Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
71 S. Ct. 259
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1951-02-26
- Topic
- general
holding distillers' agreement on maximum resale price of liquor sold by distributors per se violation of Sec. 1 | holding distillers’ agreement on maximum resale price of liquor sold by distributors per se violation of § 1 | stating that defendants not entitled to use an in pari delicto defense as a complete bar to plaintiffs claims, but can always enforce them rights in a separate action | describing how the defendants allegedly conspired to sell liquor only to wholesalers who would resell at prices below a fixed maximum, while the plaintiff wholesaler allegedly conspired with other wholesalers to resell liquor only at prices above a fixed minimum | “common ownership and control does not liberate [them] from the impact of the antitrust laws.” | distillers’ agreement on maximum resale price of liquor sold by distributors held per se violation of section 1 | plaintiffs infractions of the antitrust laws could not legalize defendants’ unlawful combination nor immunize them from liability | plaintiff’s private antitrust suit not barred by proof that he had engaged in unrelated conspiracy to violate antitrust laws | distillers’ agreement to fix maximum resale prices of their products sold by distributors held per se violation of Section 1 | price fixing conspiracies "cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment" | price fixing conspiracies “cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment” | alleged illegal conduct of plaintiff “could not legalize the unlawful combination by [defendants] nor immunize them against liability to those they injured” | manufacturers refused to supply wholesalers who would not agree to resale prices fixed by the manufacturers | unclean hands: plaintiff's participation in price-fixing scheme unrelated to complained-of maximum resale price restriction and concerted refusal to deal | unclean hands: plaintiff’s participation in price-fixing scheme unrelated to complained-of maximum resale price restriction and concerted refusal to deal | “The crux of any price-fixing agreement is the relinquishment by a trader ... of the freedom to set prices in accordance with his own judgment.” | under the Sherman Act boycotts are boycotts even when they target customers rather than competitors | distiller’s agreement on maximum resale price of liquor sold by distillers held per se violative of § 1 | irrelevant in private Sherman Act suit that plaintiff had also violated Sherman Act | no defense of price-fixing by manufacturers that wholesale purchasers had fixed resale prices | no defense of price-fixing by manufacturers that wholesale purchasers had fixed resale prices | rejecting unclean-hands defense based on plaintiff's involvement in unrelated conduct | Seagram refused to sell unless purchaser agreed to maximum resale price | rejecting unclean-hands defense based on plaintiff’s involvement in unrelated conduct | "agreement[s] among competitors to fix maximum resale prices of their products ... no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of venders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment." | liquor manufacturers’ collective refusal to sell to pricecutting wholesalers | liquor manufacturers' collective refusal to sell to price-cutting wholesalers | liquor manufacturers’ collective refusal to sell to price-cutting wholesalers | liquor manufacturers’ collective refusal to sell to price-cutting wholesalers | liquor manufacturers collectively refused to sell to price-cutting wholesalers | liquor manufacturers’ collective refusal to sell to price-cutting wholesalers | liquor manufacturers collectively refused to sell to price-cutting wholesalers | vertical and horizontal maximum price fixing | vertical and horizontal maximum price fixing | agreement on maximum resale prices | making of agreements must be present
Citator
- Cited by
- 276 opinions
2. Under the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegalper se. P. 213.
3. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support a finding by the jury that respondents had conspired to fix maximum resale prices. Pp. 213-214.
4. In an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages, brought by a complainant injured by a conspiracy of sellers of liquor in interstate commerce to fix maximum resale prices, it is no defense that the complainant had conspired with others to fix minimum prices for liquor in violation of the antitrust laws. P. 214.
5. The fact that corporations are under common ownership and control does not relieve them from liability under the antitrust laws, especially where they hold themselves out as competitors. P. 215.
6. Since the District Court's instructions to the jury submitted to them only the cause of action under the Sherman Act, it did not err in refusing a more formal withdrawal of an issue concerning a violation of the Clayton Act, which had been charged in the complaint but which was not proved. P. 215.182 F.2d 228, reversed.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an agreement among competitors to fix maximum resale prices of their products does not violate the Sherman Act. For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment. We reaffirm what we said inUnited Statesv.Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,310 U.S. 150,223: "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegalper se."
The Court of Appeals also erred in holding the evidence insufficient to support a finding by the jury that respondents had conspired to fix maximum resale prices. The jury was authorized by the evidence to accept the following as facts: Seagram refused to sell to petitioner and others unless the purchasers agreed to the maximum resale price fixed by Seagram. Calvert was at first willing to sell without this restrictive condition and arrangements were made for petitioner to buy large quantities of Calvert liquor. Petitioner subsequently was informed by Calvert, however, that the arrangements would not be carried out because Calvert had "to go along with Seagram." Moreover, about this time conferences were held by officials of the respondents concerning sales of liquor to petitioner. Thereafter, on identical terms as to the fixing of retail prices, both Seagram and Calvert resumed sales to other Indiana wholesalers who agreed to abide by such conditions, but no shipments have been made to petitioner.
The foregoing is sufficient to justify the challenged jury finding that respondents had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding when they forbadePage 214their purchasers to exceed the fixed ceilings. Thus, there is support for the conclusion that a conspiracy existed,American Tobacco Co. v.United States,328 U.S. 781,809-810, even though, as respondents point out, there is other testimony in the record indicating that the price policies of Seagram and Calvert were arrived at independently.
Respondents also seek to support the judgment of reversal on other grounds not passed on by the Court of Appeals but which have been argued here both orally and in the briefs. These grounds raise only issues of law not calling for examination or appraisal of evidence and we will consider them. Respondents introduced evidence in the District Court designed to show that petitioner had agreed with other Indiana wholesalers to set minimum prices for the sale of liquor in violation of the antitrust laws. It is now contended that the trial court erred in charging the jury that petitioner's part in such a conspiracy, even if proved, was no defense to the present cause of action. We hold that the instruction was correct. Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal with petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers. But the Sherman Act makes it an offense for respondents to agree among themselves to stop selling to particular customers. If petitioner and others were guilty of infractions of the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Government or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner, however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against liability to those they injured. Cf.FashionOriginators' Guildv.Trade Comm'n,312 U.S. 457;Mandeville Island Farmsv.American Crystal Sugar Co.,334 U.S. 219,242-243.Page 215
Respondents next suggest that their status as "mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandizing unit" makes it impossible for them to have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act. But this suggestion runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws.E. g. UnitedStatesv.Yellow Cab Co.,332 U.S. 218. The rule is especially applicable where, as here, respondents hold themselves out as competitors.
It is also claimed that the District Court improperly refused to withdraw from the jury an issue as to respondents' violation of the Clayton Act which had been charged in the complaint but which was not proved. A fair reading of the instructions to the jury, however, reveals that the trial court submitted to them only the cause of action under the Sherman Act. We are convinced from this record that a more formal withdrawal of the Clayton Act issue would have served solely to confuse.
Other contentions of error in the admission of evidence and in the charge to the jury are so devoid of merit that it is unnecessary to discuss them.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed.It is so ordered.Page 216
- Page 212 Petitioner also charged a violation of the Clayton Act,15 U.S.C. § 18, but this theory has been abandoned and is not important here. See p. 215,infra. ↩