Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Dorchy v. Kansas

264 U.S. 286

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1924-03-10
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • "A statute bad in part is not necessarily void in its entirety. Provisions within the legislative power may stand if separable from the bad"
  • in ruling on claim under the federal law, United States Supreme Court may decide whether unconstitutional section of state statute is severable or may leave that determination to the state court
  • “Where the legislature attempts to do several things one of which is invalid it may be discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way dependent upon the invalid portion.”
  • Severability is "a question of interpretation and of legislative intent."
  • “[I]t is an aid merely; nqt an inexorable command.”
  • existence of severability clause not dispositive

Citator

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Cited by
346 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Due Process A system of compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes, under which strikes and lockouts are made unlawful and wages, hours, and working conditions are fixed by an administrative tribunal, violates the Federal Constitution where it is applied to an industry not clothed with a public interest. 264 U.S. at 289 (citing Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 544)
  2. Constitutional Law — Due Process A system of compulsory arbitration held unconstitutional as applied to one industry is likewise unconstitutional as applied to other industries for the same reasons; the invalidity of the statutory scheme as applied to packing plants therefore extends to its application to coal mines. 264 U.S. at 289
  3. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Appellate Jurisdiction — Disposition on Review In reviewing a judgment of a state court, the Supreme Court has power not only to correct errors but to make such disposition of the case as justice may require in view of changes in law and in fact that have supervened since the judgment was entered below. 264 U.S. at 289 (citing Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503, 506; Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca di Navigazione, 248 U.S. 9, 21)
  4. Statutory Interpretation — Partial Invalidity — Separability A statute bad in part is not necessarily void in its entirety; provisions within the legislative power may stand if separable from the invalid parts, but a provision inherently unobjectionable cannot be deemed separable unless it appears both that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the legislature intended it to stand in case other provisions included in the act and held bad should fall. 264 U.S. at 289-290 (citing Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 54-56; Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 121)
  5. Statutory Interpretation — Construction — Legislative Intent A statutory declaration that it shall be conclusively presumed the legislature would have passed the statute without any part of it found invalid by the courts provides a rule of construction which may aid in determining the legislative intent, but it is an aid merely and not an inexorable command. 264 U.S. at 290
  6. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — State Court Decisions — Severability The determination of the intention of a state legislature as to the severability of a statutory provision, like the usual function of interpreting a state statute, rests primarily upon the state court, and its decision as to severability is conclusive upon the Supreme Court. 264 U.S. at 290 (citing Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 543; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 366; Schneider Granite Co. v. Gast Realty Co., 245 U.S. 288, 290)
  7. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Appellate Jurisdiction — Severability Determination In cases coming from the state courts, the Supreme Court, in the absence of a controlling state decision, may in passing upon a federal claim also decide the question of severability, but it is not obliged to do so; where the situation makes it appropriate, the Court may leave the determination of that question to the state court. 264 U.S. at 290
  8. Criminal Law & Procedure — Statutory Construction — Union Officers A statute making it a felony for an officer of a labor union to use the power incident to his official position to influence another to violate any provision of the statute or any valid order of the industrial relations court does not in terms prohibit the calling of strikes or influencing workingmen to strike. 264 U.S. at 290
  9. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Remand — Changed Circumstances Where a conviction under a statutory provision was affirmed by the state supreme court before the Supreme Court, in another case, declared a closely related part of the same act unconstitutional, the question whether that provision is separable from the invalid system should be remitted for primary determination by the state court, and the state court's judgment should be vacated for that purpose. 264 U.S. at 290-291
DORCHYv. KANSAS,264 U.S. 286(1924)
44 S.Ct. 323
DORCHYv. STATE OF KANSAS.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.
No. 163.
Argued January 15, 16, 1924.
Decided March 10, 1924.
1. The system of compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes set up by the Court of Industrial Relations Act of Kansas, and held unconstitutional inWolf Packing Co. v.Court ofIndustrial Relations,262 U.S. 522, as applied to packing plants, is, for the same reasons, invalid as applied to coal mines of that State. P. 289.Page 2872.Quaere:Whether as a matter of statutory construction, § 19 of this act, which declares that one who uses his position as an officer of a union, or as an employer, to influence violations of the act or of valid orders of the Court of Industrial Relations shall be deemed guilty of a felony, is separable from the system of compulsory arbitration held invalid? P. 290. 3. A declaration in a statute that it shall be conclusively presumed the legislature would have passed the statute without any part of it found invalid by the courts, provides a rule which may aid in determining the legislative intent, but is not an inexorable command.Id. 4. In reviewing a judgment of a state court, this Court may not only correct errors but may make such disposition of the case as justice may require in view of changes in law and fact that have supervened since the judgment was entered. P. 289. 5. Where a conviction under § 19 of the above mentioned statute was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kansas before this Court had, in another case, declared a closely related part of the same act unconstitutional,heldthat the question whether § 19 is separable should be remitted for primary determination by that court. P. 290.112 Kan. 235, reversed.
ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas which
affirmed a judgment entered against the plaintiff in error in a
criminal prosecution, under § 19 of the Court of Industrial
Relations Act of Kansas.
Mr. John F. McCarronandMr. Phil H. Callery, with whomMr. Redmond S. BrennanandMr. Frank Bonar Hegartywere on the brief, for plaintiff in error.Mr. John G. Egan, Assistant Attorney General of the State of Kansas, andMr. Chester I. Long, with whomMr. Charles B.Griffith, Attorney General,Mr. Austin M. CowanandMr.William E. Stanleywere on the brief, for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court of Industrial Relations Act was approved January 23, 1920. Laws of Kansas, 1920, Special Session,Page 288c. 29. The purpose of the statute is to ensure continuity of operation in coal mining and other businesses declared to be affected with a public interest.1The means provided for accomplishing this is a system of compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes. The instrument is the so-called industrial court. Upon it is conferred power to investigate all matters involved in such controversies; to make findings thereon; to issue such orders as it may deem needful, fixing the wages to be paid, the hours of work, the rules for work, and the working and living conditions. The provisions in aid of the enforcement of this system are both comprehensive and detailed. The employer is prohibited, among other things, from limiting or ceasing operations with a view to defeating the purpose of the statute. Likewise, every association of persons (e.g., trade unions) is prohibited from acting to that end. In effect, strikes and lockouts, the boycott and picketing, are made unlawful. Any person violating any provision of the statute, or any order of the so-called court, is declared guilty of a misdemeanor. Some of the provisions of the act were considered inHowatv.Kansas,258 U.S. 181, and inChas. Wolff Packing Co. v.Court ofIndustrial Relations,262 U.S. 522.

Section 19 provides that any officer of a union of workmen engaged in an industry within the provisions of the act, who shall wilfully use the power incident to his official position to influence any other person to violate any provision of the statute or any valid order of the Court ofPage 289Industrial Relations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony punishable by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or by imprisonment at hard labor, not to exceed two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Under this section an information was filed against Dorchy, a union official, for calling a strike in a coal mine. He was found guilty. The judgment entered was affirmed by the highest court of the State,112 Kan. 235; and a rehearing was denied. The case is here on writ of error under § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended. It is contended that § 19 is void, because it prohibits strikes; and that to do so is denial of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

After the judgment under review was entered in the Supreme Court of Kansas, this Court declared, in theWolff Packing Co.Case, supra, p. 544, that the system of compulsory arbitration as applied to packing plants, violates the Federal Constitution. For the reason there set forth, it is unconstitutional, also, as applied to the coal mines of that State. The question suggests itself whether § 19 has not, therefore, necessarily fallen as a part of the system of compulsory arbitration. If so, there is no occasion to consider the specific objection to the provisions of that section. This Court has power not only to correct errors in the judgment entered below, but, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to make such disposition of the case as justice may now require.Gulf, Colorado Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.Dennis,224 U.S. 503,506. In determining what justice requires the Court must consider changes in law and in fact which have supervened since the judgment was entered below.Watts, Watts Co. v.Unione Austriaca di Navigazione,248 U.S. 9,21. If § 19 falls as the result of the decision in theWolf Packing Co. Case, the effect is the same as if the section had been repealed without any reservation.

A statute bad in part is not necessarily void in its entirety. Provisions within the legislative power may standPage 290if separable from the bad.Berea Collegev.Kentucky,211 U.S. 45,54-56;Careyv.South Dakota,250 U.S. 118,121. But a provision, inherently unobjectionable, cannot be deemed separable unless it appears both that, standing alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall. Section 19 does not, in terms, prohibit the calling of strikes or influencing workingmen to strike. It merely declares that one who uses his official position, or his position as an employer, to "influence, impel, or compel any other person to violate any of the provisions of this act, or any valid order of said Court of Industrial Relations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Most of the provisions of the original act are very intimately connected with the system of compulsory arbitration. Whether § 19 is so interwoven with the system held invalid that the section cannot stand alone, is a question of interpretation and of legislative intent. CompareButtsv.MerchantsTransportation Co.,230 U.S. 126. Section 28 of the act,2(which resembles that discussed inHillv.Wallace,259 U.S. 44,70,71) provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in determining that intent. But it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.

The task of determining the intention of the state legislature in this respect, like the usual function of interpreting a state statute, rests primarily upon the state court. Its decision as to the severability of a provision is conclusive upon this Court.Gatewoodv.North Carolina,203 U.S. 531,543;Guinnv.United States,238 U.S. 347,366;Page 291Schneider Granite Co. v.Gast Realty Co.,245 U.S. 288,290. In cases coming from the lower federal courts, such questions of severability, if there is no controlling state decision, must be determined by this Court. CompareMyersv.Anderson,238 U.S. 368,381;Louisville Nashville R.R. Co. v.Garrett,231 U.S. 298,311. In cases coming from the state courts, this Court, in the absence of a controlling state decision, may, in passing upon the claim under the federal law, decide, also, the question of severability. But it is not obliged to do so. The situation may be such as to make it appropriate to leave the determination of the question to the state court. We think that course should be followed in this case.

The Supreme Court of Kansas has already dealt, to some extent, with the effect of our decision upon other sections of the act. When a motion was made there inWolf Packing Co. Caseto spread the mandate of this Court upon its record, the state court held that the order of the Court of Industrial Relations under review remains in force in so far as it regulates hours of labor and weekly rest periods.114 Kan. 304. The judgment then entered was modified November 10, 1923, upon a rehearing.3[114 Kan. 487.] The relation of § 19 to the provisions held invalid is a different matter. So far as appears, the state court has not passed upon the question whether § 19, being an intimate part of the system of compulsory arbitration held to be invalid, falls with it. In order that the state court may pass upon this question, its judgment in this case, which was rendered before our decision in theWolff Packing Co. Case, should be vacated. CompareGulf, Colorado Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.Dennis, supra, p. 509. To this end the judgment isReversed.Page 292
  1. Page 288 Section 2 of the statute, as enacted, conferred upon the Court of Industrial Relations the functions theretofore performed by the Public Utilities Commission. These functions were restored to a Public Utilities Commission by c. 260, Laws of 1921. There was conferred upon the Court of Industrial Relations by c. 262 of the Laws of 1921 the function theretofore performed by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry, and by c. 263 of the Laws of 1921 the function theretofore performed by the Industrial Welfare Commission. These latter powers were also enlarged. ↩
  2. Page 290 Section 28: "If any section or provision of this act shall be found invalid by any court, it shall be conclusively presumed that this act would have been passed by the legislature without such invalid section or provision, and the act as a whole shall not be declared invalid by reason of the fact that one or more sections or provisions may be found to be invalid by any court." ↩
  3. Page 291 The action of the state court has been brought here for review by proceedings entered February 16, 1924, and not yet disposed of. ↩