Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Harper v. Poway Unified School District
549 U.S. 1262
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2007-03-05
- Topic
- litigation
How later courts describe this case
- opining that our court had “moved away from … austere moral values” before characterizing as “relatively harmless” (1
- noting that the Supreme Court has “previously dismissed interlocutory appeals from the denials of motions for temporary injunctions once final judgment has been entered” and vacating and remanding for circuit court to dismiss appeal as moot
- addressing high-school students' display of a confederate flag on - 14 - school premises
- granting petition for writ of certiorari, then remanding with instructions to dismiss as moot an appeal of a denial of a motion for preliminary injunction because district court had, in the interim, entered final judgment dismissing claims
- “We have previously dismissed interlocutory appeals from the denials of motions for temporary injunctions once final judgment has been entered.”
- injunction against university vacated when plaintiffs would “graduate before the district court’s order [could] affect them”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Harper v. Poway Unified School District. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 45 opinions
Tyler Chase HARPER, a Minor, By and Through His Parents Ron HARPER, et ux., et al., petitioners,
v.
POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.
No. 06-595.
Supreme Court of United States.
March 5, 2007.On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Motion of Kelsie J. Harper for leave to intervene denied. Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Petitioner seeks review of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court, however, has now entered final judgment dismissing petitioner's claims for injunctive relief as moot. We have previously dismissed interlocutory appeals from the denials of motions for temporary injunctions once final judgment has been entered. See Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 205-206, 44 S.Ct. 553, 68 L.Ed. 975 (1924); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 44, 40 S.Ct. 221, 64 L.Ed. 445 (1920). In this case, vacatur of the prior judgment is also appropriate to "`clea[r] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and [to] eliminat[e] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.'" Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557, 560, 115 S.Ct. 1059, 130 L.Ed.2d 1050 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950)) (alterations in original). The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., supra. Reported below: 445 F.3d 1166.
Justice BREYER dissents.