Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Ga., 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1991-06-20
- Topic
- general
holding that "it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so" | holding that because the Supreme Court in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984 | holding that no court may refuse to apply retroactively a federal rule of law applied to the litigants | holding that no court may refuse to apply retroactively a federal rule of law applied to the litigants | recognizing that retroactivity is not question of federal law unless rule at issue itself derives from federal law | holding that a Supreme Court ruling invalidating excise tax that favored Georgia-grown alcoholic products applied retrospectively to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata | holding that in the civil context it is error not to apply retroactively to all cases pending on direct review a rule of federal law previously applied retroactively in the case announcing the rule. | noting that the rejection of “modified prospectivity” did not “preelude[ ] consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.” | explaining that when case announcing federal rule applies rule retroactively, lower federal courts must also apply rule retroactively | holding that it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so, "principles of equality and stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chevron Oil analysis" | stating that retroactivity “is overwhelmingly the norm, and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of the law” | stating that retroactivity "is overwhelmingly the norm, and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of the law" | explaining that when case announcing federal rule applies rule retroactively, lower federal courts must also apply rule retroactively | “[NJothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases” | noting that the practice of retroactive application is overwhelmingly the norm | addressing the retroactive application of Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984 | stating that retroactive application of judicial decisions is “overwhelmingly the norm” and is “in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based on their best current understanding of the law” | describing McKesson as a case in which the issue concerns only the appropriate remedy to apply | noting that the practice of retroactive application is overwhelmingly the norm | explicating the principle that changes in decisional law “cannot reopen the door already closed” | "nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases” | concerning retroactive application of new rules of decision in civil cases | “Nothing we say here [precludes the right] to raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the nature of the remedy that must be provided, a matter with which McKes son did not deal” (emphases added) | determining whether to apply new rules to cases on direct appeal or cases arising collaterally is not a problem in the civil arena as "there is little opportunity for collateral attack of final judgments" | addressing the retroactive application of Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 L.Ed.2d 200 (1984), holding that Bacchus applies retroactively in an opinion joined by only Justices Souter and Stevens, and suggesting that Chevron Oil should be overruled | recognizing Justice Souter’s opinion “as controlling” | "[T]he remedial inquiry is one governed by state la
Citator
- Authority status
- pending
- Cited by
- 699 opinions
JAMES B. BEAM DISTILLING CO.v. GEORGIA,501 U.S. 529(1991)
111 S.Ct. 2439
JAMES B. BEAM DISTILLING CO.v. GEORGIA ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
No. 89-680
Argued October 30, 1990
Decided June 20, 1991
JUSTICE SOUTER, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded that, once this Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case, it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements orres judicata. Pp. 534-544.
(a) Whether a new rule should apply retroactively is in the first instance a matter of choice of law, to which question there are three possible answers. The first and normal practice is to make a decision fully retroactive. Second, there is the purely prospective method of overruling, where the particular case is decided under the old law but announces the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring after the date of that decision. Finally, the new rule could be applied in the case in which it is pronounced, but then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement. The possibility of such modified, or selective, prospectivity was abandoned in the criminal context inGriffithv.Kentucky,479 U.S. 314. Pp. 534-538.
(b) BecauseBacchusdid not reserve the question, and remanded the case for consideration of remedial issues, it is properly understood to have followed the normal practice of applying its rule retroactively to the litigants there before the Court. Pp. 540.Page 530
(c) BecauseBacchusthus applied its own rule, principles of equality andstare decisisrequire that it be applied to the litigants in this case.Griffith'sequality principle, that similarly situated litigants should be treated the same, applies equally well in the civil context as in the criminal. Of course, retroactivity is limited by the need for finality, since equality for those whose claims have been adjudicated could only be purchased at the expense of the principle that there be an end of litigation. In contrast, parties, such as petitioner, who wait to litigate until after others have labored to create a new rule, are merely asserting a right that is theirs in law, is not being applied on a prospective basis only, and is not otherwise barred by state procedural requirements. Modified prospectivity rejected, a new rule may not be retroactively applied to some litigants when it is not applied to others. This necessarily limits the application of theChevron Oiltest, to the effect that it may not distinguish between litigants for choice-of-law purposes on the particular equities of their claims to prospectivity. It is the nature of precedent that the substantive law will not shift and spring on such a basis. Pp. 540-544.
(d) This opinion does not speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity. Nor does it determine the appropriate remedy in this case, since remedial issues were neither considered below nor argued to this Court. P. 544.
JUSTICE WHITE concluded that, under any one of several suppositions, the opinion inBacchus Imports, Ltd. v.Dias,468 U.S. 263, may reasonably read to extend the benefits of the judgment in that case toBacchus Imports, and that petitioner here should also have the benefit ofBacchus. If the Court inBacchusthought that its decision was not a new rule, there would be no doubt that it would be retroactive to all similarly situated litigants. The Court in that case may also have thought that retroactivity was proper under the factors set forth inChevron Oil Co. v.Huson,404 U.S. 97. And even if the Court was wrong in applyingBacchusretroactively, there is no precedent in civil cases for applying a new rule to the parties of the case, but not to others. Moreover,Griffithv.Kentucky,479 U.S. 314,328, has overruled such a practice in criminal cases, and should be followed on the basis ofstare decisis. However, the propriety of pure prospectivity is settled in this Court's prior cases, see,e.g.,Ciprianov.City of Houma,395 U.S. 701,706, which recognize that, in proper cases, a new rule announced by the Court will not be applied retroactively, even to the parties before the Court. To allow for the possibility of speculation as to the propriety of such prospectivity is to suggest that there may come a time when this Court's precedents on the issue will be overturned. Pp. 544-547.Page 531
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded that prospectivity, whether "selective" or "pure," breaches the Court's obligation to discharge its constitutional function in articulating new rules for decision, which must comport with its duty to decide only cases and controversies.Griffithv.Kentucky,479 U.S. 314. The nature of judicial review constrains the Court to require retroactive application of each new rule announced. Pp. 547-548.
JUSTICE SCALIA, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN, while agreeing with JUSTICE SOUTER's conclusion, disagreed that the issue is one of choice of law, and concluded that both selective and pure prospectivity are impermissible, not for reasons of equity, but because they are not permitted by the Constitution. To allow the Judiciary powers greater than those conferred by the Constitution, as the fundamental nature of those powers was understood when the Constitution was enacted, would upset the division of federal powers central to the constitutional scheme. Pp. 548-549.
SOUTER, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,post, p. 544. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL and SCALIA, JJ., joined,post, p. 547. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined,post, p. 548. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., joined,post, p. 549.
I
Prior to its amendment in 1985, Georgia state law imposed an excise tax on imported alcohol and distilled spirits at a rate double that imposed on alcohol and distilled spirits manufactured from Georgia-grown products. See Ga. Code Ann. §3-4-60(1982). In 1984, a Hawaii statute that similarly distinguished between imported and local alcoholic products was held inBacchusto violate the Commerce Clause.Bacchus,468 U.S. at 273. It proved no bar to our finding of unconstitutionality that the discriminatory tax involved intoxicating liquors, with respectPage 533to which the States have heightened regulatory powers under theTwenty-first Amendment.Id., at 276.
InBacchus' wake, petitioner, a Delaware corporation and Kentucky bourbon manufacturer, claimed Georgia's law likewise inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, and sought a refund of $2.4 million, representing not only the differential taxation but the full amount it had paid under §3-4-60for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Georgia's Department of Revenue failed to respond to the request, and Beam thereafter brought a refund action against the State in the Superior Court of Fulton County. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court agreed that §3-4-60could not withstand aBacchusattack for the years in question, and that the tax had therefore been unconstitutional. Using the analysis described in this Court's decision inChevron Oil Co. v.Huson,404 U.S. 97(1971), the court nonetheless refused to apply its ruling retroactively. It therefore denied petitioner's refund request.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court in both respects. The court held the pre-1985 version of the statute to have violated the Commerce Clause as, in its words, an act of "simple economic protectionism." See259 Ga. 363,364,382 S.E.2d 95,96(1989) (citingBacchus). But it, too, applied that finding on a prospective basis only, in the sense that it declined to declare the State's application of the statute unconstitutional for the years in question. The court concluded that, but forBacchus, its decision on the constitutional question would have established a new rule of law by overruling past precedent, seeScottv.State,187 Ga. 702,2 S.E.2d 65(1939) (upholding predecessor to §3-4-60against Commerce Clause objection), upon which the litigants may justifiably have relied. See259 Ga., at 365,382 S.E.2d, at 96. That reliance, together with the "unjust results" that would follow from retroactive application, was thought by the court to satisfy theChevron Oiltest for prospectivity. To thePage 534dissenting argument of two justices that a statute found unconstitutional is unconstitutionalab initio, the court observed that, while it had "`declared statutes to be void from their inception when they were contrary to the Constitution at the time of enactment, . . . those decisions are not applicable to the present controversy, as the original . . . statute, when adopted, was not violative of the Constitution under the court interpretations of that period.'"259 Ga., at 366,382 S.E.2d, at 97(quotingAdams v. Adams,249 Ga. 477,478-479,291 S.E.2d 518,520(1982)).
Beam sought a writ of certiorari from the Court on the retroactivity question.1We granted the petition,496 U.S. 924(1990), and now reverse.
II
In the ordinary case no question of retroactivity arises. Courts are, as a general matter, in the business of applying settled principles and precedents of law to the disputes that come to bar. See Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 60 (1965). Where those principles and precedents antedate the events on which the dispute turns, the court merely applies legal rules already decided, and the litigant has no basis on which to claim exemption from those rules.
It is only when the law changes in some respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity may be entertained, the paradigm case arising when a court expressly overrules a precedent upon which the contest would otherwise be decided differently and by which the parties may previously have regulated their conduct. Since the question is whether the court should apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity isPage 535properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice of law, "a choice . . . between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward."Great Northern R. Co. v.Sunburst Oil Refining Co.,287 U.S. 358,364(1932). Once a rule is found to apply "backward," there may then be a further issue of remedies,i.e., whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one. Subject to possible constitutional thresholds, seeMcKesson Corp. v.Florida Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Div.,496 U.S. 18(1990), the remedial inquiry is one governed by state law, at least where the case originates in state court. SeeAmerican TruckingAssns., Inc. v.Smith,496 U.S. 167,210(1990) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal one where the rule at issue itself derives from federal law, constitutional or otherwise. SeeSmith, supra, at 177-178 (plurality opinion); cf.United Statesv.Estate of Donnelly,397 U.S. 286,297, n. (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
As a matter purely of judicial mechanics, there are three ways in which the choice-of-law problem may be resolved. First, a decision may be made fully retroactive, applying both to the parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed, consistent withres judicataand procedural barriers such as statutes of limitations. This practice is overwhelmingly the norm, seeKuhnv.Fairmont Coal Co.,215 U.S. 349,372(Holmes, J., dissenting), and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of the law. SeeMackeyv.United States,401 U.S. 667,679(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). It also reflects the declaratory theory of law, seeSmith, supra, at 201 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment);Linkletterv.Walker,381 U.S. 618,Page 536622-623 (1965), according to which the courts are understood only to find the law, not to make it. But in some circumstances, retroactive application may prompt difficulties of a practical sort. However much it comports with our received notions of the judicial role, the practice has been attacked for its failure to take account of reliance on cases subsequently abandoned, a fact of life if not always one of jurisprudential recognition. See,e.g.,Mosserv.Darrow,341 U.S. 267,276(1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
Second, there is the purely prospective method of overruling, under which a new rule is applied neither to the parties in the law-making decision nor to those others against or by whom it might be applied to conduct or events occurring before that decision. The case is decided under the old law, but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring after the date of that decision. This Court has, albeit infrequently, resorted to pure prospectivity, seeChevron Oil Co. v.Huson,404 U.S. 97(1971);Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.Marathon Pipe Line Co.,458 U.S. 50,88(1982);Buckleyv.Valeo,424 U.S. 1,142-143(1976);Englandv.Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,375 U.S. 411,422(1964); see alsoSmith, supra, at 221, n. 11 (STEVENS, J., dissenting);Linkletter, supra, at 628, although, in so doing it has never been required to distinguish the remedial from the choice-of-law aspect of its decision. SeeSmith, supra, at 210, (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This approach claims justification in its appreciation that "[t]he past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration,"Chicot County Drainage Districtv.Baxter State Bank,308 U.S. 371,374(1940); see alsoLemonv.Kurtzman,411 U.S. 192,199(1973) (plurality opinion), and that to apply the new rule to parties who relied on the old would offend basic notions of justice and fairness. But this equitable method has its own drawback: it tends to relax the force of precedent, by minimizing the costs of overruling, and thereby allows the courts to act with a freedom comparable to that of legislatures. SeeUnited Statesv.Johnson,457 U.S. 537,554-555Page 537(1982);Jamesv.United States,366 U.S. 213,225(1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
Finally, a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement. This method, which we may call modified, or selective, prospectivity, enjoyed its temporary ascendancy in the criminal law during a period in which the Court formulated new rules, prophylactic or otherwise, to insure protection of the rights of the accused. See,e.g., Johnsonv.New Jersey,384 U.S. 719(1966);Stovallv.Denno,388 U.S. 293,297(1967);Danielv.Louisiana,420 U.S. 31(1975); see alsoSmith, supra, at 198 ("During the period in which much of our retroactivity doctrine evolved, most of the Court's new rules of criminal procedure had expanded the protections available to criminal defendants"). On the one hand, full retroactive application of holdings such as those announced inMirandav.Arizona,384 U.S. 436(1966);Escobedov.Illinois,378 U.S. 478(1964); andKatzv.United States,389 U.S. 347(1967), would have "seriously disrupt[ed] the administration of our criminal laws[,] . . . requir[ing] the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards."Johnson, supra, at 731. On the other hand, retroactive application could hardly have been denied the litigant in the law-changing decision itself. A criminal defendant usually seeks one thing only on appeal, the reversal of his conviction; future application would provide little in the way of solace. In this context, without retroactivity at least to the first successful litigant, the incentive to seek review would be diluted, if not lost altogether.
But selective prospectivity also breaches the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component ofstare decisisand the rule of law generally. See R. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision 69-72 (1961). "We depart from this basic judicialPage 538tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a `new' rule of constitutional law."Desistv.United States,394 U.S. 244,258-259(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Von Moschzisker,Stare Decisisin Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 409, 425 (1924). For this reason, we abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity in the criminal context inGriffithv.Kentucky,479 U.S. 314,328(1987), even where the new rule constituted a "clear break" with previous law, in favor of completely retroactive application of all decisions to cases pending on direct review. ThoughGriffithwas held not to dispose of the matter of civil retroactivity, seeid., at 322, n. 8, selective prospectivity appears never to have been endorsed in the civil context.Smith,496 U.S., at 200(plurality opinion). This case presents the issue.
III
Both parties have assumed the applicability of theChevron Oiltest, under which the Court has accepted prospectivity (whether in the choice-of-law or remedial sense, it is not clear) where a decision displaces a principle of law on which reliance may reasonably have been placed, and where prospectivity is, on balance, warranted by its effect on the operation of the new rule and by the inequities that might otherwise result from retroactive application. SeeChevron Oil,404 U.S., at 106-107. But we have never employedChevron Oilto the end of modified civil prospectivity.
The issue is posed by the scope of our disposition inBacchus. In most decisions of this Court, retroactivity both as to choice of law and as to remedy goes without saying. Although the taxpaying appellants prevailed on the merits of their Commerce Clause claim, however, theBacchusCourt did not grant outright their request for a refund of taxes paid under the law found unconstitutional. Instead, we remanded the case for consideration of the State's arguments that appellantsPage 539were "not entitled to refunds, since they did not bear the economic incidence of the tax, but passed it on as a separate addition to the price that their customers were legally obligated to pay."Bacchus,468 U.S., at 276-277. "These refund issues, . . . essentially issues of remedy," had not been adequately developed on the record nor passed upon by the state courts below, and their consideration may have been intertwined with, or obviated by, matters of state law.Id., at 277.
Questions of remedy aside,Bacchusis fairly read to hold, as a choice of law, that its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the Court. Because theBacchusopinion did not reserve the question whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it,American Trucking Assns., Inc. v.Scheiner,483 U.S. 266,297-298(1987) (remanding case to consider whether ruling "should be applied retroactively and to decide other remedial issues"), it is properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in civil cases. If the Court were to have found prospectivity as a choice-of-law matter, there would have been no need to consider the pass-through defense; if the Court had reserved the issue, the terms of the remand to consider "remedial" issues would have been incomplete. Indeed, any consideration of remedial issues necessarily implies that the precedential question has been settled to the effect that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the Court. SeeMcKesson,496 U.S., at 18(pass-through defense considered as remedial question). Because the Court inBacchusremanded the case solely for consideration of the pass-through defense, it thus should be read as having retroactively applied the rule there decided.2SeePage 540alsoWilliamsv.Vermont,472 U.S. 14,28(1985);ExxonCorp. v.Eagerton,462 U.S. 176,196-197(1983); cf.Davisv.MichiganDept. of Treasury,489 U.S. 803,817(1989).Bacchusthus applied its own rule, just as if it had reversed and remanded without further ado, and yet, of course, the Georgia courts refused to apply that rule with respect to the litigants in this case. Thus, the question is whether it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so. We hold that it is, principles of equality andstaredecisishere prevailing over any claim based on aChevron Oilanalysis.Griffithcannot be confined to the criminal law. Its equality principle, that similarly situated litigants should be treated the same, carries comparable force in the civil context. SeeUnited Statesv.Estate of Donnelly,397 U.S., at 296(Harlan, J., concurring). Its strength is in fact greater in the latter sphere. With respect to retroactivity in criminal cases, there remains even now the disparate treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in collateral proceedings. SeeGriffith, supra, at 331-332 (WHITE, J., dissenting). WhereasGriffithheld that new rules must apply retroactively to all criminal cases pending on direct review, we have since concluded that new rules will not relate back to convictions challenged on habeas corpus.Teaguev.Lane,489 U.S. 288(1989). No such difficulty exists in the civil arena, in which there is little opportunity for collateral attack of final judgments.
Nor is selective prospectivity necessary to maintain incentives to litigate in the civil context as it may have been in the criminal beforeGriffith'srule of absolute retroactivity. In the civil context, "even a party who is deprived of the full retroactivePage 541benefit of a new decision may receive some relief."Smith,496 U.S., at 198-199. Had the appellants inBacchuslost their bid for retroactivity, for example, they would nonetheless have won protection from the future imposition of discriminatory taxes, and the same goes for the petitioner here. Assuming that pure prospectivity may be had at all, moreover, its scope must necessarily be limited to a small number of cases; its possibility is therefore unlikely to deter the broad class of prospective challengers of civil precedent. SeegenerallyCurrier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201, 215 (1965).
Of course, retroactivity in civil cases must be limited by the need for finality, seeChicot County Drainage Districtv.Baxter State Bank,308 U.S. 371(1940); once suit is barred byres judicataor by statutes of limitation or repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door already closed. It is true that one might deem the distinction arbitrary, just as some have done in the criminal context with respect to the distinction between direct review and habeas: why should someone whose failure has otherwise become final not enjoy the next day's new rule, from which victory would otherwise spring? It is also objected that, in civil cases, unlike criminal, there is more potential for litigants to freeload on those without whose labor the new rule would never have come into being. (Criminal defendants are already potential litigants by virtue of their offense, and invoke retroactivity only by way of defense; civil beneficiaries of new rules may become litigants as a result of the law change alone, and use it as a weapon.) That is true of the petitioner now before us, which did not challenge the Georgia law until after its fellow liquor distributors had won their battle inBacchus. To apply the rule ofBacchusto the parties in that case but not in this one would not, therefore, provoke Justice Harlan's attack on modified prospectivity as "[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutionalPage 542standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases to flow by unaffected by that new rule."Mackey,401 U.S., at 679(Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part); see alsoSmith, supra, at 214-215 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Beam had yet to enter the waters at the time of our decision inBacchus, and yet we give itBacchus'benefit. Insofar as equality drives us, it might be argued that the new rule should be applied to those who had toiled and failed, but whose claims are now precluded by res judicata, and that it should not be applied to those who only exploit others' efforts by litigating in the new rule's wake.
As to the former, independent interests are at stake; and with respect to the latter, the distinction would be too readily and unnecessarily overcome. While those whose claims have been adjudicated may seek equality, a second chance for them could only be purchased at the expense of another principle. "Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of that contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.'"FederatedDepartment Storesv.Moitie,452 U.S. 394,401(1981) (quotingBaldwinv.Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn.,283 U.S. 522,525(1931)). Finality must thus delimit equality in a temporal sense, and we must accept as a fact that the argument for uniformity loses force over time. As for the putative hangers-on, they are merely asserting a right that the Court has told them is theirs in law, that the Court has not deemed necessary to apply on a prospective basis only, and that is not otherwise barred by state procedural requirements. They cannot be characterized as freeloaders any more than those who seek vindication under a new rule on facts arising after the rule's announcement. Those in each class rely on the labors of the first successful litigant. We might, of course, limit retroactive application to those who at least tried to fight their own battles by litigating before victory wasPage 543certain. To this possibility it is enough to say that distinguishing between those with cases pending and those without would only serve to encourage the filing of replicative suits when this or any other appellate court created the possibility of a new rule by taking a case for review.
Nor, finally, are litigants to be distinguished for choice-of-law purposes on the particular equities of their claims to prospectivity: whether they actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive application of the new. It is simply in the nature of precedent, as a necessary component of any system that aspires to fairness and equality, that the substantive law will not shift and spring on such a basis. To this extent, our decision here does limit the possible applications of theChevron Oilanalysis, however irrelevantChevron Oilmay otherwise be to this case. Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others, theChevron Oiltest cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the particular case. SeeSimpsonv.Director, Office ofWorkers' Compensation Programs, United States Dept. of Labor,681 F.2d 81,85-86(CA1 1982), cert. denied sub nom.Bath Iron Works Corp. v.Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United StatesDept. of Labor,459 U.S. 1127(1983); see also Note, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 117, 131-132. Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application. The applicability of rules of law are not to be switched on and off according to individual hardship; allowing relitigation of choice-of-law issues would only compound the challenge to the stabilizing purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the very development of "new" rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the courts to consider, the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but similarlyPage 544situated. Conversely, nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.
IV
The grounds for our decision today are narrow. They are confined entirely to an issue of choice of law: when the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case, it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata. We do not speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.
Nor do we speculate about the remedy that may be appropriate in this case; remedial issues were neither considered below nor argued to this Court, save for an effort by petitioner to buttress its claim by reference to our decision last Term inMcKesson. As we have observed repeatedly, federal "issues of remedy . . . may well be intertwined with, or their consideration obviated by, issues of state law."Bacchus,468 U.S., at 277. Nothing we say here deprives respondent of his opportunity to raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the nature of the remedy that must be provided, a matter with whichMcKessondid not deal. SeeEstate of Donnelly,397 U.S., at 296(Harlan, J., concurring); cf.Lemon,411 U.S., at 203.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.It is so ordered.
Nothing in the above, however, is meant to suggest that I retreat from those opinions filed in this Court which I wrote or joined holding or recognizing that in proper cases a new rule announced by the Court will not be applied retroactively, even to the parties before the Court. See,e.g., Ciprianov.City of Houma,395 U.S. 701,706(1969). ThisPage 546was what Justice Stewart wrote for the Court inChevronOil, summarizing what was deemed to be the essence of those cases.Chevron Oil, supra, at 105-109. This was also what JUSTICE O'CONNOR wrote for the plurality inAmerican Trucking Assns., Inc. v.Smith,496 U.S. 167(1990). I joined that opinion, and would not depart from it. Nor, without overrulingChevron Oiland those other cases before and afterChevron Oil, holding that certain decisions will be applied prospectively only, can anyone sensibly insist on automatic retroactivity for any and all judicial decisions in the federal system.
Hence, I do not understand how JUSTICE SOUTER can cite the cases on prospective operation,ante, at 536-537, and yet say that he need not speculate as to the propriety of pure prospectivity,ante, at 544. The propriety of prospective application of decision in this Court, in both Constitutional and statutory cases, is settled by our prior decisions. To nevertheless "speculate" about the issue is only to suggest that there may come a time when our precedents on the issue will be overturned.
Plainly enough, JUSTICES SCALIA, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN would depart from our precedents. JUSTICE SCALIA would do so for two reasons, as I read him.Post, at 548. First, even though the JUSTICE is not naive enough (nor does he think the Framers were naive enough) to be unaware that judges in a real sense "make" law, he suggests that judges (in an unreal sense, I suppose) should never concede that they do, and must claim that they do no more than discover it, hence suggesting that there are citizens who are naive enough to believe them. Second, JUSTICE SCALIA, fearful of our ability and that of other judges to resist the temptation to overrule prior cases, would maximize the injury to the public interest when overruling occurs, which would tend to deter them from departing from established precedent.Page 547
I am quite unpersuaded by this line of reasoning, and hence concur in the judgment on the narrower ground employed by JUSTICE SOUTER.
I do not read JUSTICE SCALIA's comments on the division of federal powers to reject the idea expressed so well by the last Justice Harlan that selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same. SeeMackeyv.UnitedStates,401 U.S. 667,678-679(1971), andDesistv.United States,394 U.S. 244,258-259(1969) (dissenting opinion), on whichGriffithrelied. This rule, which we have characterized as a question of equity, is not the remedial equity that the dissent seems to believe can trump the role of adjudication in our constitutional scheme. Seepost, at 550-551. It derives from the integrity of judicial review, which does not justify applying principles determined to be wrong toPage 548litigants who are in or may still come to court. We fulfill our judicial responsibility by requiring retroactive application of each new rule we announce.
Application of new decisional rules does not thwart the principles ofstare decisis, as the dissent suggests. Seepost, at 552. The doctrine ofstare decisisprofoundly serves important purposes in our legal system. Nearly a half century ago, Justice Roberts cautioned: "Respect for tribunals must fall when the bar and the public come to understand that nothing that has been said in prior adjudication has force in a current controversy."Mahnichv.Southern S.S. Co.,321 U.S. 96,113(1944) (dissenting opinion). The present dissent's view ofstaredecisiswould rob the doctrine of its vitality through eliminating the tension between the current controversy and the new rule. By announcing new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may dodge thestare decisisbullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us from disturbing our settled precedents. Because it forces us to consider the disruption that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines withstare decisisto prevent us from altering the law each time the opportunity presents itself.
Like JUSTICE SCALIA, I conclude that prospectivity, whether "selective" or "pure," breaches our obligation to discharge our constitutional function.
If the division of federal powers central to the constitutional scheme is to succeed in its objective, it seems to me that the fundamental nature of those powers must be preserved as that nature was understood when the Constitution was enacted. The Executive, for example, in addition to "tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, has no power to bind private conduct in areas not specifically committed to his control by Constitution or statute; such a perception of "[t]he Executive power" may be familiar to other legal systems, but is alien to our own. So also, I think, "[t]he judicial Power of the United States" conferred upon this Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish, Art. III, § 1, must be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our common law tradition. That is the power "to say what the law is,"Marburyv.Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), not the power to change it. I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense "make" law. But they make itas judges make it, which is to sayas thoughthey were "finding" it — discerning what the lawis, rather than decreeing what it is todaychanged to, or what it willtomorrowbe. Of course this mode of action poses "difficulties of a . . . practical sort,"ante, at 536, when courts decide to overrule prior precedent. But those difficulties are one of the understood checks upon judicial law making; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to "make new law," and thus to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three Branches.
For this reason, and not reasons of equity, I would find both "selective prospectivity" and "pure prospectivity" beyond our power.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE SCALIA concur in the judgment of the Court, but would abrogate completely theChevron Oilinquiry and hold that all decisions must be applied retroactively in all cases. I explained last Term that such a rule ignores well-settled precedent in which this Court has refused repeatedly to apply new rules retroactively in civil cases. SeeAmerican Trucking Assns. v.Smith,496 U.S. 167,188-200(opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). There is no need to repeat that discussion here. I reiterate, however, that precisely because this Court has "the power `to say what the law is,'Marburyv.Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803),"ante, at 549 (SCALIA, J., concurring), when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it. If the Court decides, in the context of a civil case or controversy, to change the law, it must make the subsequent determination whether the new law or the old is to apply to conduct occurring before the law-changing decision.Chevron Oildescribes our long-established procedure for making this inquiry.
I
I agree that the Court inBacchusapplied its rule retroactively to the parties before it. TheBacchusopinion is silent on the retroactivity question. Given that the usual course in cases before this Court is to apply the rule announced to the parties in the case, the most reasonable reading of silence is that the Court followed its customary practice.
TheBacchusCourt erred in applying its rule retroactively. It did not employ theChevron Oilanalysis, but should have. Had it done so, the Court would have concluded that theBacchusrule should be applied prospectively only. JUSTICE SOUTER today concludes that, even in the absence of an independent examination of retroactivity, once the Court appliesPage 551a new rule retroactively to the parties before it, it must thereafter apply the rule retroactively to everyone. I disagree. Without a determination that retroactivity is appropriate underChevron Oil, neither equality norstare decisisleads to this result.
As to "equality," JUSTICE SOUTER believes that it would be unfair to withhold the benefit of the new rule inBacchusto litigants similarly situated to those who received the benefit in that case.Ante, at 537-538, 540. If JUSTICE SOUTER is concerned with fairness, he cannot ignoreChevron Oil; the purpose of theChevron Oiltest is to determine the equities of retroactive application of a new rule. SeeChevronOil, supra, at 107-108;American Trucking, supra, at 191. Had theBacchusCourt determined that retroactivity would be appropriate underChevron Oil, or had this Court made that determination now, retroactive application would be fair. Where theChevron Oilanalysis indicates that retroactivity is not appropriate, however, just the opposite is true. If retroactive application was inequitable inBacchusitself, the Court only hinders the cause of fairness by repeating the mistake. Because I conclude that theChevronOiltest dictates thatBacchusnot be applied retroactively, I would decline the Court's invitation to impose liability on every jurisdiction in the Nation that reasonably relied on pre-Bacchuslaw.
JUSTICE SOUTER also explains that "stare decisis" compels its result.Ante, at 540. By this, I assume he means that the retroactive application of theBacchusrule to the parties in that case is itself a decision of the Court to which the Court should now defer in deciding the retroactivity question in this case. This is not a proper application ofstare decisis. The Court inBacchusapplied its rule retroactively to the parties before it without any analysis of the issue. This tells us nothing about how this case — where theChevronOilquestion is squarely presented — should come out.
Contrary to JUSTICE SOUTER's assertions,stare decisiscuts the other way in this case. At its core,stare decisisallowsPage 552those affected by the law to order their affairs without fear that the established law upon which they rely will suddenly be pulled out from under them. A decision not to apply a new rule retroactively is based on principles ofstare decisis. By not applying a law-changing decision retroactively, a court respects the settled expectations that have built up around the old law. SeeAmerican Trucking, 496 U.S., at 197 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) ("prospective overruling allows courts to respect the principle ofstare decisiseven when they are impelled to change the law in light of new understanding");id., at 205 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (imposition of retroactive liability on a litigant would "upset that litigant's settled expectationsbecause the earlier decision for whichstare decisiseffect is claimed . . . overruled prior law. That would turn the doctrine ofstare decisisagainst the very purpose for which it exists"). If aChevron Oilanalysis reveals, as it does, that retroactive application ofBacchuswould unjustly undermine settled expectations,stare decisisdictates strongly against the Court's holding.
JUSTICE SOUTER purports to have restricted the application ofChevronOilonly to a limited extent.Ante, at 543. The effect appears to me far greater. JUSTICE SOUTER concludes that theChevron Oilanalysis, if ignored in answering the narrow question of retroactivity as to the parties to a particular case, must be ignored also in answering the far broader question of retroactivity as to all other parties. But it is precisely in determining general retroactivity that theChevron Oiltest is most needed; the broader the potential reach of a new rule, the greater the potential disruption of settled expectations. The inquiry the Court summarized inChevron Oilrepresents longstanding doctrine on the application of nonretroactivity to civil cases. SeeAmericanTrucking, supra, at 188-200. JUSTICE SOUTER today ignores this well-established precedent, and seriously curtails theChevron Oilinquiry. His reliance uponstare decisisin reaching this conclusion becomes all the more ironic.Page 553
II
Faithful to this Court's decisions, the Georgia Supreme Court in this case applied the analysis described inChevron Oilin deciding the retroactivity question before it. Subsequently, this Court has gone out of its way to ignore that analysis. A proper application ofChevron Oildemonstrates, however, thatBacchusshould no be applied retroactively.Chevron Oildescribes a three-part inquiry in determining whether a decision of this Court will have prospective effect only:
"First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, . . . we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. Finally, we [must] weig[h] the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for [w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity."404 U.S., at 106-107(citations and internal quotations omitted).Bacchuseasily meets the first criterion. That case considered a Hawaii excise tax on alcohol sales that exempted certain locally produced liquor. The Court held that the tax, by discriminating in favor of local products, violated the Commerce Clause,U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl.3, by interfering with interstate commerce.468 U.S., at 273. The Court rejected the State's argument that any violation of ordinary Commerce Clause principles was, in the case of alcohol sales, overborne by the State's plenary powers under § 2 of thePage 554Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution. That section provides:
"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The Court noted that language in some of our earlier opinions indicated that § 2 did indeed give the States broad power to establish the terms under which imported liquor might compete with domestic. See468 U.S., at 274, and n. 13. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that other cases had by then established "that the [Twenty-first] Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause."Id., at 275. Relying onHostetterv.Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,377 U.S. 324(1964),CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,445 U.S. 97(1980), andCapital Cities Cable, Inc. v.Crisp,467 U.S. 691(1984), the Court concluded that § 2 did not protect the State from liability for economic protectionism.468 U.S., at 275-276.
The Court's conclusion inBacchuswas unprecedented. Beginning withState Board of Equalization of Californiav.Young's Market Co.,299 U.S. 59(1936), an uninterrupted line of authority from this Court held that States need not meet the strictures of the so-called "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause when regulating sales and importation of liquor within the State.Young's Marketis directly on point. There, the Court rejected precisely the argument it eventually accepted inBacchus. The California statute at issue inYoung's Marketimposed a license fee for the privilege of importing beer into the State. The Court concluded that, "[p]rior to theTwenty-first Amendment, it would obviously have been unconstitutional to have imposed any fee for that privilege," because doing so directly burdens interstate commerce.299 U.S., at 62. Section 2 changed all of that. The Court answered appellees' assertion that § 2 did not abrogatePage 555negative Commerce Clause restrictions. The contrast between this discussion and the Court's rule inBacchusis stark:
"[Appellees] request us to construe the Amendment as saying, in effect: the State may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture and sale within its borders; but if it permits such manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms. To say that would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a rewriting of it.
"The plaintiffs argue that, despite the Amendment, a State may not regulate importations except for the purpose of protecting the public health, safety or morals, and that the importer's license fee was not imposed to that end. Surely the State may adopt a lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition. Can it be doubted that a State might establish a state monopoly of the manufacture and sale of beer, and either prohibit all competing importations or discourage importation by laying a heavy impost, or channelize desired importations by confining them to a single consignee?"Id., at 62-63.
Numerous cases followingYoung's Marketare to the same effect, recognizing the States' broad authority to regulate commerce in intoxicating beverages unconstrained by negative Commerce Clause restrictions. See,e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v.Reeves,308 U.S. 132,138(1939);United Statesv.Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.,324 U.S. 293,299(1945);Seagram Sons, Inc. v.Hostetter,384 U.S. 35,42(1966);Heublein, Inc. v.South Carolina Tax Comm'n,409 U.S. 275,283-284(1972); see generallyBacchus, supra, at 281-282 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
The cases that theBacchusCourt cited in support of its new rule in fact provided no notice whatsoever of the impending change.Idlewild,Midcal, andCapital Cities, supra, all involved States' authority toPage 556regulate the sale and importation of alcohol when doing so conflicted directly with legislation passed by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause. The Court in each case held that § 2 did not give States the authority to override congressional legislation. These essentially were Supremacy Clause cases; in that context, the Court concluded that theTwenty-first Amendmenthad not "repealed" the Commerce Clause. SeeIdlewild, supra, at 331-332;Midcal, supra, at 108-109;Capital Cities, supra, at 712-713.
These cases are irrelevant toBacchusbecause they involved the relation between § 2 and Congress' authority to legislate under the (positive) Commerce Clause.Bacchusand theYoung's Marketline concerned States' authority to regulate liquor unconstrained by thenegativeCommerce Clause in the absence of any congressional pronouncement. This distinction was clear fromIdlewild, Midcal, andCapital Citiesthemselves.Id.,IdlewildandCapital Citiesacknowledged explicitly that § 2 trumps the negative Commerce Clause. SeeIdlewild, supra, at 330 ("`since theTwenty-first Amendment, . . . the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause. . . .'"), quotingIndianapolis Brewing Co. v.Liquor ControlComm'n,305 U.S. 391,394(1939);Capital Cities, supra, at 712, ("`This Court's decisions . . . have confirmed that the [Twenty-first] Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause.' . . . § 2 reserves to the States power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent the Amendment, would clearly be invalid under the Commerce Clause"), quotingCraigv.Boren,429 U.S. 190,206(1976).
In short,Bacchus'rule that the Commerce Clause places restrictions on state power under § 2 in the absence of any congressional action came out of the blue.Bacchusoverruled theYoung's Marketline in this regard and created a new rule. SeeBacchus,468 U.S., at 278-287Page 557(STEVENS, J., dissenting) explaining just how new the rule of that case was).
There is nothing in the nature of theBacchusrule that dictates retroactive application. The negative Commerce Clause, which underlies that rule, prohibits States from interfering with interstate commerce. As to its application inBacchus, that purpose is fully served if States are, from the date of that decision, prevented from enacting similar tax schemes. Petitioner James Beam argues that the purposes of the Commerce Clause will not be served fully unlessBacchusis applied retroactively. The company contends that retroactive application will further deter States from enacting such schemes. The argument fails. Before our decision inBacchus, the State of Georgia was fully justified in believing that the tax at issue in this case did not violate the Commerce Clause. Indeed, beforeBacchus, it did not violate the Commerce Clause. The imposition of liability in hindsight against a State that, acting reasonably would do the same thing again, will prevent no unconstitutionality. SeeAmerican Trucking,496 U.S., at 180-181(opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).
Precisely becauseBacchuswas so unprecedented, the equities weigh heavily against retroactive application of the rule announced in that case. "Where a State can easily foresee the invalidation of its tax statutes, its reliance interests may merit little concern. . . . By contrast, because the State cannot be expected to foresee that a decision of this Court would overturn established precedents, the inequity of unsettling actions taken in reliance on those precedents is apparent."American Trucking, supra, at 182 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). In this case, Georgia reasonably relied not only on theYoung's Marketline of cases from this Court, but a Georgia Supreme Court decision upholding the predecessor to the tax statute at issue. SeeScottv.Georgia,187 Ga. 702,705,2 S.E.2d 65,66(1939), relying onYoung's MarketandIndianapolisBrewing.Page 558
Nor is there much to weigh in the balance. BeforeBacchus, the legitimate expectation of James Beam and other liquor manufacturers was that they had to pay the tax here at issue and that it was constitutional. They made their business decisions accordingly. There is little hardship to these companies from not receiving a tax refund they had no reason to anticipate.
The equitable analysis ofChevron Oilplaces limitations on the liability that may be imposed on unsuspecting parties after this Court changes the law. James Beam claims that, ifBacchusis applied retroactively, and the Georgia excise tax is declared to have been collected unconstitutionally from 1982 to 1984, the State owes the company a $2.4 million refund. App. 8. There are at least two identical refund actions pending in the Georgia courts. These plaintiffs seek refunds of almost $28 million. SeeHeublein, Inc. v.Georgia, Civ. Action No. 87-3542-6 (DeKalb Super. Ct., Apr. 24, 1987);Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. v.Georgia, Civ. Action No. 87-7070-8 (DeKalb Super.Ct., Sept. 4, 1987). Brief for Respondents 26, n. 8. The State estimates its total potential liability to all those taxed at $30 million.Id., at 30. To impose on Georgia and the other States that reasonably relied on this Court's established precedent such extraordinary retroactive liability, at a time when most States are struggling to fund even the most basic services, is the height of unfairness.
We are not concerned here with a State that reaped an unconstitutional windfall from its taxpayers. Georgia collected in good faith what was at the time a constitutional tax. The Court now subjects the State to potentially devastating liability without fair warning. This burden will fall not on some corrupt state government, but ultimately on the blameless and unexpecting citizens of Georgia in the form of higher taxes and reduced benefits. Nothing in our jurisprudence compels that result; our traditional analysis of retroactivity dictates against it.Page 559
A fair application of theChevron Oilanalysis requires thatBacchusnot be applied retroactively. It should not have been applied even to the parties in that case. That mistake was made. The Court today compounds the problem by imposing widespread liability on parties having no reason to expect it. This decision is made in the name of "equality" and "stare decisis." By refusing to take into account the settled expectations of those who relied on this Court's established precedents, the Court's decision perverts the meaning of both those terms. I respectfully dissent.Page 560
- Page 531 Briefs ofamici curiaeurging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama et al. byMary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia,H.Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attorney General,Gail Starling Marshall, Deputy Attorney General, andPeter W. Low, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective State as follows:Don Siegelmanof Page 532 Alabama,Robert K. Corbinof Arizona,Steve Clarkof Arkansas,Duane Woodardof Colorado,Linley E. Pearsonof Indiana,ThomasJ. Millerof Iowa,William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana,James E.Tierneyof Maine,J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,Hubert H.Humphrey IIIof Minnesota,Robert J. Del Tufoof New Jersey,RobertAbramsof New York,R. Paul Van Damof Utah,Jeffrey L. Amestoyof Vermont, andDon Hanawayof Wisconsin; for the State of California et al. byJohn K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California,RichardF. Finn, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, andEric J. Coffill,Clarine Nardi Riddle, Attorney General of Connecticut,Robert A.Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida,Warren Price III, Attorney General of Hawaii,James T. Jones, Attorney General of Idaho,Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan,Robert M.Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska,Hal Stratton, Attorney General of New Mexico,Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio,Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota,R. PaulVan Dam, Attorney General of Utah,Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington,Roger W. Thompkins, Attorney General of West Virginia,Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General of Wisconsin, andHerbert O. Reid, Sr.; and for the Council of State Governments et al. byCharles RothfeldandBenna Ruth Solomon. ↩
- Page 534 Although petitioner expends some effort, see Brief for Petitioner 5-8, in asserting the unconstitutionality underBacchusof the Georgia law as amended, see Ga. Code Ann. §3-4-60(1990), an argument rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court inHeublein, Inc. v.State,256 Ga. 578,351 S.E.2d 190(1987), that issue is neither before us nor relevant to the issue that is. ↩
- Page 539 In fact, the state defendant inBacchusargued for pure prospectivity under the criteria set forth inChevron Oil Co. v.Huson,404 U.S. 97(1971). See Brief for Appellee inBacchus Imports Ltd. v.Dias, O.T. 1983, No. 82-1565, p. 19. It went on to argue that "evenif" the challenged tax were held invalidandthe decision were not limited to prospective application, the challengers should not be Page 540 entitled to refunds, because any taxes paid would have been passed through to consumers.Id., at 46. Though unnecessary to our ruling here, the prospectivity issue can thus be said actually to have been litigated and, by implication actually to have been decided by the Court by the fact of its consideration of the pass-through defense. SeeClemonsv.Mississippi,494 U.S. 738,747-748(1990). ↩
- Page 545 SeeNorthern Pipeline Construction Co. v.Marathon Pipe Line Co.,458 U.S. 50,88(1982);Buckleyv.Valeo,424 U.S. 1,142-143(1976);Chevron Oil Co. v.Huson,404 U.S. 97(1971);Ciprianov.City ofHouma,395 U.S. 701,706(1969);Allenv.State Bd. of Elections,393 U.S. 544,572(1969);Simpsonv.Union Oil Co.,377 U.S. 13,24-25(1964);Englandv.Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,375 U.S. 411,422(1964);Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.Baxter State Bank,308 U.S. 371,374(1940). ↩