Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Harris v. Oklahoma

Harris v. Okla., 433 U.S. 682 (1977)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1977-06-29
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that appellant, who had been tried and convicted of felony murder, could not be subsequently tried under a separate indictment for the predicate felony
  • holding that a defendant previously convicted of felony murder during a robbery could not then be tried for the robbery
  • holding that, for double jeopardy purposes, robbery with a firearm is the same offense as felony murder predicated on armed robbery
  • holding that when one defendant was convicted of felony murder based on his co-defendant’s killing of a victim during the course of an armed robbery, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred a separate prosecution of the defendant for the lesser crime of armed robbery
  • holding that when one defendant was convicted of felony murder based on his codefendant's killing of a victim during the course of an armed robbery, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment barred a separate prosecution of the defendant for the lesser crime of armed robbery
  • holding Double Jeopardy Clause prevents prosecution for underlying felony after conviction of felony murder
  • holding double jeopardy violated by convictions for felony murder and underlying crime
  • noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause treats offenses as one “[w]hen, as here, conviction of a greater crime . . . cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime”

Citator

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Cited by
616 opinions
433 U.S. 682 (1977)

HARRIS
v.
OKLAHOMA

No. 76-5663.

Supreme Court of the United States.

Decided June 29, 1977. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA

PER CURIAM.

A clerk in a Tulsa, Okla., grocery store was shot and killed by a companion of petitioner in the course of a robbery of the store by the two men. Petitioner was convicted of felony-murder in Oklahoma State court. The opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in this case states that "[i]n a felony murder case, the proof of the underlying felony [here robbery with firearms] is needed to prove the intent necessary for a felony murder conviction." 555 P. 2d 76, 80-81 (1976). Petitioner nevertheless was thereafter brought to trial and convicted on a separate information charging the robbery with firearms, after denial of his motion to dismiss on the ground that this prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because he had been already convicted of the offense in the felony-murder trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.

When, as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one.[*]In re *683 Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 (1889); cf. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (1977). "[A] person [who] has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, . . . cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offence." In re Nielsen, supra, at 188. See also Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387 (1970); Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 352 (1907).

The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion but in any event would reverse on a ground not addressed by the Court, namely, that the State did not prosecute the two informations in one proceeding. I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the prosecution in one proceeding, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, of "all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U. S. 1053 (1977) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and cases collected therein.

NOTES

[*] The State conceded in its response to the petition for certiorari that "in the Murder case, it was necessary for all the ingredients of the underlying felony of Robbery with Firearms to be proved . . . ." Brief in Opposition 4.