Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Gardner v. Bonestell

180 U.S. 362

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1901-02-25
Topic: litigation

Mr. Justice Brewer, after stating the above facts, delivered .the opinion of the court. The plaintiffs in error base their right to the land in controversy upon this provision of the act of July 23, 1866, c. 219, 14 Stat. 218, 220: “ That where persons in good faith and for a valuable consideration have purchased lands of Mexican grantees or assigns, which grants have subsequently been rejected, or where the lands so purchased have been excluded from the final survey-of any Mexican grant; and have used, improved and continued in the actual possession of the same as according to the lines of their original purchase, and where no valid adverse right or title (except of the United States) exists, such purchasers may purchase the same.” Livery branch of the Land Department, from the register and receiver of the local land-office up to the Secretary of the Interior, decided ágainst the contention of Throckmorton, (under whom the plaintiffs in error claim,) holding that the land ivas not within the exterior boundaries of the grant, and that Throckmorton was not a purchaser in good faith from the grantee, or his. assigns. The trial court, referring to the decision of the Land Department, found thát it was not based upon any matter of law, but upon questions of fact in respect to which there was *369 conflicting testimony. Further, that court upon the testimony adduced before it found in accord with the conclusions of the Land Department, and the Supreme Court of the State has sustai…

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Gardner v. Bonestell. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by: 25 opinions

Headnotes

Environmental Law — Survey Authority The power to make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs exclusively to the political department of the Government, and the action of that department, within the scope of its authority, is unassailable in the courts except by a direct proceeding. 180 U.S. 362 (citing Knight v. United States Land Association, 142 U.S. 161, 176)
Environmental Law — Conclusiveness of Land Department Determinations The determination by the Land Department, in a case within its jurisdiction, of questions of fact depending upon conflicting testimony is conclusive and cannot be challenged by subsequent proceedings in the courts. 180 U.S. 362 (citing Burfenning v. Chicago, St. Paul &c. Railway, 163 U.S. 321, 323; Johnson v. Drew, 171 U.S. 93, 99)
Environmental Law — Mexican Grants — Final Survey Where a Mexican grant is one not of quantity but by metes and bounds, the final survey approved by the Land Department conclusively determines the exterior boundaries of the grant. 180 U.S. 362
Environmental Law — Challenge to Survey — Remedy A party asserting that a final survey of a Mexican grant is incorrect cannot litigate the correctness of that survey in an action between private parties; the remedy is by application to the Land Department to correct the survey, and failing correction there, by a direct proceeding in the courts in which the grant claimants are made parties. 180 U.S. 362
Environmental Law — Attack on Survey — Evidentiary Burden A survey, even where it is a proper subject of attack, can be overthrown only upon satisfactory evidence of mistake; it cannot be ignored in favor of the tendency and significance of oral testimony concerning lines, metes, and bounds, because a surveyor observes matters in making a survey that cannot be reproduced on paper yet properly guide the lines run. 180 U.S. 362
Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Review of State Court Judgments — Questions of Fact In proceedings in this court to review the action of state courts, this court does not enter into a consideration of questions of fact; the determination of the state courts on such matters is accepted as conclusive, and the inquiry is simply whether there have been errors of law. 180 U.S. 362 (citing Dower v. Richards, 151 U.S. 658; Egan v. Hart, 165 U.S. 188; Hedrick v. Atchison, Topeka &c. Railroad Co., 167 U.S. 673, 677)

GARDNERv. BONESTELL,180 U.S. 362(1901)

GARDNERv. BONESTELL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 143.

Argued January 17, 18, 1901.

Decided February 25, 1901.

It is a well settled rule of law that the power to make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs exclusively to the political department of the Government, and that the action of that department, within the scope of its authority, is unassailable in the courts except by a direct proceeding. The determination of the Land Department, in a case within its jurisdiction, of questions of fact depending on conflicting testimony is conclusive, and cannot be challenged by subsequent proceedings in the courts. In proceedings in this court to review the action of state courts, this court does not enter into a consideration of questions of fact.

IN 1834 Juan Reed applied to and received from the Mexican

Page 363

governor of California a grant of a tract of land. In 1854 his

heirs petitioned the commission created by the United States for

a confirmation of that grant. It was confirmed, the order

therefor being in these words:

"In this case on hearing the proofs and allegations, it is

adjudged by the commission that the said claim of the petitioners

is valid, and it is therefore hereby decreed that the same be

confirmed.

"The land of which confirmation is hereby made is the same on

which said Juan Reed resided in his lifetime; is known by the

name of Corte de Madera del Presidio, is situated in Marin County

and bounded as follows, to wit: Commencing from the solar which

faces west at a point at the slope and foot of the hills which

lie in that direction and on the edge of the forest of redwoods

called Corte de Madera del Presidio, and running from thence in a

northwardly direction four thousand five hundred varas to an

arroyo called Holon where is another forest of redwoods called

Corte de Madera de San Pablo; thence by the waters of said arroyo

and the Bay of San Francisco ten thousand varas to the Point

Taburon, said point serving as a mark and limit; thence running

along the borders of said bay and continuing in a westerly

direction along the shore of the bay formed by Point Caballos and

Point Taburon, four thousand seven hundred varas to the north of

the canada and the point of the `sausal' which is near the Estero

lying east of the house on said premises which was occupied by

said Juan Reed in November, 1835; and thence continuing the

measurement from east to west along the last line eight hundred

varas to the place of beginning; containing one square league of

land, be the same more or less; being the same land described in

the testimonial of juridical possession on file in this case, as

having been measured to said Juan Reed under a grant of the same

to him, to which testimonial and the map therein referred to and

constituting a part of the expediente, a traced copy of which is

filed in the case, reference is to be had."

An appeal was taken therefrom to the District Court of the

United States, and the following order of confirmation was made

on January 14, 1856:

Page 364

"This cause came on to be heard at a stated term of the court

on appeal from the final decision of the board of commissioners

to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of

California under the act of Congress approved on the 3d of March,

A.D. 1851, upon the transcript of the proceedings and decision of

the board of commissioners, and the papers and evidence on which

the said decision was founded, and it appearing to the court that

the said transcript has been duly filed according to law, and

counsel for the respective parties having been heard, it is by

the court hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said

decision be, and the same is hereby, in all things affirmed, and

it is likewise further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the

claim of the appellees is a good and valid claim, and that the

said claim be, and the same is hereby, confirmed to the extent

and quantity of one square league, being the same land described

in the grant and of which the possession was proved to have been

long enjoyed. Provided, that the said quantity of one square

league now confirmed to the claimants be contained within the

boundaries called for in the said grant and the map to which the

grant refers, and if there be less than that quantity within the

said boundaries, then we confirm to the claimants that less

quantity."

No appeal was taken from this order of confirmation, and it,

therefore, became final. In 1858 a survey was ordered by the Land

Department, and was made by a surveyor, named Mathewson, who

surveyed one square league as being the full amount of the tract

confirmed to the petitioners. The petitioners claimed that their

grant was of a tract described by metes and bounds and not of a

given quantity within exterior boundaries, and after some

controversy between them and the Land Department the latter

recognized their claim, set aside the Mathewson survey and

ordered a new survey. This was made in 1871. It was confirmed by

the Land Department, and has never been questioned therein.

Thereupon a patent was issued to the petitioners, conveying the

tract by metes and bounds as described in the order of the

commission and shown by the last survey.

The tract in controversy is outside the limits of both surveys.

Prior to the last survey Ebenezer Wormouth, the testator of

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defendant in error, settled upon the tract in controversy, and

thereafter made application to enter the tract as public land of

the United States. A contest was had between such testator and

one Samuel R. Throckmorton, claiming title from the heirs of

Reed, the original grantee, first in the local land office,

thence carried by appeal to the General Land Office, and

thereafter to the Secretary of the Interior. The right to enter

was sustained and a patent issued. Thereafter this action against

the plaintiffs in error holding under Throckmorton was instituted

in the Superior Court of the county of Marin, California, which,

at first a mere action in ejectment, became by the pleadings

subsequently filed a suit in equity to try title. The decree in

the trial court was in favor of Wormouth, which was affirmed by

the Supreme Court of the State,125 Cal. 316, and

thereafter this writ of error was sued out.

In the trial court the question of title was submitted to the

court and findings of fact made. Among them were the following:

"2d. That one of the questions decided by the United States

Commissioner of the General Land Office, and by the United States

Secretary of the Interior in the said contest ofThrockmorton

v.Wormouth, mentioned in the twentieth paragraph of said cross

complaint herein, was a question of fact, namely, the location of

the western boundary of the grant made by Governor Figueroa to

Juan Reed.

"3d. That the officers of the United States Land Department,

to wit, the register and receiver, the Commissioner of the

General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior, did decide

and find as a fact upon the evidence produced before said

controversy in this action was not included in the said original

grant by the Mexican government to Juan Reed."

"6th. That the officers of the United States Land Department,

to wit, the United States register and receiver, the Commissioner

of the General Land Office and the United States Secretary of the

Interior, respectively, from the evidence produced before them in

said contest ofThrockmortonv.Wormouth,

Page 366

in denying said application of Throckmorton, did not base their

decision upon a question of law alone, but did find and decide as

a fact that said Throckmorton was not a purchaser in good faith

from Mexican grantees or their assigns.

"7th. This court further finds as follows: That the rancho

granted by the governor of California, under the government of

Mexico, to Juan Reed, did not include within its exterior limits

the land described in the deed from T.B. Deffebachet al. to

Julius C. McCeney of February 14, 1871, or any part thereof,

except so much thereof as is included in the patent issued on or

about the 25th day of February, 1885, by the United States to

John J. Reedet al. That the grant mentioned in the first

paragraph of said cross complaint did not include any part of the

land in controversy in this action. That no grant ever made by

the Mexican government to Juan Reed or to his successors in

interest included any part of the land described and granted to

plaintiff by the United States patent mentioned in the

twenty-second paragraph of said cross complaint.

"8th. That the land described in said deed of T.B. Deffebach

et al. to Julius C. McCeney, or any part thereof, except as in

the last finding above set forth, was not within the exterior

boundaries of said Mexican grant."

"12th. That none of the grantees named in the deeds mentioned

or referred to in the eighteenth paragraph of said cross

complaint purchased the lands or interests described or mentioned

in said deeds in good faith, or used or improved or possessed any

part of the lands in controversy, except as trespassers upon the

possession and right of the plaintiff, as alleged in his

complaint in this action.

"That neither the said Throckmorton, nor his executrix, ever

had any right to use or improve any part of said lot 3 in section

28, or of said lots 2 and 3 in section 29; that neither said

Throckmorton nor his executrix was ever in the actual possession

of the same or any part thereof, except as intruders and

trespassers upon the rights and possession of the plaintiff.

"13th. That the evidence introduced in the matter of the

application and contest mentioned in the nineteenth paragraph of

said cross complaint did not show without conflict, or show

Page 367

at all, that all of the facts set forth in the preceding

paragraphs of said cross complaint were true, or that any of such

facts which are denied in the plaintiff's answer herein are or

were true; that the evidence introduced in the matter of said

application and contest did not establish all of said facts, or

any material fact in favor of Throckmorton's right to purchase

said land by competent or any evidence; that there was conflict

in said evidence; that there was evidence on said contest which

contradicted Throckmorton's evidence; that the evidence as

alleged in said cross complaint was not true.

"That the register and receiver of the land office at San

Francisco did not, nor did either of them, on the 9th day of

February, 1886, or at any other time, base their or his decision

upon the evidence as the same is alleged in said cross complaint,

or upon evidence without conflict; that the said register and

receiver did not, nor did either of them, rest their or his

decision upon the proposition, or upon a proposition of law, that

the said Throckmorton was not in law or under the law entitled to

purchase the said land.

"That the Commissioner of the General Land Office, on appeal

from the decision of the register and receiver, did not base his

decision upon evidence without conflict, and did not rest his

decision upon the or upon a proposition of law, in deciding that

Throckmorton was not entitled to purchase the said land.

"That the said Secretary of the Interior did not rest his

decision, affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the

General Land Office, upon the or upon a proposition of law.

"That the said Secretary of the Interior decided and found as

a fact from the evidence produced on said contest of

Throckmortonv.Wormouth, that said Throckmorton was not a

bona fidepurchaser from Mexican grantees or their assigns of

the lands described in paragraph sixteen of said cross complaint.

"14th. That the said Throckmorton did, claiming to be abona

fidepurchaser from Mexican grantees, make said application (to

purchase) to the register and receiver of the United States land

office at San Francisco, under section 7 of the act of Congress

entitled, `An act to quiet land titles in California.'

"That the said Throckmorton was not abona fidepurchaser

Page 368

from Mexican grantees or their assigns and was not entitled to

purchase the said land or any part thereof under said act of

Congress."

The opinion of the Supreme Court rested upon the single

proposition that the Land Department had jurisdiction of the

controversy, and that its judgment was founded upon disputed

questions of fact, and, therefore was not subject to review in

the courts.

Mr. George W. Monteithfor plaintiffs in error.Mr. C.K. Bonestellfor defendant in error.Mr. Alfred L.Blackwas on his brief.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after stating the above facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs in error base their right to the land in controversy upon this provision of the act of July 23, 1866, c. 219,14 Stat. 218, 220:

"That where persons in good faith and for a valuable consideration have purchased lands of Mexican grantees or assigns, which grants have subsequently been rejected, or where the lands so purchased have been excluded from the final survey of any Mexican grant; and have used, improved and continued in the actual possession of the same as according to the lines of their original purchase, and where no valid adverse right or title (except of the United States) exists, such purchasers may purchase the same."

Every branch of the Land Department, from the register and receiver of the local land office up to the Secretary of the Interior, decided against the contention of Throckmorton, (under whom the plaintiffs in error claim,) holding that the land was not within the exterior boundaries of the grant, and that Throckmorton was not a purchaser in good faith from the grantee, or his assigns. The trial court, referring to the decision of the Land Department, found that it was not based upon any matter of law, but upon questions of fact in respect to which there wasPage 369conflicting testimony. Further, that court upon the testimony adduced before it found in accord with the conclusions of the Land Department, and the Supreme Court of the State has sustained such finding.

Certain propositions may be stated which compel an affirmance of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State. And first, "it is a well settled rule of law that the power to make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs exclusively to the political department of the government, and that the action of that department, within the scope of its authority, is unassailable in the courts except by a direct proceeding."Knightv.UnitedStates Land Association,142 U.S. 161,176.

The grant was one not of quantity but by metes and bounds, and the final survey, approved by the Land Department, determined conclusively the exterior boundaries of that grant. The land in controversy was not within those boundaries. Counsel for plaintiff in error assumes that the correctness of this survey may be litigated in an action between private parties. He insists that the last survey, which he says was a mere compilation and not an actual resurvey, included a large body of lands on the one side which were not, in fact, within the boundaries of the tract of which juridical possession had been given, and excluded on the other side a large body which were within such boundaries and which included the lands in controversy. If his contentions were sustained to the full extent the result would be to enlarge the boundaries of the grant on the one side without reducing them on the other, and so increase the area of the grant several hundred acres above its admittedly true size. In other words, the United States, which obtained by the treaty of cession full title to all lands not subject to private grant, would be deprived of these extra acres, undoubtedly their property. He has mistaken his remedy. It was by application to the Land Department to correct the survey, and failing to secure correction there, a direct proceeding in the courts in which the Reed heirs should have been parties, and in which they could have been heard to defend the survey and patent.

Again, the determination of the Land Department in a case within its jurisdiction of questions of fact depending upon conflictingPage 370testimony is conclusive, and cannot be challenged by subsequent proceedings in the courts.Burfenningv.Chicago, St. Paul c.Railway,163 U.S. 321,323, and cases cited in the opinion;Johnsonv.Drew,171 U.S. 93-99.

The Land Department found and adjudged not only that the land in controversy was outside the exterior boundaries of the grant, but also that Throckmorton was not a purchaser in good faith. Both of these findings were matters of fact and based upon the testimony. No proposition of law controlled such findings, and no error of law is apparent. Both questions of fact were determined by the Land Department adversely to the plaintiffs in error, and that determination concludes the courts. Counsel insists that there was no conflicting testimony. He ignores the survey which is in itself evidence, and that of a most persuasive kind. There are many things which a surveyor sees and finds in making a survey which are not and cannot be reproduced on paper, and which yet guide him, and wisely guide him, in the lines he runs. So that even in a case in which a survey is a proper subject of attack, it can be overthrown only upon satisfactory evidence of mistake. It cannot be ignored and the only matter considered be the tendency and significance of the oral testimony of witnesses as to lines, metes and bounds.

The trial court, in addition to its findings in reference to the proceedings in the Land Department, found, as independent matters of fact, that the land in controversy was outside the exterior boundaries of the grant, and that Throckmorton was not abona fidepurchaser. The Supreme Court of the State sustained those findings. Now, in proceedings in this court to review the action of state courts we do not enter into a consideration of questions of fact. We accept the determination of those courts in such matters as conclusive, and inquire simply whether there have been errors of law.Dowerv.Richards,151 U.S. 658;Eganv.Hart,165 U.S. 188;Hedrickv.Atchison, Topeka c.Railroad Co.,167 U.S. 673,677.

For these reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court of California isAffirmed.Page 371