Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Glucksman v. Henkel
Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508 (1911)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1911-05-29
- Topic
- litigation
rejecting argument that deposition was required, and finding extradition proper based on translated papers | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | ‘We are bound by the existence of an extra dition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair” | court bound by existence of extradition treaty to assume requesting state’s criminal procedure is fair | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | "We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair." | ‘We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | "We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair." | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | “It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time.” | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | “[A] man is not to be sent from the country merely upon demand or surmise.” | “We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair.” | "a man is not to be sent from the country merely upon demand or surmise, ... there [must be] presented ... such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he be should be tried" | “a man is not to be sent from the country merely upon demand or surmise, ... there [must be] presented ... such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he be should be tried” | "a man is not to be sent from the country merely upon demand or surmise, ... there [must be] presented ... such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he be should be tried" | a man is not to be sent from the country merely upon demand or surmise, ... there [must be] presented ... such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he be should be tried”
Citator
- Cited by
- 45 opinions
GLUCKSMANv. HENKEL,221 U.S. 508(1911)
GLUCKSMANv. HENKEL, UNITED STATES MARSHAL.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK.
No. 944.
Argued April 6, 7, 1911.
Decided May 29, 1911.
THE facts are stated in the opinion.
A writ ofhabeas corpuscannot perform the functions ofPage 509a writ of error; nevertheless this court will go behind the commitment to ascertain whether there was any legal evidence to give the Commissioner jurisdiction, since in the absence of some legal proof the Commissioner has no jurisdiction. Art. 1, Treaty with Russia;Terlindenv.Ames,184 U.S. 541.
The laws of the State where the fugitive is found and not the acts of Congress are to govern in such cases.Wrightv.Henkel,190 U.S. 61;Pettitv.Walshe,194 U.S. 205.
In New York the magistrate has no jurisdiction and cannot act unless there is some competent legal proof to establish a probable cause.Peoplev.Wells,57 A.D. 140; Church, Hab. Corp. p. 319;Ex parte Jenkins, Fed. Cas. No. 7259;In reHenry,35 N.Y.S. 210;Perkinsv.Moss,187 N.Y. 410;Exparte Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75.
The prisoner traversed the return and hence the court can properly review the evidence to ascertain whether there was any legal evidence upon which the Commissioner could act. There is no legal evidence in the case at bar to show that a crime has been committed.
There is no legal proof in the case at bar establishing the identity of the prisoner, but on the contrary the evidence shows affirmatively that the prisoner is not the man who is alleged to have committed the crime.
The photographs were not properly authenticated as evidence by certificates of the consul.In re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. 414;Inre McPhun, 30 F. 60.
Assuming that the evidence as to the criminality is sufficient the prisoner must be discharged because the complaint charges the accused with having forged and offered forged bills of exchange whereas the proof shows that he had forged notes.Wrightv.Henkel,190 U.S. 40, andPettitv.Walshe,194 U.S. 205. This case is to be governed by the laws of New York; andPeoplev.Geyer,196 N.Y. 367, is controlling on this point. See alsoPeoplev.Page 510Poucher, 30 Hun (N.Y.), 576;Besckv.State,44 Tex. 620[44 Tex. 620]; Bishop on Statutory Crimes, 3d ed., § 346;Hamiltonv.State, 28 Am. Rep. 653;Statev.Jim, 3 Murph. 3;Commonwealthv.Sweeney, 1 Va. Cas. 151;McAulyv.State, 7 Yerg. 526;Johnstonv.State, Mart. Yerg. 129;Johnsonv.State,11 Ohio St. 324;Statev.Carr, 16 So. 155;Statev.Cullins,72 N.C. 144.
Under the treaty that requires an offense to be a crime in both countries, it is of course necessary that the laws of Russia should be proven to show that the forging or passing of a forged bill of exchange is a crime.
The complaints in extradition cases must describe the crime with some degree of accuracy in order that the accused may avail himself of the benefit of the rule of law that he cannot be tried for any other offense than that charged in the extradition proceedings.United Statesv.Rauscher,119 U.S. 407;Exparte Hibbs, 26 F. 431; Field, Extra., 107.
The complaint is likewise bad because it fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a crime. The complaint is insufficient and defective and should be dismissed under authority ofRicev.Ames,180 U.S. 371;Ex parte Lane, 6 F. 38.Grinv.Shine,187 U.S. 181, in no way qualifies or modifies the rule laid down.Ricev.Ames,supra. SeeEx parte M'Cabe, 46 F. 368.
Without a sufficient complaint on oath there is no jurisdiction to issue the warrant.In re Heilbonn, 1 Parker, Crim. R. 436. See alsoIn re Farez, 7 Blatchf. 345;In reHenrich, 5 Blatchf. 414;Ex parte Lane, supra; In re Roth, 15 F. 507; Whart., Confl. Law, § 848; Spear, Extradition, 250; 7 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 623, and note.
The marshal's return to the writ is insufficient because it shows that both the warrant and the final commitment are of no legal force inasmuch as no crime is recited therein.Peoplev.Drayton,168 N.Y. 12.Page 511
This is an extraordinary proceeding and before a person within the jurisdiction of the United States is to be deprived of his liberty and sent four thousand miles away as a prisoner to stand trial upon a criminal charge the greatest caution should be exercised.In re Extradition of Wedge, 15 F. 866.
The papers in this case show that the real purpose of this proceeding is not the forgery charge, but that it had been instituted by creditors as a matter of personal spite, malice and vengeance.Grinv.Shine,187 U.S. 133,134.
The interpretation of statutes has always in modern times been highly favorable to the personal liberty of the subject, and should always remain so.Murrayv.Reg., 7 Q.B. 707;UnitedStatesv.Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95.Mr. Frederic R. Coudert, with whomMr. Charles A. Conlonwas on the brief, for appellees.
It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time. For while of course a man is not to be sent from the country merely upon demand or surmise, yet if there is presented, even in somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government requires his surrender.Grinv.Shine,187 U.S. 181,184. SeePiercev.Creecy,210 U.S. 387,405. We are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair. The evidence in this case seems to us sufficient to require us to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.
According to the translation of the Russian documents accompanying the demand, Birenzweig, a merchant, `deposed' on July 7, 1910, that the Lodz merchant, Leiba Glikeman, in the previous June endorsed to him in payment for goods a note for one hundred roubles purporting to be drawn by a Tugendreich who resides in Ozorkov; that a few days later he learned that Glikeman had left those parts and that he was confirmed by Tugendreich in his suspicion that the note was spurious. Fraidenreich, a merchant, deposed to like effect, giving the name of the purported drawer of the note as Moschek-Leiba Tugendreich. And so did Zelinsky. Birenzweig and Fraidenreich produced their notes. Moschek-Leiba Jakubov-Maerov Tugendreich deposed that he was a merchant in Ozorkov, that he never drew any notes in Glikeman's favor, that the signatures on the notes produced by Birenzweig and Fraidenreich represented a kind of imitation of his signature, and that the text of his notes was written by Glikeman, (with whom he had had dealings). There is no rational doubt that the evidence tends to show that Leiba Glikeman, a leather merchant of Lodz, forged notes of the above-named TugendreichPage 513and disappeared before July 7, 1910. The prisoner by his own admission was a leather merchant and came from Lodz, arriving in New York on or about August 3, 1910. When first arrested he said that he had enemies on the other side who were bringing these charges against him, and, as we think it appears, tried to bribe the officers to let him go. He also said that the spelling of his name Glucksman was a typographical error, that his name was Lewek Glicksman. The Russian magistrate sends a description of Leiba-Levek Pinkusov Glikeman, which is worthless, as such descriptions generally are, but adds certainty to the correspondence of the name of the person referred to in the proceedings in Russia, with that of the prisoner, and after the description the magistrate adds: "A photograph of Glikeman is hereto attached," with his seal on the card, and the photograph represents the prisoner. It is objected that there is no deposition that the photograph represents the party accused, and it may be that in other circumstances we should require further proof. But the magistrate in certifying as if of his own knowledge, presumably had some reason for doing so, and taking the convergence of the other facts mentioned toward the prisoner as the party accused, we cannot say that the Commissioner was wrong in finding the identity made out.
One or two subordinate matters need but a bare mention. The complaint speaks of bills of exchange, the evidence shows the forged instruments to have been promissory notes. The instruments are identified sufficiently and for this purpose no more is needed. NeitherWrightv.Henkel,190 U.S. 40, norPettitv.Walshe,194 U.S. 205, indicates that because the law of New York in this case may determine whether the prisoner is charged with an extraditable crime, it is to determine the effect of such a variance between evidence and complaint. That is a matter to be decided on general principles, irrespectivePage 514of the law of the State. The complaint is sworn to upon information and belief, but it is supported by the testimony of witnesses who are stated to have deposed and whom therefore we must presume to have been sworn. That is enough.Ricev.Ames,180 U.S. 371,375.Judgment affirmed.