Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Doctor v. Harrington
Dr. v. Harrington, 25 S. Ct. 355 (1905)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1905-02-20
- Topic
- general
"The ultimate interest of the corporation made defendant may be the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff, but the corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and made to act in a way detrimental to his rights." | “The ultimate interest of the corporation made defendant may be the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff, but the corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and made to act in a way detrimental to his rights.” | “The ultimate interest of the corporation made defendant may be the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff, but the corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and made to act in a way detrimental to his rights.”’
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- 99 opinions
DOCTORv. HARRINGTON,196 U.S. 579(1905)
25 S.Ct. 355
DOCTORv. HARRINGTON.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK.
No. 477.
Submitted January 25, 1905.
Decided February 20, 1905.
THE bill in this case was dismissed by the Circuit Court on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction upon the fact alleged, and
certified to this court the question of jurisdiction. The
following is the question certified:
"Whether or not the complainants' bill of complaint showed
that there was such diversity of citizenship between the parties
complainant and parties defendant in this cause as would be
sufficient under the provisions of the United States Revised
Statutes to confer jurisdiction upon the United States Circuit
Court for the Southern District of New York, of this cause."
The court further certified that it entered a decree
dismissing the bill, "holding that it appeared from the said bill
of complaint that there was no such diversity of citizenship
between the parties complainant and defendant as would confer
Page 580
jurisdiction upon the United States Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York in the cause within the meaning of
the United States Revised Statutes, and that in arranging the
parties to this cause relatively to the controversy the Sol
Sayles Company must be grouped on the side of the complainants,
with the result that citizens of the same State would thus be
parties on both sides of the litigation, and thus deprive this
court of jurisdiction."
The bill is very voluminous, and, as it is agreed by appellees
that the statement of appellants substantially states its
allegation, we quote from appellants' brief as follows:
"This action was brought by the appellants, as stockholders of
the Sol Sayles Company, a corporation organized under the laws of
the State of New York, for the purpose of vacating and setting
aside a judgment obtained by the appellees Harrington against the
Sol Sayles Company in the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
on October 28, 1902, and the levy and sale under an execution
issued thereunder, and of requiring the appellees Harrington to
deliver to the Sol Sayles Company certain shares of stock in the
Sayles, Zahn Company, and certain bonds, belonging to the Sol
Sayles Company, which had been sold under such execution, and for
other equitable relief.
"In substance, the complainants allege in their bill of
complaint that they are citizens of Morris County, New Jersey;
that the defendants Harrington are citizens of the State of New
York, and that the defendants Sol Sayles Company and Sayles, Zahn
Company are likewise citizens of said State, both being
incorporated under the laws of that State; that the Sol Sayles
Company was organized with a capital stock of $100,000, divided
into 1,000 shares of the par value of $100 per share, of which
the complainants owned 500 shares and the defendants Harrington
500 shares; that by an arrangement made between the owners of the
stock, the voting power on a majority thereof was given to the
defendant John J. Harrington, who directed the management of the
affairs of the corporation, dictated its
Page 581
policy, and selected its directors; that on January 26, 1898, the
defendant John J. Harrington caused the defendant Sayles, Zahn
Company to be organized, for the purpose of taking over the
business of the defendant Sol Sayles Company and of one Henry
Zahn, and thereupon the property of the Sol Sayles Company and of
Zahn was transferred to the Sayles, Zahn Company, which likewise
was controlled by the defendant John J. Harrington; that the Sol
Sayles Company received, in consideration of the transfer of its
property, $50,000 of the capital stock of the Sayles, Zahn
Company, and subsequently subscribed for $50,000 additional
stock.
"It is further alleged that about February 1, 1899, the
defendants Harrington, for the purpose of cheating and defrauding
the Sol Sayles Company, and the complainants, of their interest
in the assets of the Sayles, Zahn Company, fraudulently caused
the Sol Sayles Company to execute and deliver to them, without
any consideration whatsoever, its promissory notes, aggregating
$23,700, which were utterly fictitious, and thereafter, and on
October 3, 1902, the defendants Harrington, in furtherance of
their fraudulent scheme, caused an action to be instituted and a
judgment to be recovered against the Sol Sayles Company, for the
amount of the said promissory notes and interest which was
alleged to have accrued thereon, the Sol Sayles Company being in
utter ignorance of the nature of the action and omitting to
interpose any defense thereto.
"This scheme resulted in the recovery of a judgment against
the defendant Sol Sayles Company on October 28, 1902, for
$27,357.28, in favor of the defendants Harrington, who thereupon
caused an execution to be issued to the sheriff of the county of
New York, against the property and assets of the Sol Sayles
Company, under which execution the said sheriff levied on the
shares of stock in the Sayles, Zahn Company, and also two bonds
of the New Jersey Steamboat Company, which belonged to the Sol
Sayles Company, and sold all of the right, title and interest of
the Sol Sayles Company in the said certificates of stock and in
the said bonds, the said defendants
Page 582
Harrington causing them to be purchased for their own benefit;
said shares of stock being then, as the defendants Harrington
well knew, and have ever since continued to be, worth upwards of
$200,000.
"It further alleged that the complainants caused a demand to
be made upon the defendants Harrington, that they transfer the
said shares of stock and the said bonds to the Sol Sayles
Company, but that they have refused to do so, and have insisted
that these shares of stock and bonds are their personal and
individual property, and that neither the Sol Sayles Company nor
their complainants have any right, title or interest in either
the said shares of stock or the said bonds, or any part thereof.
"The twentieth paragraph of the bill of complaint is as
follows:
"`The complainants were and each of them was a shareholder of
the defendant Sol Sayles Company at the time of the transactions
herein complained of. This suit is not a collusive one to confer
upon a court of the United States jurisdiction of a case of which
it would not otherwise have cognizance. The complainants are
unable to secure any corporate action on the part of the
defendant Sol Sayles Company to redress the wrongs hereinbefore
set forth, nor are they able to obtain any redress at the hands
of the stockholders of the said defendant Sol Sayles Company. The
board of directors of said corporation is under the absolute
control and domination of the defendant John J. Harrington, and
the said Harrington, by reason of having possession of a majority
of the capital stock of the said corporation, likewise controls
the action of the stockholders. Although requested for
information with regard to the facts hereinbefore set forth, he
has refused to give any information with regard thereto, and has
declined to redress the wrongs of which complaint is herein made,
or to give to the complainants any opportunity to lay before the
board of directors or the stockholders of the defendant Sol
Sayles Company the facts herein set forth.'"
Page 583
There is diversity of citizenship between complainants and defendants, the former being citizens of New Jersey and the latter of New York.
Appellees' contention that appellants are estopped or debarred from asserting the actual facts as to diversity of citizenship because stockholders are presumed to be citizens of the same State as the corporation, may on its face be good reasoning, but it is based entirely on a legal fiction, which has been indulged for the purpose of enabling the Federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over corporations. Legal fictions, however, are not always carried out to their logical conclusion, and this court has entertained jurisdiction in numerous instances, where precisely the same state of facts existed as in the present case. Among the more important precedents are the following:Dodgev.Woolsey, 18 How. 331;Hawesv.Oakland,104 U.S. 450;Quincyv.Steel,120 U.S. 241;Pollockv.Farmers' L. T.Co.,157 U.S. 429;Cottingv.Kansas City Stock Yard Co.,183 U.S. 79;Utah-Nevada Co. v.DeLamar, 133 F. 113.
Even though complainants are seeking to maintain this action in the right of the Sol Sayles Company, in view of the trend of authority that fact is not entitled to weight as against the circumstances that such company is in fact a defendant.DeNeufvillev.N.Y. Northern Ry. Co., 81 F. 10, 13.Mr. Philip J. BrittandMr. John J. Adamsfor appellees:
There is no such diversity of citizenship between the complainants and defendants as is required under the Federal statutes. Complainants sue, not in their own right, but as stockholders of the Sol Sayles Company, and are, therefore, to be conclusively presumed, for purposes of jurisdiction, to be citizens of New York. See also rule 94 in equity.
The action is brought in the right of the corporation.Davenportv.Dows, 18 Wall. 626;Dewingv.Perdicaris,96 U.S. 197;Porterv.Sabin,149 U.S. 473;Dickermanv.NorthernPage 584Trust Co.,176 U.S. 188;Alexanderv.Donohoe,143 N.Y. 203;Flynnv.Brooklyn City R.R. Co.,158 N.Y. 493. As to different classes of stockholders' actions and where the damages belong to the corporation and not to individual stockholders seeNilesv.N.Y.C. H.R.R. Co.,176 N.Y. 119;Smithv.Hurd, 12 Metc. 371;Allenv.Curtis,26 Conn. 456. As to the status of corporations as citizens and the stockholders being of the same State as that under whose laws the corporation is organized seeBank of U.S. v.Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61;Hope Ins. Co. v.Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57;Sullivanv.Fulton Steamboat Co., 6 Wheat. 540;Breithauptv.Bank of Georgia, 1 Pet. 238;Commercial Bankv.Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60;Louisville c. R.R. Co. v.Letson, 2 How. 497, 558;Marshallv.B. O.R.R. Co.,16 Ohio St. 314,328;Drawbridge Co. v.Shepherd, 20 How. 227, 233;Ohio Miss.R.R. v.Wheeler, 1 Black, 286, 296;Mullerv.Dows,94 U.S. 444;Steamship Co. v.Tugman,106 U.S. 118,121;Memphis Charleston R.R. v.Alabama,107 U.S. 581;Shawv.Quincy Mining Co.,145 U.S. 444,451;St. Louis SanFrancisco Railway Co. v.James,161 U.S. 545;Barrow S.S.Co. v.Kane,170 U.S. 100;Southern Ry. Co. v.Allison,190 U.S. 326;Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.Jones,177 U.S. 456;Taylorv.Illinois Central Ry. Co., 89 F. 119;Thomasv.Board of Trustees,195 U.S. 207; cases cited by appellants andHanchettv.Blair, 100 F. 817, are not in point, and as to rule 94 in equity seeDavis FarnumMfg. Co. v.Los Angeles,189 U.S. 220.
The complainants are suing solely for the benefit of the Sol Sayles Company and that corporation, although in form a defendant, is, in legal effect, on the same side of the controversy as the complainants.Arapahoe Countyv.RailwayCo., 4 Dillon, 277;Waldenv.Skinner,101 U.S. 589; and see also as to where defendants may be on same side as complainants,Covertv.Waldron, 33 F. 311;The Removal Cases,100 U.S. 457;Pacific Railroadv.Ketchum,101 U.S. 289;Harterv.Kernochan,103 U.S. 562;Eversv.Watson,156 U.S. 532;Page 585Brownv.Truesdale,138 U.S. 389,395;Merchants CottonPress Co. v.N.A. Ins. Co.,151 U.S. 385;Wilsonv.OswegoAgency,151 U.S. 63;Cillyv.Patton, 62 F. 498;Board of Trusteesv.Blair, 70 F. 414;Consol. WaterCo. v.Babcock, 76 F. 642;Shippv.Williams, 62 F. 4;Gardnerv.Brown, 21 Wall. 36;Pittsburg, C.St. L. Ry. Co. v.B. O.R.R. Co., 61 F. 705;BostonSafe Dep. Tr. Co. v.Racine, 97 F. 817;Old ColonyTrust Co. v.Atlanta Ry. Co., 100 F. 798; 1 Foster's Federal Practice, 64.
The lack of jurisdiction of the court can be raised at any stage of the litigation, and even though the appellees had not raised the question, the court could, of its own motion, have dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction.Gracev.Am.Cen. Ins. Co.,109 U.S. 278,283;Mexican Cen. R.R. Co. v.Pinkney,149 U.S. 194;Thomasv.Board of Trustees,195 U.S. 207.Mr. George H. Yeamanby leave of the court filed a brief asamicus curicecontending that diversity of citizenship did not exist and that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case.
1. This is based on the assumption adopted by this court, that stockholders of a corporation are citizens of the State which created the corporation — an assumption physically possible but hardly true in a single instance; and appellants here contend that it should be classed with the fictions of the law and subject to one of their fundamental maxims, and cannot be carried beyond the reasons which caused its adoption necessarily requisite. It is, however, more of a presumption than a fiction, but whether we regard it as either it cannot be pushed to the end contended for by appellees.
The reason of the presumption (we will so denominate it) was to establish the citizenship of the legal entity for the purpose of jurisdiction in the Federal courts. Before its adoption difficulties had been encountered on account of the conditions under which jurisdiction was given to those courts. A corporation, is constituted, it is true, of all its stockholders, but it has a legal existence separate from them — rights and obligations separate from them; and may have obligations to them. It can sue and be sued. At first this could be done in the Circuit Court of the United States only when the corporation was composed of citizens of the State which created it.Bank ofUnited Statesv.Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61;Hope InsuranceCompanyv.Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57. But the limitation came to be seen as almost a denial of jurisdiction to or against corporations in the Federal courts, and inLouisville c.Railroad Companyv.Letson, 2 How. 497, prior cases were reviewed; and this doctrine laid down:
"That a corporation created by and doing business in a particular State, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, . . . capable of being treated as a citizen of that State, as much as a natural person." And "when the corporation exercises its powers in the State which chartered it, that is its residence, and such an averment is sufficient to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction."Page 587
The presumption that the citizenship of the corporators should be that of the domicil of the corporation was not then formulated. That came afterwards, and overcame the difficulty and objection that the legal creation, the corporation, could not be a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution.Marshalv.B. O. Railroad Company, 16 How. 314. This, then, was its purpose, and to stretch beyond this is to stretch it to wrong. It is one thing to give to a corporation a status, and another thing to take from a citizen the right given him by the Constitution of the United States. Disregarding the purpose of the presumption, it is easy to represent it, as counsel does, as illogical if not extended to every stockholder; but as easy it would be to show its falseness if so applied. But such charges and countercharges are aside from the question. To the fact and place of incorporation the law attaches its presumption for a special purpose. Perhaps, as intimated inSt. Louis San Francisco Ry. v.James,161 U.S. 545,563, this "went to the very verge of judicial power." Against the further step urged by appellees we encounter the Constitution of the United States.
2. The ninety-fourth rule in equity contemplates that there may be, and provides for, a suit brought by a stockholder in a corporation founded on rights which may properly be asserted by the corporation. And the decisions of this court establish that such a suit, when between citizens of different States, involves a controversy cognizable in a Circuit Court of the United States. The ultimate interest of the corporation made defendant may be the same as that of the stockholder made plaintiff, but the corporation may be under a control antagonistic to him, and made to act in a way detrimental to his rights. In other words, his interests, and the interests of the corporation, may be made subservient to some illegal purpose. If a controversy hence arise, and the other conditions of jurisdiction exist, it can be litigated in a Federal court.
InDetroitv.Dean,106 U.S. 537, Dean, who was a citizenPage 588of New York and a stockholder in the Mutual Gas Light Company, a Michigan corporation, in order to protect its right and property against the threatened action of a third party brought suit against the latter and the corporation in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan. This court ordered the bill dismissed, not because Dean and the corporation had identical interests, but because the refusal of the directors of the corporation to sue was collusive. The right of a stockholder to sue a corporation for the protection of his rights was recognized, the condition only being the refusal of the directors to act, which refusal, it is said, must be real, not feigned.Hawesv.Oakland,104 U.S. 450, was cited, where a like right was decided to exist. See alsoDodgev.Woolsey, 18 How. 331;Davenportv.Dows, 18 Wall. 626;Memphisv.Dean, 8 Wall. 64;Greenwoodv.Freight Company105 U.S. 13;Quincyv.Steel,120 U.S. 241. It was said inDodgev.Woolsey, that the refusal of the directors to sue caused them and Woolsey, who was a stockholder in a corporation of which they were directors, "to occupy antagonistic grounds in respect to the controversy, which their refusal to sue forced him to take in defense of his rights."Dodgev.Woolseywas modified byHawesv.Oakland, as to what circumstances would justify a suit by a stockholder if the directors refuse to sue. See alsoQuincyv.Steel, supra.
The case at bar is brought within the doctrine of those cases by the allegations of the bill. The defendant corporations are alleged to be under the control of John J. and Dennis A. Harrington, and that complainants are unable to secure any corporate action on the part of the defendant, the Sol Sayles Company, to redress the wrongs complained of. It is also alleged that the Harringtons control the action of the stockholders, and have declined to redress the wrongs complained of or give complainants any opportunity to lay before the board of directors or the stockholders of the Sol Sayles Company the facts alleged. It is also alleged the suit is not collusive. It is manifest that if the matter alleged be true, complainantsPage 589will suffer irremediable loss if not permitted to sue, and as they had a cause of action they rightly brought it in the Circuit Court of the United States.Decree reversed.