Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Hallowell v. Commons
Hallowell v. Commons, 36 S. Ct. 202 (1916)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1916-01-10
- Topic
- general
holding that a statute making decisions of the Secretary of the Interior final and unreviewable required dismissal of a legal challenge to one such decision even though the challenge was within the courts’ jurisdiction at the time of filing | upholding the dismissal of an equitable title suit over tribal lands where an intervening statute provided that the Secretary of Interior would have sole jurisdiction over the claims | finding no jurisdiction existed for state court "to establish the equitable title of the plaintiff to an allotment” where allottee died intestate during the trust period | upholding the dismissal of an equitable title suit over tribal lands where 13 an intervening statute provided that the Secretary of Interior would have sole 14 jurisdiction over the claims | statute vesting Secretary of Interior with jurisdiction over controversies surrounding Indian heirship held to be applicable retroactively | “The [provision] applies with the same force to all cases and was embodied in a statute that no doubt was intended to apply to all.” | “Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually ‘takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.’ ” | “Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually ‘takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.’ ” | statute which simply changes tribunal that is to hear case applied to pending action | statute which simply changes tribunal that is to hear case applied to pending action | statute which simply changes tribunal that is to hear case applied to pending action | retroactive application of federal agency's declaratory ruling did not violate plaintiffs' due-process rights | jurisdictional shift from federal court to an administrative tribunal applied retroactively. | change of forum can be applied retroactively | change of forum can be applied retroactively | statute immediately divested district court of jurisdiction | Congress removed jurisdiction from judiciary to executive branch
Citator
- Cited by
- 126 opinions
It is unnecessary to consider whether there was jurisdiction when the suit was begun. By the act of June 25, 1910, c. 431,36 Stat. 855, it was provided that in a case like this of the death of the allottee intestate during the trust period the Secretary of the Interior should ascertain the legal heirs of the decedent and his decision should be final and conclusive; with considerable discretion as to details. This act restored to the Secretary the power that had been taken from him by acts of 1894 and February 6, 1901, c. 217,31 Stat. 760.McKayv.Kalyton,204 U.S. 458,468. It made his jurisdiction exclusive in terms, it made no exception for pending litigation, but purported to be universal and so to take away the jurisdiction that for a time had been conferred upon the courts of the United States. The appellee contends for a different construction on the strength of Rev. Stats., § 13, that the repeal of any statute shall not extinguish any liability incurred under it,Hertzv.Woodman,218 U.S. 205,216, and refers to the decisions upon the statutes concerning suits upon certain bonds given to the United States.United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v.United States,209 U.S. 306. But apart from a question that we have passed, whether the plaintiff even attempted to rely upon the statutes giving jurisdiction to the courts in allotment cases, the reference of the matter to the Secretary, unlike the changes with regard to suits upon bonds, takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case. In doing so it evinces a change of policy, and an opinion that the rights of the Indians can be better preserved by the quasi-paternal supervision of the general head of Indian affairs. The consideration applies with the same force to all cases and was embodied in a statute that no doubt was intended to apply to all, so far as construction is concerned.Page 509
There is equally little doubt as to the power of Congress to pass the act so construed. We presume that no one would question it if the suit had not been begun. It is a strong proposition that bringing this bill intensified, strengthened or enlarged the plaintiff's rights, as suggested inDe Limav.Bidwell,182 U.S. 1,199,200. SeeSimmonsv.Hanover, 40 Pick. 188, 193, 194.Hepburnv.Curts, 7 Watts, 300.Welchv.Wadsworth,30 Conn. 149,154.Atwoodv.Buckingham,78 Conn. 423. The difficulty in applying such a proposition to the control of Congress over the jurisdiction of courts of its own creation is especially obvious. SeeBirdv.UnitedStates,187 U.S. 118,124. In any event the rights of the Indians in this matter remained subject to such control on principles that have been illustrated in many ways. SeeTigerv.Western Investment Co.,221 U.S. 286;Hallowellv.UnitedStates,221 U.S. 317.
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case is in accord with such earlier decisions as we have seen.Bondv.United States, 181 F. 613;Pel-atayakotv.UnitedStates, 188 F. 387;Parrv.Colfax, 197 F. 302.Decree dismissing the bill for want of jurisdictionaffirmed.Page 510