Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Herb v. Pitcairn
Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77 (1945)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1945-04-30
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- holding an action is commenced for time limitations purposes when filed in court with no jurisdiction over the matter but with the power to transfer to an appropriate court
- explaining that “[a]n action is ‘commenced’ for [FELA] purposes as a matter of federal law when instituted by service of process issued out of a state court, even if one which itself is unable to proceed to judgment . . . ”
- filing of discrimination complaint in state court without jurisdiction equitably tolled filing requirement
- where action under FELA was commenced in state court without jurisdiction within two year statute of limitations, the statute was tolled
- equitable tolling appropriate where employee filed FELA action in state court without jurisdiction
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Herb v. Pitcairn. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 90 opinions
Headnotes
- Transportation Law — Statute of Limitations — Commencement of Action For purposes of the Federal Employers' Liability Act's two-year limitations period, an action is "commenced" as a matter of federal law when instituted by service of process issued out of a state court, even if that court is itself unable to proceed to judgment, provided the state law or practice directs or permits transfer of the proceeding through change of venue or otherwise to a court that does have jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine the cause. 325 U.S. at 78
- Transportation Law — Statute of Limitations — Sufficiency of Initial Process Where process has been adequate to bring the parties before the court and to start the case on a course of judicial handling that may lead to final judgment without the issuance of new initial process, the action is sufficiently commenced within the federal statute of limitations. 325 U.S. at 78
- Transportation Law — Statute of Limitations — Effect of State Law Whether an action would be barred under the federal limitations period if state law made new or supplemental process necessary is a question left undecided; the federal rule turns only on whether the initial process sufficed to commence the action without issuance of new initial process. 325 U.S. at 78
HERBv. PITCAIRN,325 U.S. 77(1945)
65 S.Ct. 954
HERBv. PITCAIRN ET AL., RECEIVERS FOR WABASH RAILWAY CO.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.fn*
No. 24.
Decided April 23, 1945.
CERTIORARI,321 U.S. 759, to review judgments affirming
dismissals of two suits under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. An earlier opinion of this Court in this case is reported in
That court, responding to petitioners' request, has made clear that its judgment resulted solely from its interpretation of a federal statute of limitations applicable to actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act which provided: "No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued."35 Stat. 66,45 U.S.C. § 56; amended to three years, August 11, 1939,53 Stat. 1404. That court said (March 21, 1945) that it "did not pass upon any of the questions certified except to apply the limitation of two years fixed in the last-mentioned statute after deciding whether said cause had been commenced when it was filed in the city court of Granite City, Illinois." And it added: "We observed that section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act required the plaintiff to commence an action within two years from the date of the injury; that the city court of Granite City had no jurisdiction of the cause for the reasons set forth in the opinion, and that, under Illinois law, commencing an action means starting it in a court that has the power to decide the matter involved, to issue process, to bring the parties to the particular cause before it and to render and enforce a judgment on the merits of said cause."
We are unable to agree to an interpretation of the federal statute by which a case is not "commenced" for its purposes unless instituted in a court with power to proceed to final judgment. An action is "commenced" for these purposes as a matter of federal law when instituted byPage 79service of process issued out of a state court, even if one which itself is unable to proceed to judgment, if the state law or practice directs or permits the transfer through change of venue or otherwise to a court which does have jurisdiction to hear, try, and otherwise determine that cause. Whether the action would be barred if state law made new or supplemental process necessary is a question not involved here and not decided. Clearly, however, when process has been adequate to bring in the parties and to start the case on a course of judicial handling which may lead to final judgment without issuance of new initial process, it is enough to commence the action within the federal statute. As these cases were dismissed solely because of a contrary view, the judgments are reversed and the causes remanded to the Supreme Court of Illinois for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinions herein.
- Page 77 Together with No. 25,Belcherv.Louisville NashvilleRailroad Co.,also on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois. ↩