Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Levy v. Louisiana Ex Rel. Charity Hospital
20 L. Ed. 2d 436
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1968-10-14
- Topic
- general
holding that once state recognizes wrongful death recovery for child, state cannot hold that term “child” excludes illegitimate child | holding that once state recognizes wrongful death recovery for child, state cannot hold that term "child" excludes illegitimate child | holding that state may not create a right of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a parent and exclude illegitimate children from the benefit of such a right | holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother | holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother | holding unconstitutional a statute denying an illegitimate child’s recovery for the wrongful death of its mother | holding statute that precluded illegitimate child from maintaining an action for wrongful death of mother violated illegitimate child’s right to equal protection | holding unconstitutional state statute that discriminated against illegitimates to discourage births out of wedlock | holding unconstitutional state statute that discriminated against illegitimates to discourage births out of wedlock | finding that a state may not create a right of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a parent and exclude illegitimate children from the benefit of the same right | prohibiting exclusion of illegitimate children from bringing suit under state wrongful death statute | state court dismissed action by illegitimate children to recover for wrongful death of mother, since state law barred such suits | Louisiana statute unconstitutional because it denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of mother | state may not create a right of action for the wrongful death of a parent that is available solely to marital children | wrongful death statute interpreted by State court as denying recovery to illegitimate children violates equal protection | illegitimate children sought to recover for wrongful death of their mother statute extended to include illegitimates | illegitimate children sought to recover for wrongful death of their mother — statute extended to include illegitimates | state may not create a right of action for the wrongful death of a parent that is available solely to marital children | denial to mother of right to sue for death of illegitimate son also violative of equal protection clause | statute prohibiting a white person from marrying any person other than a white person is invalid | statute prohibiting a white person from marrying any person other than a white person is invalid | state court dismissed action by illegitimate children to recover for wrongful death of mother, since state law barred such suits | an illegitimate child has the same rights a legitimate child would have to recover for the wrongful death of his natural parent | "[t]hough the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is a rational one" | Louisiana statute unconstitutional because it denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of mother | “While a State has broad power when it comes to making classifications, it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class.” (citation omitted) | state law denying wrongful death recovery by illegitimates was unconstitutional as denying a right to a child “when no action, conduct, or demeanor of [the child was] possibly relevant to the harm that was done” | right of child to sue for wrongful death of mother | employing a "heightened” standard of review to illegitimate children | Discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy | illegitimate children entitled to equal protection | as to the Equal Protection Clause
Citator
- Cited by
- 309 opinions
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant sued on behalf of five illegitimate children to recover, under a Louisiana statute 1 (La. Civ. Code Ann. Art. 2315 (Supp. 1967)) for two kinds of damages as a result of the wrongful death of their mother: (1) the damages to them for the loss of their mother; *70 and (2) those based on the survival of a cause of action which the mother had at the time of her death for pain and suffering. Appellees 2 are the doctor who treated her and the insurance company.
We assume in the present state of the pleadings that the mother, Louise Levy, gave birth to these five illegitimate children and that they lived with her; that she treated them as a parent would treat any other child; that she worked as a domestic servant to support them, taking them to church every Sunday and enrolling them, at her own expense, in a parochial school. The Louisiana District Court dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “child” in Article 2315 means “legitimate child,” the denial to illegitimate children of “the right to recover” being “based on morals and general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the world out of wedlock.” 192 So. 2d 193, 195. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied certiorari. 250 La. 25, 193 So. 2d 530.
The case is here on appeal (28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2)) ; and we noted probable jurisdiction, 389 U. S. 925, the statute as construed having been sustained against challenge under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not “nonpersons.” They are humans, live, and have their being. 3 They are clearly “persons” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
*71 While a State has broad power when it comes, to making classifications (Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 732), it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541-542. Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is a rational one. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457, 465-466.
In applying the Equal Protection Clause to social and economic legislation, we give great latitude to the legislature in making classifications. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489; Morey v. Doud, supra, at 465-466. Even so, would a corporation, which is a “person,” for certain purposes, within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause (Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 188) be required to forgo recovery for wrongs done its interests because its incorporators were all bastards? However that might be, we have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights (Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 669-670) and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history and tradition on its side. (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra, at 669.) The rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own mother. When the child’s claim of damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms of “equal protection,” should the tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate? Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and conscription under the Selective Service Act. How under our constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which other citizens enjoy?
*72 Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would. 5
We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate against them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs 6 is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother. 7
Reversed.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see post, p. 76.]“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
“The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the surviving spouse.
“The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. The survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which, on the death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not.
“As used in this article, the words ‘child/ ‘brother/ ‘sister/ ‘father/ and ‘mother’ include a child, brother, sister, father, and mother, by adoption, respectively.”
The State of Louisiana was dismissed from the action and exceptions relating to the Charity Hospital, at which the mother was treated, were continued indefinitely. No appeal was taken with respeet to either of those defendants.
See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 337 (1962).
No State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Under Louisiana law both, parents are under a duty to support their illegitimate children. La. Civ. Code Ann. Arts. 239, 240 (1952).
We can say with Shakespeare: “Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as well compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?” King Lear, Act I, Scene 2.
Under Louisiana’s Workmen’s Compensation Act (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§23:1231, 23:1252, 23:1253 (1964)) an illegitimate child, who is a dependent member of the deceased parent’s family, may recover compensation for his death. See Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 208 La. 83, 22 So. 2d 842 (1945). Employers are entitled to recover from a wrongdoer workmen’s compensation payments they make to the deceased’s dependent illegitimate children. See Board of Commissioners v. City of New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So. 2d 313 (1953); Thomas v. Matthews Lumber Co., 201 So. 2d 357 (Ct. App. La. 1967).