Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Jenkins v. United States
13 L. Ed. 2d 957
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1965-04-05
- Topic
- general
holding that charge that said "[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case" was coercive | holding that instructing a deadlocked jury that, “[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case,” was coercive and constituted reversible error | holding that charge that said "[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case” was coercive | holding that instructing a deadlocked jury that, “[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case,” was coercive and constituted reversible error | recognizing that entire trial record “in its context and under all the circumstances of th[e] case” must be reviewed to determine if trial judge’s statements, questions, and instructions amounted to coercion | holding an Allen charge was unduly coercive when the trial judge said to the jury, “[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case” | observing that when a defendant challenges a trial justice’s Allen charge, the Court must consider the particular facts and circumstances of the case | noting that state court's instruction ". . . a decision has to be reached by a jury. You are that jury," was coercive | holding that the trial court’s statement, in response to the jury’s note regarding its inability to reach a verdict, that “You have got to reach a decision in this case[,]” was coercive, and reversing the defendant’s conviction and remanding for a new trial | Telling the jurors that they “have got to reach a decision in this case” is coercive. | reviewing Allen charge “in its context and under all the circumstances of this case” to determine if charge was coercive | reversing where the trial judge told the jury, "You have got to reach a verdict" | reversing and remanding the case for a new trial because the charge told the jury "[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case." | finding coercive the trial judge’ statement, “You have got to reach a decision in this case” | reversing and remanding case for a new trial because the charge told the jury "[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case" | finding court’s statement, “You have got to reach a decision in this case,” unduly coercive | Dicta that an instruction is coercive if “it gave the jury the impression they must reach a verdict” | jury coerced when told, after reporting deadlock, that “[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case” | where jury indicated doubts on sufficiency of evidence, it was coercive for judge to instruct: “You have got to reach a decision in this case.” | determinative question is "whether in its context and under all the circumstances of this case the statement was coercive" | error where judge stated to jury “[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case” | determinative question is “whether in its context and under all the circumstances of this case the statement was coercive” | new trial required where judge instructed jurors, "You have got to reach a decision in this case" | error where judge stated to jury, “[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case” | trial court’s exhortation to jury that “[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case” was coercive | judge’s statement in response to deadlocked jury that the jurors “have got to reach a decision in this case" was unduly coercive | examine content, length of deliberations following instruction, total time of delibera- tions, and indicia of coercion | look to content, length of deliberations follow- ing instruction, total time of deliberations, and indicia of coercion | judge’s statement, “You have got to reach a decision in this case,” held coercive | “A charge that strays too far from the charge approved in Allen will rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if ‘in its context and under all the circumstances, [the charge] . . . was coercive.’” | "You have got to reach a decision in this case." | citingEscamillav. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) | per No. 19-3245 7 curiam | per No. 19-3245 7 curiam | per No. 19-3245 7 curiam
Citator
- Cited by
- 214 opinions
Petitioner was charged in a two-count indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia with robbing a High’s Dairy Products store on December 27, 1962 (count 1), and with assault with intent to rob upon the proprietress of a grocery store on January 24, 1963 (count 2), in violation of §§ 22-2901 and 22-501, respectively, of the District of Columbia Code. Following a trial by jury, he was found guilty on count 1 and not guilty on count 2. He was sentenced to imprisonment for from 3 to 10 years. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 346, 330 F. 2d 220. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, four judges dissenting.
*446 Slightly more than two hours after the jury retired to deliberate, the jury sent a note to the trial judge advising that it had been unable to agree upon a verdict “on both counts because of insufficient evidence.” The judge thereupon recalled the jury to the courtroom and in the course of his response stated that “You have got to reach a decision in this case.” We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 944, to consider whether in its context and under all the circumstances of this case the statement was coercive. The Solicitor General in his brief in this Court stated:
“Of course, if this Court should conclude that the judge’s statement had the coercive effect attributed to it, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial; the principle that jurors may not be coerced into surrendering views conscientiously held is so clear as to require no elaboration.”
Upon review of the record, we conclude that in its context and under all the circumstances the judge’s statement had the coercive effect attributed to it. Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Cf. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U. S. 448, 450; Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 307-308; United States v. Rogers, 289 F. 2d 433, 435 (C. A. 4th Cir.)
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan dissent.