Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Fry v. United States
Fry v. United States, 44 L. Ed. 2d 363 (1975)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1975-05-27
- Topic
- general
holding that federal wage controls applied to state employees too | upholding the Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U. S. C. § 742j — 1 | upholding the Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U. S. C. § 742j-1 | upholding the Economic Stabilization Act as applied to state and local governments | upholding application of federal wage restraints as a national emergency measure | “Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.” | state licensing of drivers an integral governmental function and beyond the equitable powers of the federal courts to revoke a license issued by a state | the various provisions of the Constitution are to be construed harmoniously with the states’ reserved powers | Tenth Amendment declares policy that Congress may not exercise power so as to impair the states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system | Tenth Amendment declares policy that Congress may not exercise power so as to impair the states’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system | once notice of removal filed, clear and unambiguous language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446 prevents state court from proceeding unless, until remand | “The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.” | purely intrastate activity may be regulated “where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations” | “Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.” | “Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by. Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States-..'..” | “Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States ....” | "Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States . . . ." | "The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." | Wage increases to state employees could substantially affect interstate commerce by “injecting] millions of dollars of purchasing power into the economy and [ ] exert[ing] pressure on other segments of the work force to demand comparable increases. | "Congress'[s] power under the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations." | states are bound by generally applicable wage and price controls | “Congress’[s] power under the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.” | States are bound by generally applicable wage and price controls | States are bound by generally applicable wage and price controls
Citator
- Authority status
- caution
- Cited by
- 201 opinions
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Economic Stabilization Act of 19701 authorized the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize wages and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing
The Court of Appeals construed the Act as applying to state employees and as thus construed upheld its constitutionality. United States v. Ohio, 487 F. 2d 936 (1973). Relying on the decisions of this Court in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), and United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), the court concluded that the interference with state affairs incident to the uniform implementation of federal economic controls was of no consequence since Congress had a rational basis upon which to conclude that the state activity substantially affected commerce. The Court of Appeals accordingly enjoined the payment of wage and salary increases in excess of the amount authorized by the Pay Board. We affirm.
I
At the outset, it is contended that Congress did not intend to include state employees within the reach of the Economic Stabilization Act and that the Pay Board therefore did not have the authority to regulate the compensation due state employees.5 We disagree. The language and legislative history of the Act leave no doubt
Petitioners acknowledge that Congress’ power under-the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 255 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128 (1942). There is little difficulty in concluding that such an effect could well result from large wage increases to 65,000 employees in Ohio and similar numbers in other States; e. g., general raises to state employees could inject millions of dollars of purchasing power into the economy and might exert pressure on other segments of the work force to demand comparable increases.
Petitioners do not appear to challenge Congress’ conclusion that unrestrained wage increases, even for employees of wholly intrastate operations, could have a significant effect on commerce. Instead, they contend that applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state employees interferes with sovereign state functions and for that reason the Commerce Clause should not be read to permit regulation of all state and local governmental employees.7
We conclude that the Economic Stabilization Act was constitutional as applied to state and local governmental employees. Since the Ohio wage legislation conflicted with the Pay Board’s ruling; under the Supremacy Clause the State must yield to the federal mandate. See Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542-545 (1958); Murphy v. O’Brien, 485 F. 2d 671, 675 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1973).
Affirmed.
Less than three months after we granted certiorari, Congress allowed the Economic Stabilization Act to expire on April 30, 1974. There is therefore no continuing impediment to the payment of salary increases of the kind at issue in this case. I would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.
Title II of the Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. I). The Act was extended five times before it expired on April 30, 1974.
6 CFR §§ 101.21, 201.10 (1971). See also 6 CFR §101.28 (1972).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 143.10 (A) (Supp. 1972). The Act provided for salary increases for employees of the state government, state universities, and county welfare departments. Elected state officials were not included.
The Pay Board determined that the implementation of the pay increase from March 1972 to November 1972 would reduce the effective rate to 7% for the wage year November 14, 1971, to November 13, 1972. The payments in issue here therefore represent the wages and salaries that were due from January 1, 1972, when the pay increase was to take effect, to March 16, 1972. The total amount involved is $10.5 million.
Petitioners did not raise the statutory issue either in their petition for certiorari or in their brief. Rather than decide a constitutional question when there may be doubt whether there is any statutory basis for it, however, we deal first with the statutory question, which is addressed in the briefs of amici curiae seeking reversal.
Congress did provide for the exemption of certain categories of employees, such as members of the working poor, those earning substandard wages, and those entitled to wage increases under the Fair Labor Standards Act. §§ 203 (d) and (f), note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. I). See also §§ 203 (c) (l)-(3), (f)(2), (3), and (g). The various stabilization agencies have uniformly interpreted the Act to include the States within its scope, see 36 Fed. Reg. 21790, 25428 (1971); 37 Fed. Reg. 1240, 24961, 24989-24991 (1972). We have long recognized that the interpretation of a statute by an implementing agency is entitled to great weight. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965).
Petitioners have stated their argument, not in terms of the Commerce power, but in terms of the limitations on that power imposed by the Tenth Amendment. While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a “truism,” stating merely that “all is retained which has not been surrendered,” United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system. Despite the extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we are con