Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Lance v. Dennis

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
2006-02-21
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts “from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments”
  • holding that “lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”
  • holding that, "under what has come to be known as the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments."
  • holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts “from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments” because such appellate jurisdiction rests solely with the United States Supreme Court
  • holding that “Rooker/Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.”
  • holding that the doctrine “does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment”
  • holding that Rooker- 10 Feldman is inapplicable where the federal plaintiff “was not a party in the state court and was in no 11 position to ask this Court to review the state court’s judgment.”
  • holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies to final state-court judgments

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Lance v. Dennis. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
963 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Rooker-Feldman Doctrine The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments and applies only in limited circumstances where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court. 546 U.S. at 463–464
  2. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Rooker-Feldman Doctrine vs. Preclusion The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not simply preclusion by another name; whatever the impact of privity principles on preclusion rules, the doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to an earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment. 546 U.S. at 464–466
  3. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Preclusion and Full Faith and Credit Incorporating preclusion principles into the Rooker-Feldman doctrine risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which directs federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding what effect to give state-court judgments. 546 U.S. at 466
LANCE v. DENNIS,546 U.S. 459(2006)
126 S.Ct. 1198
LANCE ET AL. v. DENNIS, COLORADO SECRETARY OF STATE.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLORADO.
No. 05-555.
Decided February 21, 2006.
Several rounds of state-court litigation following the 2000 census culminated in a Colorado Supreme Court holding that the state legislature's congressional redistricting plan violated the State Constitution. Subsequently, plaintiffs, Colorado voters, filed a federal-court suit, seeking to require the secretary of state to use the legislature's plan because the State Constitution, as interpreted by the State Supreme Court, violated,inter alia, the Elections Clause of the U. S. Constitution. A three-judge District Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear the claim because theRooker-Feldmandoctrine — which prevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by "state-court losers" challenging "state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,"Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,544 U. S. 280,284— applied to plaintiffs, who were in privity with the Colorado General Assembly, a losing party in the state case. In finding privity, the court reasoned that the preclusion principle that a State's citizens are deemed to be in privity with a state government that litigates a matter of public concern, see,e. g., Washington v.Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn.,443 U. S. 658, applied equally in theRooker-Feldmancontext.Held:TheRooker-Feldmandoctrine does not bar plaintiffs from proceeding. The District Court erroneously conflated preclusion law withRooker-Feldman.Whatever the impact of privity principles on preclusion rules,Rooker-Feldmanis not simply preclusion by another name. It applies only in limited circumstances where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court. Incorporation of preclusion principles intoRooker-Feldmanrisks turning that limited doctrine into a uniformfederalrule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act.

Jurisdiction noted;379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, vacated and remanded.Page 460
PER CURIAM.
TheRooker-Feldmandoctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by "state-court losers" challenging "state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced."Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,544 U. S. 280,284(2005). In this case, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs' suit on the ground that they were in privity with a state-court loser. We hold that theRooker-Feldmandoctrine does not bar plaintiffs from proceeding, and vacate the District Court's judgment.
I
This is the latest of several rounds of litigation involving the State of Colorado's congressional redistricting after the 2000 census, under which the State gained a seat in the House of Representatives.Lance v.Davidson,379 F. Supp. 2d 1117,1121(2005). The first round began in May 2001. When the Colorado General Assembly failed to pass a redistricting plan for the 2002 congressional elections by the close of its regular session, a group of Colorado voters asked the state courts to create a plan. The courts agreed, drawing a new map reflecting the additional district. SeeBeauprez v. Avalos,42 P. 3d 642(Colo. 2002) (en banc). The 2002 elections were held using this court-ordered plan.

The General Assembly passed its own redistricting plan in the spring of 2003, prompting further litigation — this time about which electoral map was to govern, the legislature's or the courts'. Two suits were filed seeking to enjoin the legislature's plan: an original action in the Colorado Supreme Court by the state attorney general seeking to require the secretary of state to use the court-ordered plan, and a similar action brought in a lower state court by several proponents of the court-ordered plan.379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1121. After the Colorado General Assembly intervened to defend its plan in the first case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that thePage 461plan violated Article V, § 44, of the State Constitution, which the court construed to limit congressional redistricting to "once per decade."People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson,79 P. 3d 1221,1231(2003) (en banc). It therefore ordered the secretary of state to use the court-created plan. We denied certiorari.541 U. S. 1093(2004).

The second suit was removed to federal court by the defendants on the basis of plaintiffs' federal-law claims. SeeKeller v. Davidson,299 F. Supp. 2d 1171,1175(Colo. 2004). OnceSalazarwas decided by the Colorado Supreme Court, the viability of the defendants' counterclaims was the only remaining issue. A three-judge District Court held that the defendants were barred by theRooker-Feldmandoctrine from amending their counterclaims to assert additional challenges to the decision inSalazar.It also held that the defendants' original counterclaims, while not barred by theRooker-Feldmandoctrine, were precluded under Colorado law by the judgment inSalazar.Accordingly, the court dismissed the case.

Finally, this suit: Before the dismissal inKeller, several Colorado citizens unhappy withSalazarfiled an action in the District Court seeking to require the secretary of state to use the legislature's plan.1The plaintiffs argued that ArticleV, §44, of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violated the Elections Clause of ArticleI, §4, of the U. S. Constitution ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof"), and theFirstAmendment's Petition Clause ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguingPage 462that theRooker-Feldmandoctrine and Colorado preclusion law barred any attack on the Colorado Supreme Court's judgment inSalazarand that the plaintiffs had failed to state a valid Petition Clause claim.

The three-judge District Court ruled that under theRooker-Feldmandoctrine, it had no jurisdiction to hear the Elections Clause claim.379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1127. TheRooker-Feldmandoctrine, the court explained, includes three requirements: (1) "the party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually been a party to the prior state-court judgment or have been in privity with such a party"; (2) "the claim raised in the federal suit must have been actually raised or inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment"; and (3) "the federal claim must not be parallel to the state-court claim."379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1124. The District Court found the first requirement satisfied on the ground that the citizen plaintiffs were in privity with the Colorado General Assembly — a losing party inSalazar.Relying on our decisions inWashington v. Washington State CommercialPassenger Fishing Vessel Assn.,443 U. S. 658(1979), andTacoma v.Taxpayers of Tacoma,357 U. S. 320(1958), the court stated that "when a state government litigates a matter of public concern, that state's citizens will be deemed to be in privity with the government for preclusion purposes."379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125. This principle, the court reasoned, applies "with equal force in theRooker-Feldmancontext."Ibid.The court went on to conclude that the Elections Clause claim was actually raised inSalazar, or inextricably intertwined with that decision, and was not parallel to the claims presented inSalazar.As to the Petition Clause claim, the court ruled that neitherRooker-Feldmannor Colorado preclusion law prevented the court from proceeding to the merits, but that plaintiffs failed to state a claim.379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1132; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.12(b)(6).

The plaintiffs appealed. See28 U. S. C. § 1253. We now note jurisdiction, and address whether theRooker-FeldmanPage 463doctrine bars the plaintiffs from proceeding because they were in privity with a party inSalazar.We conclude it does not, and vacate the judgment of the District Court.
II
This Court is vested, under28 U. S. C. § 1257, with jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments. We have held that this grant of jurisdiction is exclusive: "Review of such judgments may be hadonlyin this Court."District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,460 U. S. 462,482(1983) (emphasis added); see alsoAtlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers,398 U. S. 281,286(1970);Rooker v.Fidelity Trust Co.,263 U. S. 413,416(1923). Accordingly, under what has come to be known as theRooker-Feldmandoctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.

TheRooker-Feldmandoctrine takes its name from the only two cases in which we have applied this rule to find that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction. InRooker, a party who had lost in the Indiana Supreme Court, and failed to obtain review in this Court, filed an action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of the state-court judgment. We viewed the action as tantamount to an appeal of the Indiana Supreme Court decision, over which only this Court had jurisdiction, and said that the "aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he no longer can do directly."263 U. S., at 416.Feldman, decided 60 years later, concerned slightly different circumstances, with similar results. The plaintiffs there had been refused admission to the District of Columbia bar by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and sought review of these decisions in Federal District Court. Our decision held that to the extent plaintiffs challenged the Court of Appeals decisions themselves — as opposed to the bar admission rules promulgated nonjudicially by the Court of Appeals — their sole avenue of review was with this Court.460 U. S., at 476.Page 464

NeitherRookernorFeldmanelaborated a rationale for a wide-reaching bar on the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and our cases sinceFeldmanhave tended to emphasize the narrowness of theRooker-Feldmanrule. SeeExxon Mobil,544 U. S., at 292(Rooker-Feldmandoes not apply to parallel state and federal litigation);Verizon Md. Inc. v. PublicServ. Comm'n of Md.,535 U. S. 635,644, n. 3 (2002) (Rooker-Feldman"has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency");Johnson v. DeGrandy,512 U. S. 997,1005-1006(1994) (Rooker-Feldmandoes not bar actions by a nonparty to the earlier state suit). Indeed, during that period, "this Court has never appliedRooker-Feldmanto dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction."Exxon Mobil, supra, at 287.

InExxon Mobil, decided last Term, we warned that the lower courts have at times extendedRooker-Feldman"far beyond the contours of theRookerandFeldmancases, overriding Congress' conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to28 U. S. C. § 1738."544 U. S., at 283.Rooker-Feldman, we explained, is a narrow doctrine, confined to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."544 U. S., at 284.

Although we have never addressed the precise question before us, we have heldRooker-Feldmaninapplicable where the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding. SeeDe Grandy, supra, at 1006. InDe Grandy, the State of Florida sought, usingRooker-Feldman, to prevent the United States from bringing a challenge under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the reapportionment of state electoral districts. The Florida Supreme Court, in an action initiated by thePage 465state attorney general, had already declared the law valid under state and federal law. We held thatRooker-Feldmandid not bar the United States from bringing its own action in federal court because the United States "was not a party in the state court," and "was in no position to ask this Court to review the state court's judgment and has not directly attacked it in this proceeding."512 U. S., at 1006.

In the case before us, plaintiffs were plainly not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding inSalazar. Salazarwas an action brought by the state attorney general against the secretary of state, in which the Colorado General Assembly intervened.79 P. 3d, at 1227. The four citizen-plaintiffs here did not participate inSalazar, and were not in a "position to ask this Court to review the state court's judgment."De Grandy, supra, at 1006; seeKarcher v. May,484 U. S. 72,77(1987) ("[T]he general rule [is] that one who is not a party or has not been treated as a party to a judgment has no right to appeal therefrom").

Although the District Court recognized the "general rule" that "Rooker-Feldmanmay not be invoked against a federal-court plaintiff who was not actually a party to the prior state-court judgment,"379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1123, it nevertheless followed Tenth Circuit precedent in allowing application ofRooker-Feldmanagainst parties who were in privity with a party to the earlier state-court action.379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1123(citingKenmen Eng. v. Union,314 F. 3d 468,481(2002)). In determining whether privity existed, the court looked to cases concerning the preclusive effect that state courts are required to give federal-court judgments.379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125(citingWashington,443 U. S., at 693, n. 32;Taxpayers of Tacoma,357 U. S., at 340-341). It concluded that — forRooker-Feldmanas well as preclusion purposes — "the outcome of the government's litigation over a matter of public concern binds its citizens."379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1125.Page 466

The District Court erroneously conflated preclusion law withRooker-Feldman.Whatever the impact of privity principles on preclusion rules,Rooker-Feldmanis not simply preclusion by another name. The doctrine applies only in "limited circumstances,"Exxon Mobil, supra, at 291, where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court. TheRooker-Feldmandoctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.2

A more expansiveRooker-Feldmanrule would tend to supplant Congress' mandate, under the Full Faith and Credit Act,28 U. S. C. § 1738, that federal courts "`give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.'"Baker v. General Motors Corp.,522 U. S. 222,246(1998) (quotingKremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,456 U. S. 461,466(1982)); seeExxon Mobil, supra, at 293. Congress has directed federal courts to look principally tostatelaw in deciding what effect to give state-court judgments. Incorporation of preclusion principles intoRooker-Feldmanrisks turning that limited doctrine into a uniformfederalrule governing the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Act.3Page 467
* * *
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, concurring.
I agree in full with the Court's correction of the District Court'sRooker-Feldmanerror, and therefore join the Court's opinion. Although JUSTICE STEVENS has persuasively urged that issue preclusion warrants affirmance, seepost, at 468-469 (dissenting opinion), that question of Colorado law seems to me best left for full airing and decision on remand.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
RookerandFeldmanare strange bedfellows.Rooker, a unanimous, three-page opinion written by Justice Van Devanter in 1923, correctly applied the simple legal proposition that only this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments. SeeRooker v. FidelityTrust Co.,263 U. S. 413,416.Feldman, a nonunanimous, 25-page opinion written by Justice Brennan in 1983, was incorrectly decided and generated a plethora of confusion and debate among scholars and judges.fn*SeeDistrict of ColumbiaPage 468Court of Appeals v. Feldman,460 U. S. 462;id., at 488 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Last Term, in JUSTICE GINSBURG'S lucid opinion inExxonMobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,544 U. S. 280(2005), the Court finally interred the so-called "Rooker-Feldmandoctrine." And today, the Court quite properly disapproves of the District Court's resuscitation of a doctrine that has produced nothing but mischief for 23 years.

My disagreement with the majority arises not from what it actually decides, but from what it fails to address. Even though the District Court mistakenly believed it had no jurisdiction to hear this matter, its judgment dismissing the cause with prejudice was correct and should be affirmed. SeeLance v. Davidson,379 F. Supp. 2d 1117,1132(Colo. 2005). The Elections Clause claim advanced by citizen-appellants in this case is the same as that advanced by their official representatives and decided by the Colorado Supreme Court inPeople ex rel. Salazar v.Davidson,79 P. 3d 1221,1231-1232(Colo. 2003) (en banc). See379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1126. As appellee points out, appellants' second question presented "is literally the same question presented by the General Assembly oncertiorarireview (and denied) inSalazar." Motion to Affirm 12. And, as a matter of Colorado law, appellants are clearly in privity with both then-Colorado Attorney General Salazar, who brought the suit on behalf of the people of Colorado, and the Colorado General Assembly,Page 469which was also a party to theSalazarlitigation. SeeMcNichols v. CityCounty of Denver,101 Colo. 316,322,74 P. 2d 99,102(1937) (en banc) (finding privity between taxpayers seeking to challenge the validity of a bond issue and a public official "charged with ministerial and executive duties in connection" with the issuance of the bonds who already brought such a suit);Atchison, T. S. F. R. Co. v. Board ofCounty Comm'rs of County of Fremont,95 Colo. 435,441,37 P. 2d 761,764(1934) (en banc) (explaining that taxpayers are in privity with a political division of the State or its official representative if the case involves "a matter of general interest to all the people"). Thus, all of the requirements under Colorado law for issue preclusion have been met, and appellants' Elections Clause claim should therefore be dismissed. See generally28 U. S. C. § 1738;Michaelson v. Michaelson,884 P. 2d 695,700-701(Colo. 1994) (en banc) (setting forth requirements for issue preclusion under Colorado law).

Appellants' spurious Petition Clause claim was also properly dismissed by the District Court. See379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1130-1132. Nothing in the Colorado Constitution prevents appellants from petitioning the Colorado General Assembly with their grievances,id., at 1131; nothing in the United States Constitution guarantees that such a petition will be effective,Smith v. Highway Employees,441 U. S. 463,465(1979) (percuriam); see alsoMinnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight,465 U. S. 271,285(1984). Moreover, as the District Court recognized, appellants' interpretation of the Petition Clause would lead to absurd results. See379 F. Supp. 2d, at 1131-1132. As such, appellants' Petition Clause claim was correctly dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See generally Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.12(b)(6).

For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.Page 470
  1. Although the secretary of state defended the legislature's plan inSalazar, following that decision she agreed to defend the court-ordered plan in this litigation and to allow the state attorney general to represent her.379 F. Supp. 2d 1117,1122, n. 3 (Colo. 2005). ↩
  2. In holding thatRooker-Feldmandoes not bar plaintiffs here from proceeding, we need not address whether there areanycircumstances, however limited, in whichRooker-Feldmanmay be applied against a party not named in an earlier state proceeding —e. g., where an estate takes ade factoappeal in a district court of an earlier state decision involving the decedent. ↩
  3. Our holding also disposes of the claim, which the District Court did not reach, that plaintiffs were barred byRooker-Feldmanbecause they were in privity with the secretary of state, the other losing party inPeople ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson,79 P. 3d 1221(Colo. 2003) (en banc). We do not pass on the District Court's resolution of the merits of plaintiffs' Petition Clause claim. ↩
  4. See,e. g., Comment, Collateral Estoppel and theRooker-FeldmanDoctrine: The Problematic Effect These Preclusion and Jurisdictional Principles Have on Bankruptcy Law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 579 (2005); Comment, TheRooker-FeldmanDoctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1555 (2001); Proctor, Wirth, Spencer,Rooker-Feldmanand the Jurisdictional Quandary, 2 Fla. Coastal L. J. 113 (2000); Rowley, Tenth Circuit Survey, TheRooker-FeldmanDoctrine: A Mere Superfluous Nuance or a Vital Civil Procedure Doctrine? An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Decision inJohnson v. Rodrigues, 78 Denver U. L. Rev. 321 (2000); Symposium, TheRooker-FeldmanDoctrine, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081 (1999); Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments AfterSeminoleTribe, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 161 (1998); Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Ignores Principles of Federalism and theRooker-FeldmanDoctrine:Bates v. Jones,131 F. 3d 843(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), 21 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol'y 881 (1998); Schmucker, Possible Application of theRooker-FeldmanDoctrine to State Agency Decisions: The Seventh Circuit's Opinion inVan Harken v.City of Chicago, 17 J. Nat. Assn. Admin. L. Judges 333 (1997); Casenote,Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.:Beyond a Crude Analysis of theRooker-FeldmanDoctrine's Preclusion of Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 627 (1987); Comment,Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court Proceedings, 54 Ford. L. Rev. 767 (1986). ↩