Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Gregory v. City of Chicago

22 L. Ed. 2d 134

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1969-03-10
Topic: general

holding that convictions for Disorderly Conduct could not be sustained where defendants had not been disorderly | holding that convictions for Disorderly Conduct could not be sustained where defendants had not been disorderly | holding that convictions for Disorderly Conduct could not be sustained where defendants had not been disorderly | invalidating on overbreadth grounds a disorderly conduct statute which could be used to punish citizens who refuse to move on when asked to do so by a policeman | invalidating on overbreadth grounds a disorderly conduct statute which could be used to punish citizens who refuse to move on when asked to do so by a policeman | distinguishing between charge alleging a “refusal to obey a police officer” and a charge asserting “disorderly conduct” | reversing conviction for disorderly conduct that stemmed from picketing of mayor's house | reversing conviction for disorderly conduct that stemmed from picketing of mayor’s house | concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas | concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas | disorderly conduct conviction cannot stand when defendant acted in an orderly manner but surrounding crowd became hostile | disorderly conduct conviction cannot stand when defendant acted in an orderly manner but surrounding crowd became hostile | anticipated unruly conduct of bystanders is no justification for the arrest of peaceful civil rights demonstrators | “Petitioners’ march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment.” | anticipated unruly conduct of bystanders is no justification for the arrest of peaceful civil rights demonstrators | Black, J., demonstrations or not. But in the absence of a showing that concurring at 118 | governments may pass laws to protect the tranquility of spots where people escape the hurly-burly of the outside world, or where they require peace and quiet to carry out their functions | re- versing convictions of peaceful protestors for disorderly conduct after “onlookers became unruly” and “police, to prevent what they regarded as an impending civil disorder, demanded that the de- monstrators, upon pain of arrest, disperse” | peaceful marches to express grievances to governmental authorities | Ante, p. 731 n. 5 | Ante, p. 731 n. 5

Citator

Cited by: 197 opinions

Mr. Chief Justice Warren

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a simple case. Petitioners, accompanied by Chicago police and an assistant city attorney, marched in a peaceful and orderly procession from city hall to the mayor’s residence to press their claims for desegregation of the public schools. Having promised to cease singing at 8:30 p. m., the marchers did so. Although petitioners and the other demonstrators continued to march in a completely lawful fashion, the onlookers became unruly as the number of bystanders increased. *112 Chicago police, to prevent what they regarded as an impending civil disorder, demanded that the demonstrators, upon pain of arrest, disperse. When this command was not obeyed, petitioners were arrested for disorderly conduct.

Petitioners’ march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, post, p. 147; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 141-142 (1966) (prevailing opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas) ; Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U. S. 376 (1964); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U. S. 44 (1963), reversing 240 S. C. 366, 126 S. E. 2d 6 (1962). There is no evidence in this record that petitioners’ conduct was disorderly. Therefore, under the principle first established in Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960), convictions so totally devoid of evidentiary support violate due process.

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois suggests that petitioners were convicted not for the manner in which they conducted their march but rather for their refusal to disperse when requested to do so by Chicago police. See 39 Ill. 2d 47, 60, 233 N. E. 2d 422, 429 (1968). However reasonable the police request may have been and however laudable the police motives, petitioners were charged and convicted for holding a demonstration, not for a refusal to obey a police officer.* As we said in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 164 (1961): “[I]t is as much a denial of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction for a charge that was never made as it is to convict him upon a charge for which there is no evidence to support that conviction.” See also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948).

*113 Finally, since the trial judge’s charge permitted the jury to convict for acts clearly entitled to First Amendment protection, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), independently requires reversal of these convictions.

The judgments are

Reversed.

The trial judge charged solely in terms of the Chicago ordinance. Neither the ordinance nor the charge defined disorderly conduct as the refusal to obey a police order.