Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Fong Foo v. United States
7 L. Ed. 2d 629
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1962-03-19
- Topic
- general
holding that although acquittal was based on “egregiously erroneous foundation,” it “could not be reviewed without putting defendant twice in jeopardy” | ruling that, if a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, he cannot be retried even if the acquittal was based on an “erroneous foundation” | concluding that court’s directed verdict of acquittal could not be reviewed without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, despite fact that it rested upon an “egregiously erroneous foundation” | concluding that court's directed verdict of acquittal could not be reviewed without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, despite fact that it rested upon an "egregiously erroneous foundation" | holding that a trial court’s determination during the course of the defendant’s trial that the defendant should be acquitted on a legally unsupportable ground was entitled to double jeopardy effect | holding that a trial court’s determination during the course of the defendant’s trial that the defendant should be acquitted on a legally unsupportable ground was entitled to double jeopardy effect | holding that a trial court’s determination during the course of the defendant’s trial that the defendant should be acquitted on a legally unsupportable ground was entitled to double jeopardy effect | holding that in criminal cases, even an erroneous acquittal prevents a retrial | holding that in criminal cases, even an erroneous acquittal prevents a retrial | stating that an acquittal triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause even if "the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation" | stating that an acquittal triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause even if “the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation” | finding an acquittal to be an absolute bar to a subsequent prosecution even when the acquittal was “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation” | finding an acquittal to be an absolute bar to a subsequent prosecution even when the acquittal was “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation” | finding acquittal based on poor credibility of prosecution witnesses and improper conduct of prosecutor was "egregiously erroneous" | finding acquittal based on poor credibility of prosecution witnesses and improper conduct of prosecutor was “egregiously erroneous” | finding valid acquittal even where district court was "without power" to direct verdict | upholding “the entry of a final judgment of acquittal” by the trial judge due to “supposed improper conduct on the part of the [prosecutor], and a supposed lack of credibility in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution” due to double jeopardy concerns | upholding "the entry of a final judgment of acquittal" by the trial judge due to "supposed improper conduct on the part of the [prosecutor], and a supposed lack of credibility in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution" due to double jeopardy concerns | directed verdict of acquittal by trial judge in middle of jury trial is entitled to finality and is unreviewable by appeal even though "based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation" | directed verdict of acquittal by trial judge in middle of jury trial is entitled to finality and is unreviewable by appeal even though “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation” | directed verdict after seven days of trial barred retrial notwithstanding appellate court’s disagreement with the ruling | retrial barred although verdict erroneously directed against Government because of lack of credibility of Government's initial witnesses and improper prosecutorial conduct | retrial barred although verdict erroneously directed against Government because of lack of credibility of Government’s initial witnesses and improper prosecutorial conduct | a defendant acquitted at trial may not be retried for the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were clearly erroneous | district court determined, among other things, that t
Citator
- Authority status
- positive
- Cited by
- 497 opinions
- Followed
- 1 times
- Distinguished
- 1 times
The petitioners, a corporation and two of its employees, were brought to trial before a jury in a federal district court upon an indictment charging a conspiracy and the substantive offense of concealing material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §§ 371 and 1001. After seven
The record shows that the district judge’s action was based upon one or both of two grounds: supposed improper conduct on the part of the Assistant United States Attorney who was prosecuting the case, and a supposed lack of credibility in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution who had testified up to that point.
The Government filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, praying that the judgment of acquittal be vacated and the case reassigned for trial. The court granted the petition, upon the ground that under the circumstances revealed by the record the trial court was without power to direct the judgment in question. Judge Aldrich concurred separately, finding that the directed judgment of acquittal had been based solely on the supposed improper conduct of the prosecutor, and agreeing with his colleagues that the district judge was without power to direct an acquittal on that ground. 286 F. 2d 556. We granted certiorari to consider a question of importance in the administration of justice in the federal courts. 366 U. S. 959.
In holding that the District Court was without power to direct acquittals under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the Court of Appeals relied primarily upon two decisions of this Court, Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27, and Ex parte United States, 287 U. S. 241. In the first of these cases it was held that a district judge had no power to suspend a mandatory prison sentence, and that a writ of mandamus would lie to require the judge to vacate his erroneous order of suspension. In the second case the Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering a dis
Neither of those decisions involved the guaranty of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” That constitutional provision is at the very root of the present case, and we cannot but conclude that the guaranty was violated when the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of acquittal and directed that the petitioners be tried again for the same offense.
The petitioners were tried under a valid indictment in a federal court which had jurisdiction over them and over the subject matter. The trial did not terminate prior to the entry of judgment, as in Gori v. United States, 367 U. S. 364. It terminated with the entry of a final judgment of acquittal as to each petitioner. The Court of Appeals thought, not without reason, that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation. Nevertheless, “[t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed . . . without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.” United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 671.
Reversed.
Ms. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.