families might select a tract of land within the reservation,
not exceeding 320 acres in extent, which should thereafter cease
to be held in common, and should be for the exclusive possession
of the Indian making the selection, so long as he or his family
might continue to cultivate the land. The twelfth article of the
treaty was as follows:
"Article 12. No treaty for the cession of any portion or part
of the reservation herein described, which may be held in common,
shall be of any validity or force as against the said Indians,
unless executed and signed by at least three fourths of all the
adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession by the
tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to
deprive, without his consent, any individual member of the tribe
of his rights to any tract of land selected by him as provided in
article III (VI) of this treaty."
The three tribes settled under the treaties upon the described
land. On October 6, 1892, 456 male adult members of the
confederated tribes signed, with three commissioners representing
the United States, an agreement concerning the reservation. The
Indian agent, in a certificate appended to the agreement,
represented that there were then 562 male adults in the three
tribes. Senate Ex. Doc. No. 27, 52d Congress, second session,
Page 555
page 17. Four hundred and fifty-six male adults therefore
constituted more than three fourths of the certified number of
total male adults in the three tribes. In form the agreement was
a proposed treaty, the terms of which, in substance, provided for
a surrender to the United States of the rights of the tribes in
the reservation, for allotments out of such lands to the Indians
in severally, the fee simple title to be conveyed to the
allottees or their heirs after the expiration of twenty-five
years; and the payment or setting apart for the benefit of the
tribes of two million dollars as the consideration for the
surplus of land over and above the allotments which might be made
to the Indians. It was provided that sundry named friends of the
Indians (among such persons being the Indian agent and an army
officer) "should each be entitled to all the benefits, in land
only, conferred under this agreement, the same as if members of
said tribes." Eliminating 350,000 acres of mountainous land, the
quantity of surplus lands, suitable for farming and grazing
purposes was estimated at 2,150,000 acres. Concerning the payment
to be made for these surplus lands, the commission, in their
report to the President announcing the termination of the
negotiations, said (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 17, second session, 52d
Congress):
"In this connection it is proper to add that the commission
agreed with the Indians to incorporate the following in their
report, which is now done:
"The Indians upon this reservation seem to believe (but
whether from an exercise of their own judgment or from the advice
of others the commission cannot determine) that their surplus
land is worth two and one half million dollars, and Congress may
be induced to give them that much for it. Therefore, in
compliance with their request, we report that they desire to be
heard through an attorney and a delegation to Washington upon
that question, the agreement signed, however, to be effective
upon ratification, no matter what Congress may do with their
appeal for the extra half million dollars."
In transmitting the agreement to the Secretary of the
Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs said:
"The price paid, while considerably in excess of that paid
Page 556
to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, seems to be fair and reasonable,
both to the government and the Indians, the land being doubtless
of better quality than that in the Cheyenne and Arapahoe
reservation."
Attention was directed to the provision in the agreement in
favor of the Indian agent and an army officer, and it was
suggested that to permit them to avail thereof would establish a
bad precedent.
Soon after the signing of the foregoing agreement it was
claimed by the Indians that their assent had been obtained by
fraudulent misrepresentations of its terms by the interpreters,
and it was asserted that the agreement should not be held binding
upon the tribes because three fourths of the adult male members
had not assented thereto, as was required by the twelfth
article of the Medicine Lodge treaty.
Obviously, in consequence of the policy embodied in section
2079 of the Revised Statutes, departing from the former custom of
dealing with Indian affairs by treaty and providing for
legislative action on such subjects, various bills were
introduced in both Houses of Congress designed to give legal
effect to the agreement made by the Indians in 1892. These bills
were referred to the proper committees, and before such
committees the Indians presented their objections to the
propriety of giving effect to the agreement. (H.R. Doc. No. 431,
55th Congress, second session.) In 1898 the Committee on Indian
Affairs of the House of Representatives unanimously reported a
bill for the execution of the agreement made with the Indians.
The report of the committee recited that a favorable conclusion
had been reached by the committee "after the fullest hearings
from delegations of the Indian tribes and all parties at
interest." (H.R. Doc. No. 419, first session, 56th Congress, p. 5.)
The bill thus reported did not exactly conform to the
agreement as signed by the Indians. It modified the agreement by
changing the time for making the allotments, and it also provided
that the proceeds of the surplus lands remaining after allotments
to the Indians should be held to await the judicial decision of a
claim asserted by the Choctaw and Chickasaw
Page 557
tribes of Indians to the surplus lands. This claim was based upon
a treaty made in 1866, by which the two tribes ceded the
reservation in question, it being contended that the lands were
impressed with a trust in favor of the ceding tribes, and that
whenever the reservation was abandoned, so much of it as was not
allotted to the confederated Indians of the Comanche, Kiowa and
Apache tribes reverted to the Choctaws and Chickasaws.
The bill just referred to passed the House of Representatives
on May 16, 1898. (31st Cong. Rec. p. 4947.) When the bill reached
the Senate that body, on January 25, 1899, adopted a resolution
calling upon the Secretary of the Interior for information as to
whether the signatures attached to the agreement comprised three
fourths of the male adults of the tribes. In response the
Secretary of the Interior informed the Senate, under date of
January 28, 1899, that the records of the department "failed to
show a census of these Indians for the year 1892," but that "from
a roll used in making a payment to them in January and February,
1893, it appeared that there were 725 males over eighteen years
of age, of whom 639 were twenty-one years and over." The
Secretary further called attention to the fact that by the
agreement of 1892 a right of selection was conferred upon each
member of the tribes over eighteen years of age, and observed:
"If 18 years and over be held to be the legal age of those who
were authorized to sign the agreement, the number of persons who
actually signed was 87 less than three fourths of the adult male
membership of the tribes; and if 21 years be held to be the
minimum age, then 23 less than three fourths signed the
agreement. In either event, less than three fourths of the male
adults appear to have so signed."
With this information before it the bill was favorably
reported by the Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate, but
did not pass that body.
At the first session of the following Congress (the
Fifty-sixth) bills were introduced in both the Senate and House
of Representatives substantially like that which has just been
noticed. (Senate, 1352; H.R. 905.)
Page 558
In the meanwhile, about October, 1899, the Indians had, at a
general council at which 571 male adults of the tribes purported
to be present, protested against the execution of the provisions
of the agreement of 1892, and adopted a memorial to Congress,
praying that that body should not give effect to the agreement.
This memorial was forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior by
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with lengthy comments,
pointing out the fact that the Indians claimed that their
signatures to the agreement had been procured by fraud and that
the legal number of Indians had not signed the agreement, and
that the previous bills and bills then pending contemplated
modification of the agreement in important particulars without
the consent of the Indians. This communication from the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, together with the memorial of the
Indians, were transmitted by the Secretary of the Interior to
Congress. (Senate Doc. No. 76; H.R. Doc. No. 333; first session,
Fifty-sixth Congress.) Attention was called to the fact that
although by the agreement of October 6, 1892, one half of each
allotment was contemplated to be agricultural land, there was
only sufficient agricultural land in the entire reservation to
average thirty acres per Indian. After setting out the charges of
fraud and complaints respecting the proposed amendments designed
to be made to the agreement, as above stated, particular
complaint was made of the provision in the agreement of 1892 as
to allotments in severally among the Indians of lands for
agricultural purposes. After reciting that the tribal lands were
not adapted to such purposes, but were suitable for grazing, the
memorial proceeded as follows:
"We submit that the provision for lands to be allotted to us
under this treaty are insufficient, because it is evident we
cannot, on account of the climate of our section, which renders
the maturity of crops uncertain, become a successful farming
community; that we, or whoever else occupies these lands, will
have to depend upon the cattle industry for revenue and support.
And we therefore pray, if we cannot be granted the privilege of
keeping our reservation under the treaty made with us in 1868,
and known as the Medicine Lodge treaty, that authority
Page 559
be granted for the consideration of a new treaty that will make
the allowance of land to be allotted to us sufficient for us to
graze upon it enough stock cattle, the increase from which we can
market for support of ourselves and families."
With the papers just referred to before it, the House
Committee on Indian Affairs, in February, 1900, favorably
reported a bill to give effect to the agreement of 1892.
On January 19, 1900, an act was passed by the Senate, entitled
"An act to ratify an agreement made with the Indians of the Fort
Hall Indian reservation in Idaho, and making an appropriation to
carry the same into effect." In February, 1900, the House
Committee on Indian Affairs, having before it the memorial of the
Indians transmitted by the Secretary of the Interior, and also
having for consideration the Senate bill just alluded to,
reported that bill back to the House favorably, with certain
amendments. (H.R. Doc. No. 419, 56th Congress, first session.)
One of such amendments consisted in adding to the bill in
question, as section 6, a provision to execute the agreement made
with the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Indians in 1892. Although the
bill thus reported embodied the execution of the agreement last
referred to, the title of the bill was not changed, and
consequently referred only to the execution of the agreement made
with the Indians of the Fort Hall reservation in Idaho. The
provisions thus embodied in section 6 of the bill in question
substantially conformed to those contained in the bill which had
previously passed the House, except that the previous enactment
on this subject was changed so as to do away with the necessity
for making to each Indian one half of his allotment in
agricultural land and the other half in grazing land. In addition
a clause was inserted in the bill providing for the setting apart
of a large amount of grazing land to be used in common by the
Indians. The provision in question was as follows:
"That in addition to the allotment of lands to said Indians as
provided for in this agreement, the Secretary of the Interior
shall set aside for the use in common for said Indian tribes four
hundred and eighty thousand acres of grazing lands, to be
Page 560
selected by the Secretary of the Interior, either in one or more
tracts as will best subserve the interest of said Indians."
The provision of the agreement in favor of the Indian agent
and army officer was also eliminated.
The bill, moreover, exempted the money consideration for the
surplus lands from all claims for Indian depredations, and
expressly provided that in the event the claim of the Choctaws
and Chickasaws was ultimately sustained, the consideration
referred to should be subject to the further action of Congress.
In this bill as in previous ones provision was made for
allotments to the Indians, the opening of the surplus land for
settlement, etc. The bill became a law by concurrence of the
Senate in the amendments adopted by the House as just stated.
Thereafter, by acts approved on January 4, 1901,31 Stat. 727,
c. 8; March 3, 1901,31 Stat. 1078, c. 832, and March 3, 1901,
31 Stat. 1093, c. 846, authority was given to extend the time for
making allotments and opening of the surplus land for settlement
for a period not exceeding eight months from December 6, 1900;
appropriations were made for surveys in connection with
allotments and setting apart of grazing lands; and authority was
conferred to establish counties and county seats, townsites,
etc., and proclaim the surplus lands open for settlement by white
people.
On June 6, 1901, a bill was filed on the equity side of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, wherein Lone Wolf (one
of the appellants herein) was named as complainant, suing for
himself as well as for all other members of the confederated
tribes of the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Indians, residing in the
Territory of Oklahoma. The present appellees (the Secretary of
the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the
Commissioner of the General Land Office) were made respondents to
the bill. Subsequently, by an amendment to the bill, members of
the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache tribes were joined with Lone Wolf
as parties complainant.
The bill recited the establishing and occupancy of the
reservation in Oklahoma by the confederated tribes of Kiowas,
Comanches and Apaches, the signing of the agreement of October 6,
1892, and the subsequent proceedings which have been detailed,
Page 561
culminating in the passage of the act of June 6, 1900, and the
acts of Congress supplementary to said act. In substance it was
further charged in the bill that the agreement had not been
signed as required by the Medicine Lodge treaty, that is, by
three fourths of the male adult members of the tribe, and that
the signatures thereto had been obtained by fraudulent
misrepresentations and concealment, similar to those recited in
the memorial signed at the 1899 council. In addition to the
grievance previously stated in the memorial, the charge was made
that the interpreters falsely represented, when the said treaty
was being considered by the Indians, that the treaty provided
"for the sale of their surplus lands at some time in the future
at the price of $2.50 per acre;" whereas, in truth and in fact,
"by the terms of said treaty, only $1.00 an acre is allowed for
said surplus lands," which sum, it was charged, was an amount far
below the real value of said lands. It was also averred that
portions of the signed agreement had been changed by Congress
without submitting such changes to the Indians for their
consideration. Based upon the foregoing allegations, it was
alleged that so much of said act of Congress of June 6, 1900, and
so much of said acts supplementary thereto and amendatory thereof
as provided for the taking effect of said agreement, the
allotment of certain lands mentioned therein to members of said
Indian tribes, the surveying, laying out, and platting townsites
and locating county seats on said lands, and the ceding to the
United States and the opening to settlement by white men of two
million acres of said lands, were enacted in violation of the
property rights of the said Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Indians,
and if carried into effect would deprive said Indians of their
lands without due process of law, and that said parts of said
acts were contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and
were void, and conferred no right, power or duty upon the
respondents to do or perform any of the acts or things enjoined
or required by the acts of Congress in question. Alleging the
intention of the respondents to carry into effect the aforesaid
claimed unconstitutional and void acts, and asking discovery by
answers to interrogatories propounded to the respondents, the
allowance of a temporary restraining order, and a final decree
Page 562
awarding a perpetual injunction was prayed, to restrain the
commission by the respondents of the alleged unlawful acts by
them threatened to be done. General relief was also prayed.
On January 6, 1901, a rule to show cause why a temporary
injunction should not be granted was issued. In response to this
rule an affidavit of the Secretary of the Interior was filed, in
which in substance it was averred that the complainant (Lone
Wolf) and his wife and daughter had selected allotments under the
act of June 6, 1900, and the same had been approved by the
Secretary of the Interior and that all other members of the
tribes, excepting twelve, had also accepted and retained
allotments in severally, and that the greater part thereof had
been approved before the bringing of this suit. It was also
averred that the 480,000 acres of grazing land provided to be set
apart, in the act of June 6, 1900, for the use by the Indians in
common, had been so set apart prior to the institution of the
suit, "with the approval of a council composed of chiefs and
headmen of said Indians." Thereupon an affidavit verified by Lone
Wolf was filed, in which in effect he denied that he had accepted
an allotment of lands under the act of June 6, 1900, and the acts
supplementary to and amendatory thereof. Thereafter, on June 17,
1901, leave was given to amend the bill and the same was amended,
as heretofore stated, by adding additional parties complainant
and by providing a substituted first paragraph of the bill, in
which was set forth, among other things, that the three tribes,
at a general council held on June 7, 1901, had voted to institute
all legal and other proceedings necessary to be taken, to prevent
the carrying into effect of the legislation complained of.
The Supreme Court of the District on June 21, 1901, denied the
application for a temporary injunction. The cause was thereafter
submitted to the court on a demurrer to the bill as amended. The
demurrer was sustained, and the complainants electing not to
plead further, on June 26, 1901, a decree was entered in favor of
the respondents. An appeal was thereupon taken to the Court of
Appeals of the District. While this appeal was pending, the
President issued a proclamation, dated July 4, 1901, (32 Stat.
Appx. Proclamations, 11,) in which it was
Page 563
ordered that the surplus lands ceded by the Comanche, Kiowa and
Apache and other tribes of Indians should be opened to entry and
settlement on August 6, 1901. Among other things, it was recited
in the proclamation that all the conditions required by law to be
performed prior to the opening of the lands to settlement and
entry had been performed. It was also therein recited that, in
pursuance of the act of Congress ratifying the agreement,
allotments of land in severally had been regularly made to each
member of the Comanche, Kiowa and Apache tribes of Indians; the
lands occupied by religious societies or other organizations for
religious or educational work among the Indians had been
regularly allotted and confirmed to such societies and
organizations, respectively; and the Secretary of the Interior,
out of the lands ceded by the agreement, had regularly selected
and set aside for the use in common for said Comanche, Kiowa and
Apache tribes of Indians, four hundred and eighty thousand acres
of grazing lands.
The Court of Appeals (without passing on a motion which had
been made to dismiss the appeal) affirmed the decree of the court
below, and overruled a motion for reargument.19 App.D.C. 315.
An appeal was allowed, and the decree of affirmance is now here
for review.
"Article 12. No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any validity or force as against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive, without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of land selected by him as provided in article III (VI) of this treaty."
The appellants base their right to relief on the proposition that by the effect of the article just quoted the confederated tribes of Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches were vested with an interest in the lands held in common within the reservation, which interest could not be divested by Congress in any other mode than that specified in the said twelfth article, and that as a result of the said stipulation the interest of the Indians in the common lands fell within the protection of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and such interest — indirectly at least — came under the control of the judicial branch of the government. We are unable to yield our assent to this view.
The contention in effect ignores the status of the contracting Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continue to bear towards the government of the United States. To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of the treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal of the tribal lands, of all power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not be obtained.
Now, it is true that in decisions of this court, the Indian right of occupancy of tribal lands, whether declared in a treaty or otherwise created, has been stated to be sacred, or, as sometimes expressed, as sacred as the fee of the United States in the same lands.Johnsonv.McIntosh, (1823) 8 Wheat. 543, 574;Page 565Cherokee Nationv.Georgia, (1831) 5 Pet. 1, 48;Worcesterv.Georgia, (1832) 6 Pet. 515, 581;United Statesv.Cook, (1873) 19 Wall. 591, 592;Leavenworth c. R.R. Co. v.UnitedStates, (1875)92 U.S. 733,755;Beecherv.Wetherby, (1877)95 U.S. 517,525. But in none of these cases was there involved a controversy between Indians and the government respecting the power of Congress to administer the property of the Indians. The questions considered in the cases referred to, which either directly or indirectly had relation to the nature of the property rights of the Indians, concerned the character and extent of such rights as respected States or individuals. In one of the cited cases it was clearly pointed out that Congress possessed a paramount power over the property of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and that such authority might be implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians. Thus, inBeecherv.Wetherby,95 U.S. 517, discussing the claim that there had been a prior reservation of land by treaty to the use of a certain tribe of Indians, the court said (p. 525):
"But the right which the Indians held was only that of occupancy. The fee was in the United States, subject to that right, and could be transferred by them whenever they chose. The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could not disturb the occupancy of the Indians; that occupancy could only be interfered with or determined by the United States. It is to be presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race. Be that as it may, the propriety or justice of their action towards the Indians with respect to their lands is a question of governmental policy, and is not a matter open to discussion in a controversy between third parties, neither of whom derives title from the Indians."
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government. Until the year 1871 the policy was pursued of dealing with thePage 566Indian tribes by means of treaties, and, of course, a moral obligation rested upon Congress to act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered into on its behalf. But, as with treaties made with foreign nations,Chinese ExclusionCase,130 U.S. 581,600, the legislative power might pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians.Thomasv.Gay,169 U.S. 264,270;Wardv.Race Horse,163 U.S. 504,511;Spaldingv.Chandler,160 U.S. 394,405;Missouri,Kansas Texas Ry. Co. v.Roberts,152 U.S. 114,117;TheCherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616.
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that thepowerto abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians. InUnited Statesv.Kagama, (1885)118 U.S. 375, speaking of the Indians, the court said (p. 382):
"After an experience of a hundred years of the treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined upon a new departure — to govern them by acts of Congress. This is seen in the act of March 3, 1871, embodied in § 2079 of the Revised Statutes: `No Indian nation or tribe, within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.'"
In upholding the validity of an act of Congress which conferred jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States for certain crimes committed on an Indian reservation within a State, the court said (p. 383):Page 567
"It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribesarethe wards of the nation. They are communitiesdependenton the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
* * * * * * * *
"The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes."
That Indians who had not been fully emancipated from the control and protection of the United States are subject, at least so far as the tribal lands were concerned, to be controlled by direct legislation of Congress, is also declared inChoctawNationv.United States,119 U.S. 1,27, andStephensv.Cherokee Nation,174 U.S. 445,483.
In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over treaties with the Indians and Indian tribal property, we may not specially consider the contentions pressed upon our notice that the signing by the Indians of the agreement of October 6, 1892, was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment, that the requisite three fourths of adult male Indians had not signed, as required by the twelfth article of the treaty of 1867, and that the treaty as signed had been amended by Congress without submitting such amendments to the actionPage 568of the Indians, since all these matters, in any event, were solely within the domain of the legislative authority and its action is conclusive upon the courts.
The act of June 6, 1900, which is complained of in the bill, was enacted at a time when the tribal relations between the confederated tribes of Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches still existed, and that statute and the statutes supplementary thereto dealt with the disposition of tribal property and purported to give an adequate consideration for the surplus lands not allotted among the Indians or reserved for their benefit. Indeed, the controversy which this case presents is concluded by the decision inCherokee Nationv.Hitchcock,187 U.S. 294, decided at this term, where it was held that full administrative power was possessed by Congress over Indian tribal property. In effect, the action of Congress now complained of was but an exercise of such power, a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property, the property of those who, as we have held, were in substantial effect the wards of the government. We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of the government exercised its best judgment in the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to the courts. The legislation in question was constitutional, and the demurrer to the bill was therefore rightly sustained.
The motion to dismiss does not challenge jurisdiction over the subject matter. Without expressly referring to the propositions of fact upon which it proceeds, suffice it to say that we think it need not be further adverted to, since, for the reasons previously given and the nature of the controversy, we think the decree below should beAffirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result.Page 569