Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Dowling v. United States

Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1985-06-28
Topic
litigation

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that the “broad consequences of the Government’s theory” of statutory liability “provide a final and dispositive factor against reading [the statute] in the manner suggested”
  • holding that “a nondisclosure can only serve as a basis for a fraudulent. scheme when there exists an independent duty that has been breached by the person so charged,” such as a fidu ciary or statutory duty
  • stating that the NSPA "seems clearly to contemplate a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods”
  • stating that federal courts have long applied the " 'time-honored interpretive guideline' that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity’ "
  • stating that courts should exercise restraint and “[d]ue respect for the prerogatives of Congress in defining federal crimes”
  • reversing convictions based on National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314, without reviewing convictions based on Mail Fraud Act
  • discussing history of criminal liability for violations of federal copyright law
  • "[T]he provision seems clearly to contemplate a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported."

Citator

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Cited by
268 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Criminal Law & Procedure — Statutory Interpretation Federal crimes are solely creatures of statute; in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, a court must closely examine its language, legislative history, and purpose to determine strictly the scope of conduct the enactment forbids, and, out of respect for Congress's prerogative to define crimes, a narrow interpretation is typically appropriate. 473 U.S. at 213-214
  2. Criminal Law & Procedure — Rule of Lenity When a choice must be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate to require that Congress speak in clear and definite language before the harsher alternative is adopted. 473 U.S. at 214
  3. Criminal Law & Procedure — National Stolen Property Act 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which criminalizes interstate transportation of goods of a value of $5,000 or more known to have been "stolen, converted or taken by fraud," does not reach the interstate transportation of "bootleg" phonorecords that were manufactured and distributed without the consent of the copyright owners of the musical compositions performed on the records. 473 U.S. at 208-209, 226-229
  4. Criminal Law & Procedure — National Stolen Property Act The language of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 contemplates a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods; the statute does not cover goods whose contraband character derives solely from the unauthorized use of a copyright embodied in them. 473 U.S. at 216-218
  5. Copyright Law — Nature of Property Interest A copyright holder's property rights have a character distinct from the possessory interest of an owner of ordinary goods, wares, or merchandise, because a copyright comprises a series of carefully defined and delimited interests subject to precise limits, and an infringer does not assume physical control over the copyright or wholly deprive its owner of its use. 473 U.S. at 216-218
  6. Criminal Law & Procedure — National Stolen Property Act Interference with a copyright does not equate with theft, conversion, or fraud for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, because infringement implicates a more complex set of property interests than run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud and fits awkwardly with the statutory language describing goods as "stolen, converted or taken by fraud." 473 U.S. at 217-218
  7. Criminal Law & Procedure — Statutory Purpose The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 — to fill with federal action an enforcement gap created by limited state jurisdiction over the interstate transportation of stolen property — does not justify its application to copyright infringement, because Congress possesses explicit constitutional authority to legislate directly in the copyright field and has never needed supplemental federal action to reach infringing conduct. 473 U.S. at 218-221
  8. Copyright Law — Criminal Provisions The history of the criminal infringement provisions of the Copyright Act, reflecting Congress's cautious, step-by-step approach to imposing and grading criminal penalties for copyright infringement, demonstrates that Congress had no intention to reach copyright infringement through the general provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. 473 U.S. at 221-226
  9. Criminal Law & Procedure — Statutory Construction A reading of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 that would bring copyright infringement within its reach would also extend the statute to significant bodies of law — such as the interstate transportation of patent-infringing goods and goods infringing trademark rights — that Congress has evidenced no intention to enter by way of criminal sanction, and this consequence militates strongly against such a reading. 473 U.S. at 226-227
  10. Criminal Law & Procedure — Rule of Lenity Where the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 does not plainly and unmistakably cover the conduct at issue, its purpose does not reach the problem, and its rationale would support extension to bodies of law Congress did not intend to touch, the ambiguity concerning the ambit of the criminal statute is resolved in favor of lenity. 473 U.S. at 228-229