Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
114 S.Ct. 367
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1993-01-01
- Topic
- general
HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) 114 S.Ct. 367 HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 92-1168 Argued October 13, 1993Decided November 9, 1993 Petitioner Harris sued her former employer, respondent Forklift Systems, Inc., claiming that the conduct of Forklift's president toward her constituted "abusive work environment" harassment because of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Declaring this to be "a close case," the District Court found, among other things, that Forklift's president often insulted Harris because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.
HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.,510 U.S. 17(1993)
114 S.Ct. 367
HARRISv. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-1168
Argued October 13, 1993
Decided November 9, 1993
(a) The applicable standard, here reaffirmed, is stated inMeritorSavings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,477 U.S. 57: Title VII is violated when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a discriminatorily hostile or abusive working environment,id., at 64, 67. This standard requires an objectively hostile or abusive environment — one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — as well as the victim's subjective perception that the environment is abusive. Pp. 21-22.
(b) Whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances, which may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is relevant in determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. Pp. 22-23.
(c) Reversal and remand are required because the District Court's erroneous application of the incorrect legal standard may well have influenced its ultimate conclusion that the work environment was notPage 18intimidating or abusive to Harris, especially given that the court found this to be a "close case." P. 23.
976 F.2d 733, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SCALIA, J., post, p. 24, and GINSBURG, J., post, p. 25, filed concurring opinions.
I
Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., an equipment rental company, from April, 1985, until October, 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift's president.
The Magistrate found that, throughout Harris' time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos. Hardy told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, "You're a woman, what do you know" and "We need a man as the rental manager"; at least once, he told her she was "a dumb ass woman." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-13. Again in front of others, he suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise."Id., at A-14. Hardy occasionally asked Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket.Ibid. He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up.Id., at A-14 to A-15. He made sexual innuendos about Harris' and other women's clothing.Id., at A-15.
In mid-August, 1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct. Hardy said he was surprised that Harris was offended, claimed he was only joking, and apologized.Id., at A-16. He also promised he would stop, and, based on this assurance Harris stayed on the job.Ibid. But in early September, Hardy began anew: While Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's customers, he asked her, again in front of other employees, "What did you do, promise the guy . . . some [sex] Saturday night?"Id., at A-17. On October 1, Harris collected her paycheck and quit.
Harris then sued Forklift, claiming that Hardy's conduct had created an abusive work environment for her because of her gender. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, adopting the report and recommendationPage 20of the Magistrate, found this to be "a close case,"id., at A-31, but held that Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive environment. The court found that some of Hardy's comments "offended [Harris], and would offend the reasonable woman,"id., at A-33, but that they were not
"so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris'] psychological wellbeing. A reasonable woman manager under like circumstances would have been offended by Hardy, but his conduct would not have risen to the level of interfering with that person's work performance.
"Neither do I believe that [Harris] was subjectively so offended that she suffered injury . . . . Although Hardy may at times have genuinely offended [Harris], I do not believe that he created a working environment so poisoned as to be intimidating or abusive to [Harris]."Id., at A-34 to A-35.
In focusing on the employee's psychological wellbeing, the District Court was following Circuit precedent.See Rabidue v. Osceola RefiningCo.,805 F.2d 611,620(CA6 1986),cert. denied,481 U.S. 1041(1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief unpublished decision.
We granted certiorari,507 U.S. 959(1993), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as "abusive work environment" harassment (noquid pro quoharassment issue is present here), must "seriously affect [an employee's] psychological wellbeing" or lead the plaintiff to "suffe[r] injury."Compare Rabidue(requiring serious effect on psychological wellbeing);Vance v. Southern BellTelephone Telegraph Co.,863 F.2d 1503,1510(CA11 1989) (same);and Downes v. FAA,775 F.2d 288,292(CA Fed. 1985) (same),withEllison v. Brady,924 F.2d 872,877-878(CA9 1991) (rejecting such a requirement).Page 21
II
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As we made clear inMeritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,477 U.S. 57(1986), this language "is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" evinces a congressional intent "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women" in employment," which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.Id., at 64, quotingLos Angeles Dept.of Water and Powerv. Manhart,435 U.S. 702,707, n. 13 (1978) (some internal quotation marks omitted). When the workplace is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,"477 U.S., at 65, that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,"id., at 67 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted), Title VII is violated.
This standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. As we pointed out inMeritor, "mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a employee,"ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted) does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII. Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered thePage 22conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.
But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological wellbeing, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality. The appalling conduct alleged inMeritor, and the reference in that case to environments "`so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers,'"id., at 66, quotingRogers v. EEOC,454 F.2d 234,238(CA5 1971),cert. denied,406 U.S. 957(1972), merely present some especially egregious examples of harassment. They do not mark the boundary of what is actionable.
We therefore believe the District Court erred in relying on whether the conduct "seriously affect[ed] plaintiff's psychological wellbeing" or led her to "suffe[r] injury." Such an inquiry may needlessly focus the factfinder's attention on concrete psychological harm, an element Title VII does not require. Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological wellbeing, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,Meritor, supra, at 67, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.
This is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test. We need not answer today all the potentialPage 23questions it raises, nor specifically address the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's new regulations on this subject,see58 Fed. Reg. 51266(1993) (proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1, 1609.2);see also29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(1993). But we can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psychological wellbeing is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But, while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required.
III
Forklift, while conceding that a requirement that the conduct seriously affect psychological wellbeing is unfounded, argues that the District Court nonetheless correctly applied theMeritorstandard. We disagree. Though the District Court did conclude that the work environment was not "intimidating or abusive to [Harris]," App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35, it did so only after finding that the conduct was not "so severe as to be expected to seriously affect plaintiff's psychological well-being,"id., at A-34, and that Harris was not "subjectively so offended that she suffered injury,"ibid. The District Court's application of these incorrect standards may well have influenced its ultimate conclusion, especially given that the court found this to be a "close case,"id., at A-31.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.So ordered.Page 24
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the same thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard — and I do not think clarity is at all increased by adding the adverb "objectively" or by appealing to a "reasonable person['s]" notion of what the vague word means. Today's opinion does list a number of factors that contribute to abusiveness, seeante, at 23, but since it neither says how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any single factor as determinative, it thereby adds little certitude. As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damages. One might say that what constitutes "negligence" (a traditional jury question) is not much more clear and certain than what constitutes "abusiveness." Perhaps so. But the class of plaintiffs seeking to recover for negligence is limited to those who have suffered harm, whereas, under this statute "abusiveness" is to be the test of whether legal harm has been suffered, opening more expansive vistas of litigation.
Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the Court today has taken. One of the factors mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive list — whether the conduct unreasonablyPage 25interferes with an employee's work performance — would, if it were made an absolute test, provide greater guidance to juries and employers. But I see no basis for such a limitation in the language of the statute. AcceptingMeritor'sinterpretation of the term "conditions of employment" as the law, the test is not whether work has been impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered. I know of no test more faithful to the inherently vague statutory language than the one the Court today adopts. For these reasons, I join the opinion of the Court.
The Court's opinion, which I join, seems to me in harmony with the view expressed in this concurring statement.Page 27
- Page 18 Briefs ofamici curiaeurging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. bySteven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, andLois C. Waldman;for Feminists for Free Expression byCathy E. Crosson; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al., byElaine R. JonesandEric Schnapper;for the National Conference of Women's Bar Associations et al. byEdith Barnett;for the National Employment Lawyers Association byMargaret A. Harris, Katherine L. Butler, andWilliam J. Smith;for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. byDeborah A. Ellis, Sarah E. Burns, Richard F. Ziegler, andShari Siegel;for the Southern States Police Benevolent Association et al. byJ. Michael McGuinness;and for the Women's Legal Defense Fund et al. byCarolyn F. Corwin, Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, andSusan Deller Ross.Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, andAnn Elizabeth Reesmanfiled a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council asamicus curiaeurging affirmance.
Briefs ofamici curiaewere filed for the American Psychological Association byDort S. Bigg;and for the Employment Law Center et al. byPatricia A. Shiu. ↩ - Page 26 Indeed, even under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, which requires "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for a gender-based classification,Kirchberg v. Feenstra,450 U.S. 455,461(1981) (internal quotation marks omitted), it remains an open question whether "classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect."SeeMississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,458 U.S. 718,724, and n. 9 (1982). ↩