Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc.
30 L. Ed. 2d 567
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1972-01-10
- Topic
- general
holding that a facial challenge was mooted by an amendment that substantially altered the objectionable statutory provision | holding that a facial challenge was mooted by an amendment that substantially altered the objectionable statutory provision | holding that when the only relief sought was a declaratory judgment that a statute was unconstitutional, but the statute was repealed pending appeal, the case was moot | holding moot a challenge to a Florida tax exemption for church property when the law had been repealed | holding moot a challenge to a Florida tax exemption for church property when the law had been repealed | stating that review is of the current version of a challenged law, not its repealed predecessor | stating that courts must review the district court's judgment in light of the law as it now stands | stating that courts must review the district court’s judgment in light of the law as it now stands | remanding to allow plaintiffs to amend complaint where case became moot before Supreme Court’s decision | remanding case to allow amendment of the pleadings after new statute altered terms of real estate tax exemption at issue | finding challenge to repealed statute providing tax exemption for church property moot where no court could grant “[t]he only relief sought in the complaint” (emphasis added) | issuing a declaratory judgment that a repealed statute is unconstitutional and an injunction against its application would “of course [be] inappropriate now that the statute has been repealed.” | dismissing as moot a request for a declaratory judgment regarding the unconstitutionality of a statute because the “relief [was], of course, inappropriate [given] that the statute ha[d] been repealed” | dismissing as moot a request for a declaratory judgment regarding the unconstitutionality of a statute because the “relief [was], of course, inappropriate [given] that the statute ha[d] been repealed” | repeal of a Florida statute granting a church parking lot tax exemption which had been challenged under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment | where new legislation enacted, United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court with leave for appellants to amend their pleadings | “The only relief sought in the complaint was a declaratory judgment that the now repealed Fla.Stat. s 192.06(4 | “The only relief sought in the complaint was a declaratory judgment that the now repealed Fla.Stat. s 192.06(4 | “We can . . . [not] enjoin the enforcement of a provision that is no longer in effect.” | "crux of [the] complaint" was that old statute violated Constitution insofar as it authorized tax exemption "for church property used primarily for commercial purposes"; new statute authorized exemption "only if the property is used predominantly for religious purposes" | “crux of [the] complaint” was that old statute violated Constitution insofar as it authorized tax exemption “for church property used primarily for commercial purposes”; new statute authorized exemption “only if the property is used predominantly for religious purposes” | attack on tax exemption for church property used as a commercial parking lot mooted by subsequent statute that allowed exemption only if church property was used predominantly for religious purposes | attack on tax exemption for church property used as a commercial parking lot mooted by subsequent statute that allowed exemption only if church property was used predominantly for religious purposes | in appeal involving facial challenge, court reviews law as it currently stands | determination of constitutionality of specific application of repealed statute is inappropriate | challenged law was repealed while case was on appeal, rendering the case moot | challenged law was repealed while case was on appeal, rendering the case moot | challenged law was repealed while case was on appeal, rendering the case moot | challenged law was repealed while case was on appeal, rendering the case mo
Citator
- Cited by
- 132 opinions
This is an action for a declaratory judgment that Florida Stat. § 192.06 (4) (1967) violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
The Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., is the owner of nearly a full square block of land in downtown Miami which is occupied by church buildings and an offstreet parking lot. The parking facilities are utilized by numerous persons pursuing a variety of church activities. These facilities are also used as a commercial parking lot every day except Sunday. At the time this suit was instituted and decided in the District Court, Fla. Stat. § 192.06 (4) provided for exemption from taxation of:
“All houses of public worship and lots on which they are situated, and all pews or steps and furniture therein, every parsonage and all burying grounds not owned or held by individuals or corporations for speculative purposes, tombs and right of burial . . . .”
Prior to the decision of the District Court, the Florida Supreme Court had held, in a case involving the same property as is involved here, that church parking lots
At its 1971 Regular Session, the Florida Legislature repealed § 196.191 (the 1969 successor to § 192.06) and enacted new legislation, approved June 15, 1971, effective December 31, 1971, which provides, in relevant part, that church property is exempt from taxation only if the property is used predominantly for religious purposes and only “to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the non-exempt use.” Fla. Stat. § 196.192 (2).
We must review the judgment of the District Court in light of Florida law as it now stands, not as it stood when the judgment below was entered. Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 (1960); cf. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281-282 (1969); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 60 (1941). It is clear that the church parking lot that was the subject of the taxpayers’ complaint is no longer fully exempt from taxation. If, in fact, it can be demonstrated that the lot is predominantly used for nonreligious purposes, it will receive no exemption whatever. “The case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, supra, at 48.
This is not a case that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911), nor is it the kind of case that may produce irreparable injury if not decided immediately, see, e. g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969) ; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963). The only relief sought in the complaint was a declaratory judgment that
Because it is possible that appellants may wish to amend their complaint so as to demonstrate that the repealed statute retains some continuing force or to attack the newly enacted legislation, rather than remanding the case to the District Court for dismissal as is our usual practice when a case has become moot pending a decision by this Court, United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39, and n. 2 (1950), we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court with leave to the appellants to amend their pleadings. Bryan v. Austin, 354 U. S. 933 (1957).
Judgment will be entered accordingly.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.