Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Kane v. Garcia Espitia

546 U.S. 9

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
2005-10-31
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • noting that access to a prison law library may derive from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
  • finding that federal habeas relief is unavailable based on the denial of expert funding to a self-represented defendant
  • finding that absent a Supreme Court case establishing a particular right, federal court inference of such a right is not a basis upon which to grant federal habeas relief
  • reversing grant of habeas relief where right at issue was not clearly established in Supreme Court precedent
  • finding that a defendant who elected to proceed pro se on state court charges did not have a viable habeas corpus claim on the basis that he was denied access to a law library during pretrial confinement
  • construing Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975)
  • noting, in the context of habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that “Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant” and so does not “clearly establish” a pro se defendant’s right to access a law library
  • no federal habeas relief where circuit courts split and no Supreme Court holding on claimed right

Citator

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Cited by
98 opinions
KANE v. ESPITIA,546 U.S. 9(2005)
126 S.Ct. 407
KANE, WARDEN v. GARCIA ESPITIA.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 04-1538.
Decided October 31, 2005.
Respondent, apro secriminal defendant, received no law library access while in jail before trial and only about four hours of access during trial. The California courts rejected his claim that such restricted access violated the Sixth Amendment. The Federal District Court subsequently denied him habeas relief, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that his lack of pretrial access to law books violated his constitutional right to self-representation as established inFarettav.California,422 U. S. 806.Held:The Ninth Circuit erred in holding, based onFaretta, that a violation of a law library access right is a basis for federal habeas relief. A necessary condition for such relief is that the state-court decision be "contrary to, or involv[e] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by" this Court.28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). WhileFarettaestablishes a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, it does not "clearly establis[h]" a law library access right.

Certiorari granted; 113 Fed. Appx. 802, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Garcia Espitia, a criminal defendant who chose to proceedpro se, was convicted in California state court of carjacking and other offenses. He had received no law library access while in jail before trial — despite his repeated requests and court orders to the contrary — and only about four hours of access during trial, just before closing arguments. (Of course, he had declined, as was his right, to be represented by a lawyer with unlimited access to legal materials.) The California courts rejected his argument that his restricted library access violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Once his sentence became final, he petitioned in Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus under28 U. S. C. § 2254. The District Court denied relief, but thePage 10Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "the lack of any pretrial access to lawbooks violated Espitia's constitutional right to represent himself as established by the Supreme Court inFaretta[v.California,422 U. S. 806(1975)]."Garcia Espitiav.Ortiz, 113 Fed. Appx. 802, 804 (2004). The warden's petition for certiorari and respondent's motion for leave to proceedin forma pauperisare granted, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded.

A necessary condition for federal habeas relief here is that the state court's decision be "contrary to, or involv[e] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." § 2254(d)(1). Neither the opinion below, nor any of the appellate cases it relies on, identifies a source in our case law for the law library access right other thanFaretta.See 113 Fed. Appx., at 804 (relying onBribiescav.Galaza,215 F. 3d 1015,1020(CA9 2000) (quotingMiltonv.Morris,767 F. 2d 1443,1446(CA9 1985)));ibid.("Farettacontrols this case").

The federal appellate courts have split on whetherFaretta, which establishes a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, implies a right of thepro sedefendant to have access to a law library. CompareMilton, supra, withUnited Statesv.Smith,907 F. 2d 42,45(CA6 1990) ("[B]y knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel, the appellant also relinquished his access to a law library");United Statesex rel. Georgev.Lane,718 F. 2d 226,231(CA7 1983) (similar). That question cannot be resolved here, however, as it is clear thatFarettadoes not, as § 2254(d)(1) requires, "clearly establis[h]" the law library access right. In fact,Farettasays nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes apro secriminal defendant. TheBribiescacourt and the court below therefore erred in holding, based onFaretta, that a violation of a law library access right is a basis for federal habeas relief.Page 11

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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