Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Haines v. Kerner
30 L. Ed. 2d 652
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1972-02-22
- Topic
- general
holding that pro se complaints drafted by prisoners are not held to the same standards as pleadings drafted by lawyers | holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" | holding that allegations in pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers | recognizing that pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those who are counseled by attorneys | holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." | holding that allegations in pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers | holding that pro se petitions will be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." | holding that a. pro se litigant’s complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings, drafted by lawyers.” | holding that the complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" | holding that pleadings by pro se litigants should be held to a less stringent standard than litigants represented by counsel | holding that allegations from pro se litigants are . “[held] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” | holding that pro se complaints should be “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than [those] drafted by lawyers.” | holding that allegations of pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers | recognizing that pro se filings are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that allegations of pro se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that allegations of pro se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that pro se pleadings should be held to a “less stringent standard[] than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that complaints drafted by pro se petitioners are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers | holding that pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than [those] drafted by lawyers.” | holding that allegations in a pro se complaint are to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” | holding that pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) | holding that pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafter by lawyers.” | holding that pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" | holding that prisoner civil rights claims, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 28 | by lawyers” | holding that pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" | holding that a pro se litigant’s complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than
Petitioner, an inmate at the Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard, Illinois, commenced this action against the Governor of Illinois and other state officers and prison officials under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat. 13, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), seeking to recover damages for claimed injuries and deprivation of rights while incarcerated under a judgment not challenged here. *520 Petitioner’s pro se complaint was premised on alleged action of prison officials placing him in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure after he had struck another inmate on the head with a shovel following a verbal altercation. The assault by petitioner on another inmate is not denied. Petitioner’s pro se complaint included general allegations of physical injuries suffered while in disciplinary confinement and denial of due process in the steps leading to that confinement. The claimed physical suffering was aggravation of a preexisting foot injury and a circulatory ailment caused by forcing him to sleep on the floor of his cell with only blankets.
The District Court granted respondents’ motion under Rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, suggesting that only under exceptional circumstances should courts inquire into the internal operations of state penitentiaries and concluding that petitioner had failed to show a deprivation of federally protected rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that prison officials are vested with “wide discretion” in disciplinary matters. We granted certiorari and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. The only issue now before us is petitioner’s contention that the District Court erred in dismissing his pro se complaint without allowing him to present evidence on his claims.
Whatever may be the limits on the scope of inquiry of courts into the internal administration of prisons, allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears *521 “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774 (CA2 1944).
Accordingly, although we intimate no view whatever on the merits of petitioner’s allegations, we conclude that he is entitled to an opportunity to offer proof. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.