Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Green v. United States
Green v. United States, 2 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1958)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1958-03-31
- Topic
- general
holding that seven-year imprisonment for refusing to produce $15 million in property did not violate contemnor’s due process rights | holding that an alleged contemnor “is not entitled to be prosecuted by indictment on a criminal contempt charge.” | holding that the lack of statutory limitations does not give the trial court "unbridled discretion," as the trial court has a "special duty to exercise such an extraordinary power with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection" | explaining that at English common law, disobedience of a writ under the King’s seal was treated as a contempt | stating that the word "or" in section 401 means that "the court must choose between fine and imprisonment" | stating that the word "or” in section 401 means that "the court must choose between fine and imprisonment" | holding that the lack of statutory limitations does not give the trial court “unbridled discretion,” as the trial court has a “special duty to exercise such an extraordinary power with the utmost sense of responsibility and circumspection” | explaining that at English common law, disobedi- ence of a writ under the King’s seal was treated as a contempt | explaining that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts were understood to be able to exercise the English common law tradition of holding parties in contempt for disobeying the court | explaining that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts were understood to be able to exercise the English common law tradition of holding parties in contempt for disobeying the court | explaining that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts were understood to be able to exercise the English common law tradition of holding parties in contempt for disobeying the court | explaining that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts were understood to be able to exercise the English common law tradition of holding parties in contempt for disobeying the court | explaining that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts were understood to be able to exercise the English common law tradition of holding parties in contempt for disobeying the court | explaining that under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts were understood to be able to exercise the English common law tradition of holding parties in contempt for disobeying the court | upholding sentence of three years for criminal contempt to run consecutive to a five-year conspiracy sentence | noting that 18 U.S.C. § 402 contains the definitional provision formerly in § 21 of the Clayton Act and expressly refers to 18 U.S.C. § 3691, which provides that contempts falling within this definition are subject to trial by jury | affirming three-year criminal contempt sentence under Section 401 for failing to appear in court after being released on bail | referring to the “unique character” of criminal contempt, given the “absence of a statutory limitation” on sanctions imposed for its commission | noting “[u]nder English law, contempt sentences were not subject to any statutory limit.” | comparing sentences given others who refused to surrender to serve sentences | special duty of appellate courts where Congress has set no limit on sentencing power for contempt | overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968) | overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968) | criminal contempt sentence “is within the discretion of the judge and is reviewable only for an abuse of that discretion” | “Congress has not seen fit to impose limitations on the sentencing power for contempts_” | "Appellate courts have here a special responsibility for determining that the [contempt] power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising themselves the sentences imposed" | "Appellate courts have here a special responsibility for determining that the [contempt] power is not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising themselves
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are two of eleven defendants who were convicted in the Southern District of New York in 1949 of conspiring to teach and advocate the violent overthrow of the Government in violation of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670, 671, 18 U. S. C. §§ 371, 2385. Their convictions, each carrying a $10,000 fine and five years’ imprisonment, were affirmed by this Court on June 4, 1951, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494. After their convictions, petitioners had been enlarged on bail, and following the affirmance, the United States Attorney served counsel for the petitioners on June 28, 1951, with copies of a proposed order on mandate requiring petitioners to surrender to the United States Marshal on July 2 for the execution of their sentences, and with a notice that such order would be presented to the District Court for signature on the indicated day of surrender. Petitioners were thereupon informed by their counsel that their presence in court would be required on July 2. Both, however, disappeared from their homes, failed to appear in court when the surrender order was signed on July 2, and remained fugitives for more than four and a half years. Ultimately both voluntarily surrendered to the United States Marshal in New York, Green on February 27, 1956, and Winston on March 5, 1956.
Shortly thereafter, the United States instituted criminal contempt proceedings against the petitioners in the District Court for willful disobedience of the surrender order in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 401 (see p. 168, infra). Pursuant to Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, these proceedings were tried to the court without a jury.1 Following a hearing, the court found
The petitioners urge four grounds for reversal, namely: (1) the criminal contempt power of federal courts does not extend to surrender orders; (2) even if such power exists, the evidence was insufficient to support the judgments of contempt; (3) a prison sentence for criminal contempt cannot, as a matter of law, exceed one year; and (4) in any event the three-year sentences imposed were so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court. For the reasons given hereafter we think that none of these contentions can be sustained, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be upheld.
I.
The contempt judgments rest on 18 U. S. C. § 401, which in pertinent part provides that a federal court:
“. . . shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
“(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful . . . order . . . .”
An evaluation of this argument requires an analysis of the course of development of federal statutes relating to criminal contempts. The first statute bearing on the contempt powers of .federal courts was enacted as § 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83. It stated that federal courts “shall have power to . . . punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same . . . .” The generality of this language suggests that § 17 was intended to do no more than expressly attribute to the federal judiciary those powers to punish for contempt possessed by English courts at common law. Indeed, this Court has itself stated that under § 17 the definition of contempts and the procedure for their trial were “left to be determined according to such established rules and principles of the common law as were applicable to our situation.” Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 275-276.2 At English common law disobedience of a writ under the King’s seal was early treated as a contempt, 4 Blackstone Commentaries 284, 285; Beale, Contempt of Court, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 161, 164-167; Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, 25 L. Q. Rev. 238, 249, and over the centuries English courts came to use the
So much the petitioners recognize. They point out, however, that, at early English law, courts dealt with absconding defendants not by way of contempt, but under the ancient doctrine of outlawry, a practice whereby the defendant was summoned by proclamation to five successive county courts and, for failure to appear, was declared forfeited of all his goods and chattels. 4 Blackstone Commentaries 283, 319. In view of this distinct method at English common law of punishing refusal to respond to this summons, which was the equivalent of the present surrender order, petitioners argue that § 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, incorporating English practice, did not reach to a surrender order, and that the unique status of such an order subsisted under all statutory successors to § 17, including § 401 (3) of the existing contempt statute.
We find these arguments unconvincing. The reasons for the early English practice of proceeding against absconding defendants by way of outlawry rather than by contempt are obscure. It may have been that outlawry was resorted to because absconding was regarded so seriously as to require the drastic penalties of outlawry rather than fine or imprisonment. But whatever the reasons may have been, the fact that English courts adhered
The subsequent development of the federal contempt power lends no support to the petitioners’ position, for the significance of the Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 487, 488, lies quite in the opposite direction. Sentiment for passage of that Act arose out of the impeachment proceedings instituted against Judge James H. Peck because of his conviction and punishment for criminal contempt of a lawyer who had published an article critical of a decision of the judge then on appeal. Although it is true that the Act marks the first congressional step to curtail the contempt powers of the federal courts, the important thing to note is that the area of curtailment related not to punishment for disobedience of court orders but to punishment for conduct of the kind that had provoked Judge Peck’s controversial action. As to such conduct, the 1831 Act confined the summary power of punishment to “. . . mis-behaviour of any person ... in the presence of the . . . courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice . . . .” The cases in this Court which have curbed the exercise of the contempt power by federal courts have concerned this clause, as found in statutory successors to the Act of 1831 including subdivision (1) of present 18 U. S. C. § 401, or a further clause in the Act
In contrast to the judicial restrictions imposed on the contempt power exercisable under the clauses now found in subdivisions (1) and (2) of § 401, we find no case suggesting that subdivision (3) of § 401, before us here, is open to any but its obvious meaning. This clause also finds its statutory source in the Act of 1831, which first made explicit the authority of federal courts to punish for conduct of the kind involved in this case by providing that the contempt power should extend to “. . . disobedience or resistance ... to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command . . .” of a federal court. Particularly in the absence of any showing that the old practice of outlawry was ever brought to the attention of Congress, there is no warrant for engrafting upon this unambiguous clause a dubious exception to the English contempt power stemming from this practice. Although the 1831 Act no doubt incorporated many of the concepts of the English common law, its legislative history indicates that Congress sought to define independently the contempt powers of federal courts rather than to have the Act simply reflect all the oddities of early English practice. The House Committee which reported the bill had been directed “to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute all offences which may be punished as con-tempts of . . .” federal courts. 7 Cong. Deb., 21st Cong., 2d Sess. (Gale’s & Seaton’s Reg.), pp. 560-561. (Italics added.) See Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1024-1028.
It may be true, as petitioners state, that this case and those of the other absconding Dennis defendants, United States v. Thompson, 214 F. 2d 545; United States v. Hall, 198 F. 2d 726, provide the first instances where a federal court has exercised the contempt power for disobedience of a surrender order. But the power to punish for willful disobedience of a court order, once found to exist, cannot be said to have atrophied by disuse in this particular instance. Indeed, when Congress in 1954 made bail-jumping a crime in 18 U. S. C. § 3146, it expressly preserved the contempt power in this very situation. We find support in neither history nor policy to carve out so singular an exception from the clear meaning of § 401 (3).
II.
Petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their contempt convictions, in that it failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt their knowledge
In this Court, petitioners interpret the District Court’s opinion to rest the contempt convictions on alternative theories: (a) that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the issuance of the July 2 surrender order, or (b) that they at least had notice of its prospective issuance and hence were chargeable with knowledge that it was in fact issued. But we find no such dual aspect to the District Court’s decision, which rested solely on findings that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Green “knowingly disobeyed” the surrender order and Winston absented himself “with knowledge” of the order. Since we are satisfied that the record supports these findings, we need not consider whether mere notice of the prospective issuance of the order, cf. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197, 206-207, would be sufficient to sustain these convictions on the theory that petitioners were chargeable as a matter of law with notice that it was later issued.
The evidence for the Government, there being none offered by the defense, related to three time intervals: (1) the period up to June 28,1951; (2) the four-day interval between June 28, when the proposed surrender order was served on counsel with the notice of settlement, and July 2, when the surrender order was signed; and (3) the period ending with the surrender of the petitioners— February 27, 1956, in the case of Green, and March 5, 1956, in the case of Winston.
1. The judgments of conviction upon the conspiracy indictment under the Smith Act were entered, and the
“surrender himself in execution of the judgment and sentence appealed from upon such day as the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York may direct, if the judgment and sentence appealed from shall be affirmed . . . (Italics added.)
Following the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the conspiracy convictions on August 1, 1950, 183 F. 2d 201, Mr. Justice Jackson, as Circuit Justice, continued petitioners’ bail on September 25, 1950, pending review of the convictions by this Court. 184 F. 2d 280. This Court, as noted above, affirmed the conspiracy convictions on June 4, 1951, and on June 22, 1951, Mr. Justice Jackson denied a stay of the Court’s mandate.
2. On Thursday, June 28, 1951, one of the counsel in the Dennis case accepted service on behalf of all the defendants, including petitioners, of a proposed order on mandate requiring the defendants to “personally surrender to the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York ... on the 2nd day of July, 1951, at 11:05” a. m., together with a notice stating that the proposed order would be presented to the District Court “for settlement and signature” at 10 a. m. on that day.5
3. On July 3 the names of the petitioners were called again in open court, and after interrogating counsel as to their disappearance (see note 6, supra), the court declared their bail forfeited. The petitioners remained in hiding until their eventual surrender, some four and a half years later. Prior to their respective surrenders in February and March, 1956, Green and Winston issued press releases announcing their intention to surrender and “enter prison.” 7 When he turned up on the steps of the
In summary, one day after counsel was served on June 28 with the proposed order calling for petitioners’ surrender on July 2, together with the notice stating that the order would also be presented for the court’s signature on that day, petitioners were unequivocally notified by counsel that their presence in court was required on July 2. From these undisputed facts, coupled with petitioners’ disappearance, it was certainly permissible for the District Court to infer that petitioners knew of the proposed surrender order, of the failure of counsel’s efforts on June 29 to postpone the surrender date, and of the court’s intention to sign the order on July 2. We need not decide whether these facts alone would sustain the finding that petitioners knew of the issuance of the surrender order on July 2 as planned, for unquestionably as background they furnished significant support for the District Court’s ultimate finding that petitioners’ statements to the press at the time of their eventual surrender in 1956 (see note 7, supra) indicated their knowledge of the issuance of the order, a finding strengthened by the fact that the recognizance admitting the petitioners to bail obligated petitioners to surrender for service of sentence only when so directed by the District Court.
No doubt some of this evidence lent itself to conflicting inferences, but those favorable to the petitioners were, in our view, not of such strength as to compel the trier of
III.
We deal here with petitioners’ claim that the District Court was without power to sentence them to imprisonment for more than one year.
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 confirmed the power of federal courts “. . . to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts . . .” certain con-tempts. The Act of 1831 simply referred to the power to “inflict summary punishments,” and present § 401 contains substantially the above language of the Act of 1789. Petitioners contend that despite the provision for “discretion,” the power to punish under § 401 is limited to one year by certain sections of the Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730, 738-740. In any event, we are urged to read such a limitation into § 401 in order to avoid constitutional difficulties which, it is said, would otherwise confront us.
We turn first to the argument based on the Clayton Act. Sections 21 and 22 of that Act provided that certain rights not traditionally accorded persons charged with contempt, notably the right to trial by jury, should be granted in certain classes of criminal contempts, and that persons tried under these procedures were not subject to a fine of more than $1,000 or imprisonment for longer
Petitioners’ argument is that the purpose and effect of the “usages . . . now prevailing” language of § 24 of the Clayton Act was to freeze into federal contempt law the sentencing practices of federal courts, which up to that time appear never to have imposed a contempt sentence of more than one year.11 These practices, suggest peti
Particularly in the context of the rest of the Clayton Act of 1914 we cannot read the “usages . . . now prevailing” clause of § 24 as incorporating into the statute the sentencing practices up to that date. In § 22 the statute specifically restricts to six months the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for commission of any of the contempts described in § 21. Had Congress also intended to restrict the term of imprisonment for con-tempts excluded from the operation of the Act by § 24, it is difficult to understand why it did not make explicit its intention, as it did in § 22, rather than so subtly express its purpose by proceeding in the devious manner attributed to it by the petitioners. Further, there is no evidence that the past sentencing practices of the courts were ever brought to the attention of Congress. That the federal courts themselves have not considered their sentencing power to be restricted by § 24 of the Clayton Act or by § 402 of the present contempt statute is indicated by the fact that in at least nine cases subsequent to 1914, contempt convictions carrying sentences of more than
Such of the legislative history as is germane here argues against the petitioners and strengthens our conclusions that the “usages . . . now prevailing” clause of § 24 of the Clayton Act did no more than emphasize that con-tempts other than those specified in § 21 were to be tried under familiar contempt procedures, that is, among other things, by the court rather than a jury. The House Report accompanying the bill which was substantially enacted as §§ 21, 22 and 24 of the Clayton Act referred to the provisions later forming these sections as dealing “. . . entirely with questions of Federal procedure relating to injunctions and contempts committed without the presence of the court.” H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 21. There is no evidence of a broader purpose to enact so substantial a rule of substantive law encompassing all criminal contempts.
We are nevertheless urged to read into § 401 a one-year limitation on the sentencing power in order to avoid constitutional issues which the petitioner^ deem present in the absence of such a restriction. But in view of what we have shown, the section’s provision that a federal court may punish “at its discretion” the enumerated classes of contempts cannot reasonably be read to allow a court merely the choice between fines and imprisonment. We think the Court of Appeals correctly said: “The phrase 'at its discretion,’ does not mean that the court
We therefore turn to petitioners’ constitutional arguments. The claim is that proceedings for criminal con-tempts, if contempts are subject to prison terms of more than one year, must be based on grand jury indictments under the clause of the Fifth Amendment providing: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .” (Italics added.) Since an “infamous crime” within the meaning of the Amendment is one punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary, Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. 348, and since imprisonment in a penitentiary can be imposed only if a crime is subject to imprisonment exceeding one year, 18 U. S. C. § 4083, petitioners assert that criminal contempts if subject to such punishment are infamous crimes under the Amendment.
But this assertion cannot be considered in isolation from the general status of contempts under the Constitution, whether subject to “infamous” punishment or not. The statements of this Court in a long and unbroken line of decisions involving contempts ranging from misbehavior in court to disobedience of court orders establish beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right.14
We are told however that the decisions of this Court denying the right to jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings are based upon an “historical error” reflecting a misunderstanding as to the scope of the power of English courts at the early common law to try summarily for contempts, and that this error should not here be extended to a denial of the right to grand jury. But the more recent historical research into English contempt practices predating the adoption of our Constitution reveals no such clear error and indicates if anything that the precise nature of those practices is shrouded in much obscurity. And whatever the breadth of the historical error said by contemporary scholarship to have been committed by English courts of the late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries in their interpretation of English precedents involving the trials of contempts of court, it at lpast seems clear that English practice by the early Eighteenth Century comprehended the use of summary powers of conviction by courts to punish for a variety of contempts committed within and outside court.18 Such indeed is the
We do not write upon a clean slate. The principle that criminal contempts of court are not required to be tried by a jury under Article III or the Sixth Amendment is firmly rooted in our traditions. Indeed, the petitioners themselves have not contended that they were entitled to a jury trial. By the same token it is clear that criminal contempts, although subject, as we have held, to sentences of imprisonment exceeding one year, need not be prosecuted by indictment under the Fifth Amendment. In various respects, such as the absence of a statutory limitation of the amount of a fine or the length of a prison sentence which may be imposed for their commission, criminal contempts have always differed from the usual statutory crime under federal law. As to trial by jury and indictment by grand jury, they possess a unique character under the Constitution.20
IV.
Petitioners contend that the three-year sentences imposed upon them constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court.
It is in this light that we have considered the claim that the sentences here were so excessive as to amount to an abuse of discretion. We are led to reject the claim under the facts of this case for three reasons. First, the contempt here was by any standards a most egregious one. Petitioners had been accorded a fair trial on the conspiracy charges against them and had been granted bail pending review of their convictions by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Nevertheless they absconded, and over four and a half years of hiding culminated not in a belated recognition of the authority of the court, but in petitioners’ reassertion of justification for disobeying the surrender order. Second, comparing these sentences with those imposed on the other fugitives in the Dennis
In these circumstances we cannot say that the sentences imposed were beyond the bounds of the reasonable exercise of the District Court's discretion. , ~ ,
, , Affirmed.
This Rule provides that criminal contempts other than those committed in the actual presence of the court and seen or heard by
The debates conducted in 1830-1831 by leading counsel of that period during the impeachment proceedings against Judge James H. Peck, see p. 171, infra, contained discussions of the Act of 1789, and the limitations to be imposed upon it, which were cast largely in terms of the English common law preceding its enactment. See Stansbury, Report of the Trial of James H. Peck (1833).
During the debates in 1830-1831 referred to in note 2, supra, several of the managers who argued that Judge Peck had exceeded the historical boundaries of the contempt power by the conduct which had provoked the impeachment proceedings (see p. 171, infra) appear to have assumed that courts were historically justified in employing the contempt power to deal with disobedience to court process. See Stansbury, supra, note 2, at 313, 395-396, 436, 444.
See, e. g., In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224, Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, and Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, all concerning the predecessor statutes to present § 401 (1), which relates to misbehavior in court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, and Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399, arising under §401 (2), which deals with misbehavior of court officers in their official transactions.
This order can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as imposing on the Dennis defendants from the time that the order became effective on July 2 a continuing obligation to surrender promptly upon becoming aware of its effectiveness. The printed record before us indicates that the proposed order given counsel on June 28 read precisely in the form quoted in the text above, but the original copy of the order reveals that the time for surrender was first written as
The events of June 29, 1951, were testified to in court on July 3, 1951, by petitioners’ counsel, Messrs. Sacher and Isserman. By stipulation, a transcript of this testimony was introduced into evidence during the contempt proceedings in the District Court, and excerpts from the testimony follow:
The Court: “Now, you did make a statement last week that you will have the four defendants [Green, Winston, Hall and Thompson] in court, as I recall, on Monday [July 2].
“Mr. Sacher: I said that all of them would be here.
“The Court: And as you know, four of them were not here on Monday. Of course, you may be bound by some obligation of attorney and client, but are you able to give the Court any information as to their present whereabouts?
“Mr. Sacher: Your Honor, I should consider myself not bound by any obligation to withhold any information that I might have, and I give your Honor my assurance that I have no knowledge, I have no basis of knowledge as to their present whereabouts or where they might have gone.
“The Court: Where did you last see these four defendants?
“Mr. Sacher: ... I am not certain about Thompson, but I am fairly certain that I saw the three I mentioned sometime on Friday [June 29] at 35 East Twelfth Street.
“The Court: Did you tell them at that time that their presence was required in court yesterday morning?
“Mr. Sacher: Definitely. As a matter of fact I advised that because I think I saw them among other defendants after I had*177 been here on Friday, your Honor, and had made these motions [apparently referring to counsel’s efforts to postpone the surrender date until after July 4], and therefore I advised that they all should be present and I was assured they would be.
“The Court: Mr. Isserman, do you know where any of these defendants are?
“Mr. Isserman: I might say to the Court that I would not rest on privilege in this situation at all. I have no knowledge of the present whereabouts of any of these defendants. ... I remember, Green being my client, I remember distinctly that I saw him on that day [June 29] and received from him the assurance that he would be here Monday morning [July 2].”
Excerpts from Green’s press release:
“On Monday, February 27th at 12 noon I shall cease being a fugitive from injustice and instead become its prisoner. At that time, I shall appear at Foley Square. . . . The course I chose five years ago was not dictated by personal considerations. In many ways it was harsher than that of imprisonment. ... [I]t seemed incumbent upon me to resist that trend [i. e. to 'an American brand of fascism’] with every ounce of strength I possessed. Some could do so by going to jail; others by not. ... I enter prison with head high and conscience clear.” (Italics added.)
Excerpts from Winston’s press release:
“Reiterating my innocence, and protesting the flagrant miscarriage*178 of justice in my case, I now enter prison .... I shall appear this coming Monday, March 5th, 12:30 p. m., at the U. S. Marshal’s Office in Foley Square.” (Italics added.)
The substance of §§21 and 22 was that one charged with the commission of acts constituting willful disobedience to a lawful court order could demand a trial by jury if (§21) “. . . the act or thing so done by him be of such character as to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States, or under the laws of any State in which the act was committed . . . .” Section 22 provided that the jury trial “. . . shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or upon information.”
This section excluded from the Act, inter alia, contempts committed by disobedience to any court order entered in any suit or action “. . . brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States . . . .”
At the present time, 18 U. S. C. § 402 contains the definitional provision formerly in §21 of the Clayton Act and expressly refers to 18 U. S. C. § 3691, which provides that contempts falling within this definition are subject to trial by jury.
Petitioners have shown us no federal decision which intimates any constitutional or common-law restriction on the power of federal courts to sentence for over one year. As stated by the Court of Appeals in the present case, 241 F. 2d, at 634, “. . . there is not in
See p. 182, injra.
Hill v. United States ex rel. Weiner, 300 U. S. 105; United States v. Brown, 247 F. 2d 332 (2d Cir.); Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F. 2d 87 (8th Cir.); United States v. Thompson, 214 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir.); United States v. Hall, 198 F. 2d 726 (2d Cir.); United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F. 2d 136 (7th Cir.); Warring v. Huff, 74 U. S. App. D. C. 302, 122 F. 2d 641 (D. C. Cir.); Conley v. United States, 59 F. 2d 929 (8th Cir.); Creekmore v. United States, 237 F. 743 (8th Cir.).
The following are the major opinions of this Court which have discussed the relationship between criminal contempts and jury trial and have concluded or assumed that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial under Art. Ill, §2, or the Sixth Amendment: Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 278; Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 36-39; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 489; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 594-596; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 336-337;
For more general statements of the nature of the contempt power and its indispensability to federal courts, see United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 302-304; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., supra, at 326; Myers v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 103; Michaelson v. United States, supra, at 65-66.
See, e. g., Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 537 (compulsory process and assistance of counsel); Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 611-612 (benefit of a statute of limitations generally governing crimes); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 444 (proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and freedom from compulsion to testify).
“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . .
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”
Petitioners derive their argument as to historical error from the writings of Sir John Charles Fox. However, Fox’s major effort was to show that a statement in an unpublished opinion by Wilmot, J., in The King v. Almon (1765), to the effect that summary punishment for contempts committed out of court stood upon “immemorial usage,” was based on an erroneous interpretation of earlier law as applied to the case before him, namely, contempt by libel on the
See 18 U. S. C. § 402, supra, note 10; 18 U. S. C. § 3692 (jury trial for contempts based on violation of injunctions in cases involving labor disputes); § 151, 71 Stat. 638, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1995 (right to jury trial under provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 in limited circumstances in cases of criminal contempts).
This holding makes unnecessary consideration of petitioners’ argument based on Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which falls with their constitutional argument. Rule 7 refers to criminal offenses, that is “crimes” in the constitutional sense. Criminal contempts are governed by Rule 42.