Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Dickerson v. United States

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
2000-06-26
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the prophylactic warnings it requires, are “constitutionally based”
  • holding that Miranda is a constitutional decision which applies to both federal and state courts and cannot be overruled by legislative action
  • holding that because Miranda was a constitutional decision, it cannot be overruled by an act of Congress
  • holding that “Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution ... .”
  • holding that Miranda was “constitutionally based” but declining to “go further than Miranda ” to establish a constitutional right
  • holding that Congress cannot overrule prophylactic remedy designed to prevent violation of constitutional rights
  • holding that both voluntariness and compliance with Miranda are required to admit a defendant’s statements into evidence
  • holding that, despite Miranda, the Court has “never abandoned” its “due process jurisprudence,” and “continue[s] to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily”

Citator

Dickerson v. United States has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (invalidated by Dickerson v. United States). Read them before relying on it. 1,861 later decisions cite it.

Authority status
caution
Cited by
1861 opinions
DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES,530 U.S. 428(2000)
120 S.Ct. 2326
CHARLES THOMAS DICKERSON, PETITIONERv. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-5525.
Argued April 19, 2000
Decided June 26, 2000
In the wake ofMirandav.Arizona,384 U.S. 436, in which the Court held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence,id., at 479, Congress enacted18 U.S.C. § 3501, which in essence makes the admissibility of such statements turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily. Petitioner, under indictment for bank robbery and related federal crimes, moved to suppress a statement he had made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the ground he had not received "Mirandawarnings" before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that petitioner had not receivedMirandawarnings, but held that § 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. It concluded thatMirandawas not a constitutional holding, and that, therefore, Congress could by statute have the final say on the admissibility question.Held: Mirandaand its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Pp. 2-14.
(a)Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. Given § 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and its instruction for trial courts to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, this Court agrees with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended § 3501 to overruleMiranda. The law is clear as to whether Congress has constitutional authority to do so. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of evidence and procedure.Carlislev.United States,517 U.S. 416,426. While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required,e.g., Palermov.United States,360 U.S. 343,345-348, it may not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution, see,e.g.,City of Boernev.Flores,521 U.S. 507,517-521. ThatMirandaannounced a constitutional rule is demonstrated, first and foremost, by the fact that bothMirandaand two of its companion cases applied its rule to proceedings in state courts, and that the Court has consistently donePage 429so ever since. See,e.g.,Stansburyv.California,511 U.S. 318(percuriam). The Court does not hold supervisory power over the state courts,e.g., Smithv.Phillips,455 U.S. 209,221, as to which its authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the Constitution,e.g., Mu'Minv.Virginia,500 U.S. 415,422. The conclusion thatMirandais constitutionally based is also supported by the fact that that case is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule, see,e.g.,384 U.S., at 445. AlthoughMirandainvited legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination, it stated that any legislative alternative must be "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."Id., at 467.
A contrary conclusion is not required by the fact that the Court has subsequently made exceptions from theMirandarule, see,e.g., New Yorkv.Quarles,467 U.S. 649. No constitutional rule is immutable, and the sort of refinements made by such cases are merely a normal part of constitutional law.Oregonv.Elstad,470 U.S. 298,306— in which the Court, in refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed inFourth Amendmentcases, stated thatMiranda'sexclusionary rule serves theFifth Amendmentand sweeps more broadly than that Amendment itself — does not prove thatMirandais a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under theFourth Amendmentare different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth. Finally, although the Court agrees with the court-appointedamicus curiaethat there are more remedies available for abusive police conduct than there were whenMirandawas decided —e.g., a suit underBivensv.Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,403 U.S. 388— it does not agree that such additional measures supplement § 3501's protections sufficiently to create an adequate substitute for theMirandawarnings.Mirandarequires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and assure him that the exercise of that right will be honored, see,e.g.,384 U.S., at 467, while § 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of preinterrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. Section 3501, therefore, cannot be sustained ifMirandais to remain the law. Pp. 2-12.
(b) This Court declines to overruleMiranda. Whether or not this Court would agree withMiranda's reasoning and its rule in the first instance,stare decisisweighs heavily against overruling it now. Even in constitutional cases,stare decisiscarries such persuasive force that the Court has always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.E.g.,United Statesv.InternationalPage 430Business Machines Corp,517 U.S. 843,856. There is no such justification here.Mirandahas become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. SeeMitchellv.United States,526 U.S. 314,331-332. While the Court has overruled its precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, that has not happened toMiranda. If anything, subsequent cases have reducedMiranda's impact on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling. The rule's disadvantage is that it may result in a guilty defendant going free. But experience suggests that § 3501's totality-of-the-circumstances test is more difficult thanMirandafor officers to conform to, and for courts to apply consistently. See,e.g.,Haynesv.Washington,373 U.S. 503,515. The requirement thatMirandawarnings be given does not dispense with the voluntariness inquiry, but cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was compelled despite officers' adherence toMirandaare rare. Pp. 443-444.
166 F.3d 667, reversed.REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whichSTEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, andBREYER, JJ., joined.SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in whichTHOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 444.
James W. Hundley, by appointment of the Court,528 U.S. 1072, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Carter G. Phillips, Jeffrey T. Green, and Kurt H. Jacobs.

Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Attorney General Reno, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, James A. Feldman, and Lisa S. Blatt.

Paul G. Cassell, by invitation of the Court,528 U.S. 1045, argued the cause as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar.fn*Page 431
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUISTdelivered the opinion of the Court.
InMirandav.Arizona,384 U.S. 436(1966), we held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted inPage 432evidence. In the wake of that decision, Congress enacted18 U.S.C. § 3501, which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. We hold thatMiranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overruleMirandaourselves. We therefore hold thatMirandaand its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.

Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence, all in violation of the applicable provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received "Mirandawarnings" before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court, by a divided vote, reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed with the District Court's conclusion that petitioner had not receivedMirandawarnings before making his statement. But it went on to hold that § 3501, which in effect makes the admissibility of statements such as Dickerson's turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily, was satisfied in this case. It then concluded that our decision inMirandawas not a constitutional holding, and that, therefore, Congress could by statute have the final say on the question of admissibility.166 F.3d 667(1999).

Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, we granted certiorari,528 U.S. 1045(1999), and now reverse.

We begin with a brief historical account of the law governing the admission of confessions. Prior toMiranda, wePage 433evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test. The roots of this test developed in the common law, as the courts of England and then the United States recognized that coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy. See,e.g.,Kingv.Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 117-118, 122-123, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161, 164 (K. B. 1783) (Lord Mansfield, C. J.) (stating that the English courts excluded confessions obtained by threats and promises);Kingv.Warickshall, 1 Leach 262, 263-264, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K. B. 1783) ("A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt . . . but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected");Kingv.Parratt, 4 Car. P. 570, 172 Eng. Rep. 829 (N. P. 1831);Queenv.Garner, 1 Den. 329, 169 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ct. Crim. App. 1848);Queenv.Baldry, 2 Den. 430, 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. App. 1852);Hoptv.Territory of Utah,110 U.S. 574(1884);Piercev.United States,160 U.S. 355,357(1896). Over time, our cases recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: theFifth Amendmentright against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment. See,e.g.,Bramv.United States,168 U.S. 532,542(1897) (stating that the voluntariness test "is controlled by that portion of theFifth Amendment. . . commanding that no person `shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'");Brownv.Mississippi,297 U.S. 278(1936) (reversing a criminal conviction under the Due Process Clause because it was based on a confession obtained by physical coercion).

WhileBramwas decided beforeBrownand its progeny, for the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied thePage 434due process voluntariness test in "some 30 different cases decided during the era that intervened betweenBrownandEscobedov.Illinois,378 U.S. 478[(1964)]."Schnecklothv.Bustamonte,412 U.S. 218,223(1973). See,e.g.,Haynesv.Washington,373 U.S. 503(1963);Ashcraftv.Tennessee,322 U.S. 143(1944);Chambersv.Florida,309 U.S. 227(1940). Those cases refined the test into an inquiry that examines "whether a defendant's will was overborne" by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession.Schneckloth,412 U.S., at 226. The due process test takes into consideration "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances — both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation."Ibid.See alsoHaynes,supra, at 513;Gallegosv.Colorado,370 U.S. 49,55(1962);Reckv.Pate,367 U.S. 433,440(1961) ("[A]ll the circumstances attendant upon the confession must be taken into account");Malinskiv.New York,324 U.S. 401,404(1945) ("If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled, it may not be used to convict a defendant"). The determination "depend[s] upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing."Steinv.New York,346 U.S. 156,185(1953).

We have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily. But our decisions inMalloyv.Hogan,378 U.S. 1(1964), andMirandachanged the focus of much of the inquiry in determining the admissibility of suspects' incriminating statements. InMalloy, we held that theFifth Amendment'sSelf-Incrimination Clause is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendmentand thus applies to the States.378 U.S., at 6-11. We decidedMirandaon the heels ofMalloy.

InMiranda, we noted that the advent of modern custodial police interrogation brought with it an increasedPage 435concern about confessions obtained by coercion.1384 U.S., at 445-458. Because custodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual, we stated that "[e]ven without employing brutality, the `third degree' or [other] specific stratagems, . . . custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals."Id., at 455. We concluded that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be "accorded his privilege under theFifth Amendment. . . not to be compelled to incriminate himself."Id., at 439. Accordingly, we laid down "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."Id., at 442. Those guidelines established that the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four warnings. These warnings (which have come to be known colloquially as "Mirandarights") are: a suspect "has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."Id., at 479.

Two years afterMirandawas decided, Congress enacted § 3501. That section provides, in relevant part:
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trialPage 436judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
"(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
"The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession."


Given § 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overruleMiranda. See alsoDavisv.United States,512 U.S. 452,464(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that, prior toMiranda,Page 437"voluntarinessvel nonwas the touchstone of admissibility of confessions"). Because of the obvious conflict between our decision inMirandaand § 3501, we must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersedeMiranda. If Congress has such authority, § 3501's totality-of-the-circumstances approach must prevail overMiranda's requirement of warnings; if not, that section must yield toMiranda's more specific requirements.

The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals.Carlislev.United States,517 U.S. 416,426(1996). However, the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional "rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress."Palermov.United States,360 U.S. 343,353, n. 11 (1959) (citingFunkv.United States,290 U.S. 371,382(1933), andGordonv.United States,344 U.S. 414,418(1953)). Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.Palermo,supra, at 345-348;Carlisle,supra, at 426;Vancev.Terrazas,444 U.S. 252,265(1980).

But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. See,e.g.,City of Boernev.Flores,521 U.S. 507,517-521(1997). This case therefore turns on whether theMirandaCourt announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction. Recognizing this point, the Court of Appeals surveyedMirandaand its progeny to determine the constitutional status of theMirandadecision.166 F.3d, at 687-692. Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions toMiranda's warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to theMirandawarnings as "prophylactic,"New Yorkv.Quarles,467 U.S. 649,653Page 438(1984), and "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,"Michiganv.Tucker,417 U.S. 433,444(1974),2the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced inMirandaare not constitutionally required.166 F.3d, at 687-690.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, although we concede that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court. But first and foremost of the factors on the other side — thatMirandais a constitutional decision — is that bothMirandaand two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts — to wit, Arizona, California, and New York. See384 U.S., at 491-494,497-499. Since that time, we have consistently appliedMiranda's rule to prosecutions arising in state courts. See,e.g.,Stansburyv.California,511 U.S. 318(1994) (per curiam);Minnickv.Mississippi,498 U.S. 146(1990);Arizonav.Roberson,486 U.S. 675(1988);Edwardsv.Arizona,451 U.S. 477,481-482(1981). It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States.Smithv.Phillips,455 U.S. 209,221(1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension");Ciceniav.Lagay,357 U.S. 504,508-509(1958). With respect to proceedings in state courts, our "authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution."Mu'Minv.Virginia,500 U.S. 415,422(1991). See alsoHarrisv.Rivera,454 U.S. 339,344-345(1981) (per curiam) (stating that "[f]ederal judges . . . may not require thePage 439observance of any special procedures" in state courts "except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitution").3

TheMirandaopinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari "to explore some facets of the problems . . . of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation,and to give concreteconstitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies andcourts to follow."384 U.S., at 441-442(emphasis added). In fact, the majority opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.4Indeed, the Court's ultimate conclusion was that thePage 440unwarned confessions obtained in the four cases before the Court inMiranda"were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege."5Id., at 491.

Additional support for our conclusion thatMirandais constitutionally based is found in theMirandaCourt's invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination. After discussing the "compelling pressures" inherent in custodial police interrogation, theMirandaCourt concluded that, "[i]n order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored."Id., at 467. However, the Court emphasized that it could not foresee "the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States," and it accordingly opined that the Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the prescribedMirandawarnings but which were "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."6Ibid.Page 441

The Court of Appeals also relied on the fact that we have, after ourMirandadecision, made exceptions from its rule in cases such asNew Yorkv.Quarles,467 U.S. 649(1984), andHarrisv.New York,401 U.S. 222(1971). See166 F.3d, at 672,689-691. But we have also broadened the application of theMirandadoctrine in cases such asDoylev.Ohio,426 U.S. 610(1976), andArizonav.Roberson,486 U.S. 675(1988). These decisions illustrate the principle — not thatMirandais not a constitutional rule — but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.

The Court of Appeals also noted that inOregonv.Elstad,470 U.S. 298(1985), we stated that "`[t]heMirandaexclusionary rule . . . serves theFifth Amendmentand sweeps more broadly than theFifth Amendmentitself.'"166 F.3d, at 690(quotingElstad,supra, at 306). Our decision in that case — refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed inFourth Amendmentcases — does not prove thatMirandais a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under theFourth Amendmentare different from unwarned interrogation under theFifth Amendment.

As an alternative argument for sustaining the Court of Appeals' decision, the court-invitedamicus curiae7contends that the section complies with the requirement that a legislative alternative toMirandabe equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions. See Brief for Paul G. CassellPage 442asAmicus Curiae28-39. We agree with theamicus' contention that there are more remedies available for abusive police conduct than there were at the timeMirandawas decided, see,e.g.,Wilkinsv.May,872 F.2d 190,194(CA7 1989) (applyingBivensv.Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,403 U.S. 388(1971), to hold that a suspect may bring a federal cause of action under the Due Process Clause for police misconduct during custodial interrogation). But we do not agree that these additional measures supplement § 3501's protections sufficiently to meet the constitutional minimum.Mirandarequires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored. See,e.g.,384 U.S., at 467. As discussed above, § 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of preinterrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. The additional remedies cited byamicusdo not, in our view, render them, together with § 3501, an adequate substitute for the warnings required byMiranda.

The dissent argues that it is judicial overreaching for this Court to hold § 3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that theMirandawarnings are required by the Constitution, in the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements.Post, at 10-11, 22-23 (opinion of Scalia. J. But we need not go further thanMirandato decide this case. InMiranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession,384 U. S, at 457, a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary. Seeibid.;see alsoid., at 467, 490-491. As discussed above, § 3501 reinstates the totality test asPage 443sufficient. Section 3501 therefore cannot be sustained ifMirandais to remain the law.

Whether or not we would agree withMiranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles ofstare decisisweigh heavily against overruling it now. See,e.g.,Rhode Islandv.Innis,446 U.S. 291,304(1980) (Burger, C. J., concurring in judgment) ("The meaning ofMirandahas become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overruleMiranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date"). While "`stare decisisis not an inexorable command,'"State Oil Co. v.Khan,522 U.S. 3,20(1997) (quotingPaynev.Tennessee,501 U.S. 808,828(1991)), particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution,Agostiniv.Felton,521 U.S. 203,235(1997), "even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some `special justification.'"United Statesv.InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.,517 U.S. 843,856(1996) (quotingPayne,supra, at 842 (Souter, J., concurring), in turn quotingArizonav.Rumsey,467 U.S. 203,212(1984)).

We do not think there is such justification for overrulingMiranda.Mirandahas become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. SeeMitchellv.United States,526 U.S. 314,331-332(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the fact that a rule has found "`wide acceptance in the legal culture'" is "adequate reason not to overrule" it). While we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, see,e.g.,Pattersonv.McLean Credit Union,491 U.S. 164,173(1989), we do not believe that this has happened to theMirandadecision. If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of theMirandarule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarnedPage 444statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief.

The disadvantage of theMirandarule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his "rights," may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result. But experience suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances test which § 3501 seeks to revive is more difficult thanMirandafor law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner. See,e.g.,Haynesv.Washington,373 U.S., at 515("The line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw"). The requirement thatMirandawarnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry. But as we said inBerkemerv.McCarty,468 U.S. 420(1984), "[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was `compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates ofMirandaare rare."Id., at 433, n. 20.

In sum, we conclude thatMirandaannounced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule ofstaredecisis, we decline to overruleMirandaourselves.8The judgment of the Court of Appeals is thereforeReversed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whomJUSTICE THOMASjoins, dissenting.
Those to whom judicial decisions are an unconnected series of judgments that produce either favored or disfavoredPage 445results will doubtless greet today's decision as a paragon of moderation, since it declines to overruleMirandav.Arizona,384 U.S. 436(1966). Those who understand the judicial process will appreciate that today's decision is not a reaffirmation ofMiranda, but a radical revision of the most significant element ofMiranda(as of all cases): the rationale that gives it a permanent place in our jurisprudence.Marburyv.Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), held that an Act of Congress will not be enforced by the courts if what it prescribes violates the Constitution of the United States. That was the basis on whichMirandawas decided. One will search today's opinion in vain, however, for a statement (surely simple enough to make) that what18 U.S.C. § 3501prescribes — the use at trial of a voluntary confession, even when aMirandawarning or its equivalent has failed to be given — violates the Constitution. The reason the statement does not appear is not only (and perhaps not so much) that it would be absurd, inasmuch as § 3501 excludes from trial precisely what the Constitution excludes from trial, viz., compelled confessions; but also that Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's majority are on record as believing that a violation ofMirandaisnota violation of the Constitution. SeeDavisv.United States,512 U.S. 452,457-458(1994) (opinion of the Court, in whichKennedy, J., joined);Duckworthv.Eagan,492 U.S. 195,203(1989) (opinion of the Court, in whichKennedy, J., joined);Oregonv.Elstad,470 U.S. 298(1985) (opinion of the Court byO'Connor, J.);New Yorkv.Quarles,467 U.S. 649(1984) (opinion of the Court byRehnquist, J.). And so, to justify today's agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significantnew, if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law. As the Court chooses to describe that principle, statutes of Congress can be disregarded, not only when what they prescribe violates the Constitution, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision of this Court that "announced a constitutional rule,"ante, at 437. As I shall discuss in somePage 446detail, the only thing that can possibly mean in the context of this case is that this Court has the power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful "prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress and the States. That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist.

It takes only a small step to bring today's opinion out of the realm of power-judging and into the mainstream of legal reasoning: The Court need only go beyond its carefully couched iterations that "Mirandais a constitutional decision,"ante, at 438, that "Mirandais constitutionally based,"ante, at 440, thatMirandahas "constitutional underpinnings,"ante, at 440, n. 5, and come out and say quite clearly: "We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded byMirandawarnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States." It cannot say that, because a majority of the Court does not believe it. The Court therefore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of Congress.
I
Early in this Nation's history, this Court established the sound proposition that constitutional government in a system of separated powers requires judges to regard as inoperative any legislative Act, even of Congress itself, that is "repugnant to the Constitution."

"So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case."Marbury,supra, at 178.

The power we recognized inMarburywill thus permit us, indeed require us, to "disregar[d]" § 3501, a duly enactedPage 447statute governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal courts, only if it "be in opposition to the constitution" — here, assertedly, the dictates of theFifth Amendment.

It was once possible to characterize the so-calledMirandarule as resting (however implausibly) upon the proposition that what the statute here before us permits — the admission at trial of un-Mirandizedconfessions — violates the Constitution. That is the fairest reading of theMirandacase itself. The Court began by announcing that theFifth Amendmentprivilege against self-incrimination applied in the context of extrajudicial custodial interrogation, see384 U.S., at 460-467— itself a doubtful proposition as a matter both of history and precedent, seeid., at 510-511 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court's conclusion that theFifth Amendmentprivilege, rather than the Due Process Clause, governed station house confessions as a "trompe l'oeil"). Having extended the privilege into the confines of the station house, the Court liberally sprinkled throughout its sprawling 60-page opinion suggestions that, because of the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, the privilege was violated by any statement thus obtained that did not conform to the rules set forth inMiranda, or some functional equivalent. Seeid., at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsioninherentin custodial surroundings,nostatement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice" (emphases added));id., at 461 ("An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak");id., at 467 ("We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation . . . contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely");id., at 457, n. 26 (notingPage 448the "absurdity of denying that a confession obtained under these circumstances is compelled").

The dissenters, for their part, also understoodMiranda's holding to be based on the "premise . . . that pressure on the suspect must be eliminated though it be only the subtle influence of the atmosphere and surroundings."Id., at 512 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See alsoid., at 535 (White, J., dissenting) ("[I]t has never been suggested, until today, that such questioning was so coercive and accused persons so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to the very first question following the commencement of custody must be conclusively presumed to be the product of an overborne will"). And at least one case decided shortly afterMirandaexplicitly confirmed the view. SeeOrozcov.Texas,394 U.S. 324,326(1969) ("[T]he use of these admissions obtained in the absence of the required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of theFifth Amendmentas construed inMiranda").

So understood,Mirandawas objectionable for innumerable reasons, not least the fact that cases spanning more than 70 years had rejected its core premise that, absent the warnings and an effective waiver of the right to remain silent and of the (thitherto unknown) right to have an attorney present, a statement obtained pursuant to custodial interrogation was necessarily the product of compulsion. SeeCrookerv.California,357 U.S. 433(1958) (confession not involuntary despite denial of access to counsel);Ciceniav.Lagay,357 U.S. 504(1958) (same);Powersv.United States,223 U.S. 303(1912) (lack of warnings and counsel did not render statement before United States Commissioner involuntary);Wilsonv.United States,162 U.S. 613(1896) (same). Moreover, history and precedent aside, the decision inMiranda, if read as an explication of what the Constitutionrequires, is preposterous. There is, for example, simply no basis in reason for concluding that a response to the very first question asked, by a suspect who alreadyknowsall of the rights describedPage 449in theMirandawarning, is anything other than a volitional act. SeeMiranda,supra, at 533-534 (White, J., dissenting). And even if one assumes that the elimination of compulsion absolutely requires informing even the most knowledgeable suspect of his right to remain silent, it cannot conceivably require the right to havecounselpresent. There is a world of difference, which the Court recognized under the traditional voluntariness test but ignored inMiranda, between compelling a suspect to incriminate himself and preventing him from foolishly doing so of his own accord. Only the latter (which isnotrequired by the Constitution) could explain the Court's inclusion of a right to counsel and the requirement that it, too, be knowingly and intelligently waived. Counsel's presence is not required to tell the suspect that heneednot speak; the interrogators can do that. The only good reason for having counsel there is that he can be counted on to advise the suspect that heshouldnot speak. SeeWattsv.Indiana,338 U.S. 49,59(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances").

Preventing foolish (rather than compelled) confessions is likewise the only conceivable basis for the rules (suggested inMiranda, see384 U.S., at 444-445,473-474), that courts must exclude any confession elicited by questioning conducted, without interruption, after the suspect has indicated a desire to stand on his right to remain silent, seeMichiganv.Mosley,423 U.S. 96,105-106(1975), or initiated by police after the suspect has expressed a desire to have counsel present, seeEdwardsv.Arizona,451 U.S. 477,484-485(1981). Nonthreatening attempts to persuade the suspect to reconsider that initial decision are not, without more, enough to render a change of heart the product of anything other than the suspect's free will. Thus, what is most remarkable about theMirandadecision — and whatPage 450made it unacceptable as a matter of straightforward constitutional interpretation in theMarburytradition — is its palpable hostility toward the act of confessionper se, rather than toward what the Constitution abhors,compelledconfession. SeeUnited Statesv.Washington,431 U.S. 181,187(1977) ("[F]ar from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable"). The Constitution is not, unlike theMirandamajority, offended by a criminal's commendable qualm of conscience or fortunate fit of stupidity. Cf.Minnickv.Mississippi,498 U.S. 146,166-167(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

For these reasons, and others more than adequately developed in theMirandadissents and in the subsequent works of the decision's many critics, any conclusionthat a violation of theMirandarulesnecessarilyamounts to a violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination can claim no support in history, precedent, or common sense, and as a result would at least presumptively be worth reconsidering even at this late date. But that is unnecessary, since the Court has (thankfully) long since abandoned the notion that failure to comply withMiranda's rules is itself a violation of the Constitution.
II
As the Court today acknowledges, sinceMirandawe have explicitly, and repeatedly, interpreted that decision as having announced, not the circumstances in which custodial interrogation runs afoul of theFifthorFourteenth Amendment, but rather only "prophylactic" rules that go beyond the right against compelled self-incrimination. Of course the seeds of this "prophylactic" interpretation ofMirandawere present in the decision itself. SeeMiranda,384 U.S., at 439(discussing the "necessity for procedures which assure that the [suspect] is accorded his privilege");id., at 447 ("[u]nless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved — such as these decisions will advance — there can be no assurancePage 451that practices of this nature will be eradicated");id., at 457 ("[i]n these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms");ibid. (noting "concern for adequate safeguards to protect preciousFifth Amendmentrights" and the "potentiality for compulsion" in Ernesto Miranda's interrogation). In subsequent cases, the seeds have sprouted and borne fruit: The Court has squarely concluded that it is possible — indeed not uncommon — for the police to violateMirandawithout also violating the Constitution.Michiganv.Tucker,417 U.S. 433(1974), an opinion for the Court written by then-Justice Rehnquist, rejected the true-to-Marbury, failure-to-warn-as-constitutional-violation interpretation ofMiranda. It held that exclusion of the "fruits" of aMirandaviolation — the statement of a witness whose identity the defendant had revealed while in custody — was not required. The opinion explained that the question whether the "police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination" was a "separate question" from "whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right."417 U.S., at 439. The "procedural safeguards" adopted inMiranda, the Court said, "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected," and to "provide practical reinforcement for the right,"417 U.S., at 444. Comparing the particular facts of the custodial interrogation with the "historical circumstances underlying the privilege,"ibid., the Court concluded, unequivocally, that the defendant's statement could not be termed "involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of this Court,"id., at 445, and thus that there had been no constitutional violation, notwithstanding the clear violation of the "procedural rules later established inMiranda,"ibid. Lest there be any confusion on the point, the Court reiterated that the "police conduct atPage 452issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court inMirandato safeguard that privilege."Id., at 446. It is clear from our cases, of course, that if the statement inTucker hadbeen obtained in violation of theFifth Amendment, the statement and its fruits would have been excluded. SeeNixv.Williams,467 U.S. 431,442(1984).

The next year, inOregonv.Hass,420 U.S. 714(1975), the Court held that a defendant's statement taken in violation ofMirandathat was nonethelessvoluntarycould be used at trial for impeachment purposes. This holding turned upon the recognition that violation ofMirandais not unconstitutional compulsion, since statements obtained in actual violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, "as opposed to . . . taken in violation ofMiranda," quite simply "may not be put to any testimonial use whatever against [the defendant] in a criminal trial," including as impeachment evidence.NewJerseyv.Portash,440 U.S. 450,459(1979). See alsoMinceyv.Arizona,437 U.S. 385,397-398(1978) (holding that while statements obtained in violation ofMirandamay be used for impeachment if otherwise trustworthy, the Constitution prohibits "anycriminal trial use against a defendant of hisinvoluntarystatement").

Nearly a decade later, inNew Yorkv.Quarles,467 U.S. 649(1984), the Court relied upon the fact that "[t]he prophylacticMirandawarnings . . . are `not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,'"id., at 654 (quotingTucker,supra, at 444), to create a "public safety" exception. In that case, police apprehended, after a chase in a grocery store, a rape suspect known to be carrying a gun. After handcuffing and searching him (and finding no gun) — but before reading him hisMirandawarnings — the police demanded to know where the gun was. The defendant nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded that "the gun is over there." The Court held that both the unwarnedPage 453statement — "the gun is over there" — and the recovered weapon were admissible in the prosecution's case in chief under a "public safety exception" to the "prophylactic rules enunciated inMiranda."467 U.S., at 653. It explicitly acknowledged that if theMirandawarnings were an imperative of theFifth Amendmentitself, such an exigency exception would be impossible, since theFifth Amendment'sbar on compelled self-incrimination is absolute, and its "`strictures, unlike the Fourth's are not removed by showing reasonableness,'"467 U.S., at 653, n. 3. (For the latter reason, the Court found it necessary to note that respondent did not "claim that [his] statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist,"id., at 654.)

The next year, the Court again declined to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to aMirandaviolation, this time allowing the admission of a suspect's properly warned statement even though it had been preceded (and, arguably, induced) by an earlier inculpatory statement taken in violation ofMiranda.Oregonv.Elstad,470 U.S. 298(1985). As inTucker, the Court distinguished the case from those holding that a confession obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search is inadmissible, on the ground that the violation ofMirandadoes not involve an "actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights,"470 U.S., at 308.Miranda, the Court explained, "sweeps more broadly than theFifth Amendmentitself," and"Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm."470 U.S., at 306-307. "[E]rrors [that] are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylacticMirandaprocedures . . . should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of theFifth Amendmentitself."Id., at 308-309.

In light of these cases, and our statements to the same effect in others, see,e.g.,Davisv.United States,512 U.S., at 457-458;Withrowv.Williams,507 U.S. 680,690-691(1993);Page 454Eagan,492 U.S., at 203, it is simply no longer possible for the Court to conclude, even if it wanted to, that a violation ofMiranda's rules is a violation of the Constitution. But as I explained at the outset, that is what is required before the Court may disregard a law of Congress governing the admissibility of evidence in federal court. The Court today insists that thedecisioninMirandais a "constitutional" one,ante, at 432, 438; that it has "constitutional underpinnings,"ante, at 440, n. 5; a "constitutional basis" and a "constitutional origin,"ante, at 439, n. 3; that it was "constitutionally based,"ante, at 440; and that it announced a "constitutional rule,"ante, at 437, 439, 441, 444. It is fine to play these word games; but what makes a decision "constitutional" in the only sense relevant here — in the sense that renders it impervious to supersession by congressional legislation such as § 3501 — is the determination that the Constitutionrequiresthe result that the decision announces and the statute ignores. By disregarding congressional action that concededly does not violate the Constitution, the Court flagrantly offends fundamental principles of separation of powers, and arrogates to itself prerogatives reserved to the representatives of the people.

The Court seeks to avoid this conclusion in two ways: First, by misdescribing these post-Mirandacases as mere dicta. The Court concedes only "that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view" thatMiranda's protections are not "constitutionally required."Ante, at 438. It is not a matter oflanguage;it is a matter ofholdings. The proposition that failure to comply withMiranda's rules does not establish a constitutional violation was central to theholdingsofTucker,Hass,Quarles, andElstad.

The second way the Court seeks to avoid the impact of these cases is simply to disclaim responsibility for reasoned decisionmaking. It says:
"These decisions illustrate the principle — not thatMirandais not a constitutional rule — but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a generalPage 455rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision."Ante, at 441.


The issue, however, is not whether court rules are "mutable"; they assuredly are. It is not whether, in the light of "various circumstances," they can be "modifi[ed]"; they assuredly can. The issue is whether,as mutated and modified, they mustmake sense. The requirement that they do so is the only thing that prevents this Court from being some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective fancy. And if confessions procured in violation ofMirandaare confessions "compelled" in violation of the Constitution, the post-Mirandadecisions I have discussed do not make sense. The only reasoned basis for their outcome was that a violation ofMirandaisnota violation of the Constitution. If, for example, as the Court acknowledges was the holding ofElstad, "the traditional `fruits' doctrine developed inFourth Amendmentcases" (that the fruits of evidence obtained unconstitutionally must be excluded from trial) doesnotapply to the fruits ofMirandaviolations,ante, at 441; and if the reason for the difference isnotthatMirandaviolations are not constitutional violations (which is plainly and flatly whatElstadsaid); then the Court must come up with someotherexplanation for the difference. (That will take quite a bit of doing, by the way, since it isnotclear on the face of theFourth Amendmentthat evidence obtained in violation of that guarantee must be excluded from trial, whereas itisclear on the face of theFifth Amendmentthat unconstitutionally compelled confessions cannot be used.) To say simply that "unreasonable searches under theFourth Amendmentare different from unwarned interrogation under theFifth Amendment,"ante, at 441, is true but supremely unhelpful.Page 456

Finally, the Court asserts thatMirandamust be a "constitutional decision" announcing a "constitutional rule," and thus immune to congressional modification, because we have since its inception applied it to the States. If this argument is meant as an invocation ofstare decisis, it fails because, though it is true that our cases applyingMirandaagainst the States must be reconsidered ifMirandais not required by the Constitution, it is likewise true that our cases (discussed above) based on the principle thatMirandaisnotrequired by the Constitution will have to be reconsidered if itis. So thestare decisisargument is a wash. If, on the other hand, the argument is meant as an appeal to logic rather thanstare decisis, it is a classic example of begging the question: Congress's attempt to set asideMiranda, since it represents an assertion that violation ofMirandais not a violation of the Constitution,alsorepresents an assertion that the Court has no power to imposeMirandaon the States. To answer this assertion — not by showing why violation ofMiranda isa violation of the Constitution — but by asserting thatMiranda doesapply against the States, is to assume precisely the point at issue. In my view, our continued application of theMirandacode to the States despite our consistent statements that running afoul of its dictates does not necessarily — or even usually — result in an actual constitutional violation, represents not the source ofMiranda's salvation but rather evidence of its ultimate illegitimacy. See generally J. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 173-198 (1993); Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985). AsJustice Stevenshas elsewhere explained: "This Court's power to require state courts to exclude probative self-incriminatory statements rests entirely on the premise that the use of such evidence violates the Federal Constitution. . . . If the Court does not accept that premise, it must regard the holding in theMirandacase itself, as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that hasPage 457evolved from that decision, as nothingmore than an illegitimate exercise of raw judicial power."Elstad,470 U.S., at 370(dissenting opinion). Quite so.
III
There was available to the Court a means of reconciling the established proposition that a violation ofMirandadoes not itself offend theFifth Amendmentwith the Court's assertion of a right to ignore the present statute. That means of reconciliation was argued strenuously by both petitioner and the United States, who were evidently more concerned than the Court is with maintaining the coherence of our jurisprudence. It is not mentioned in the Court's opinion because, I assume, a majority of the Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the lesser evil. They may be right.

Petitioner and the United States contend that there is nothing at all exceptional, much less unconstitutional, about the Court's adopting prophylactic rules to buttress constitutional rights, and enforcing them against Congress and the States. Indeed, the United States argues that "[p]rophylactic rules are now and have been for many years a feature of this Court's constitutional adjudication." Brief for United States 47. That statement is not wholly inaccurate, if by "many years" one means since the mid-1960's. However, in their zeal to validate what is in my view a lawless practice, the United States and petitioner greatly overstate the frequency with which we have engaged in it. For instance, petitioner cites several cases in which the Court quite simply exercised its traditional judicial power to define the scope of constitutional protections and, relatedly, the circumstances in which they are violated. SeeLorettov.Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,458 U.S. 419,436-437(1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation constitutes aper setaking);Mainev.Moulton,474 U.S. 159,176(1985) (holding that theSixth Amendmentright to the assistancePage 458of counsel isactually"violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent").

Similarly unsupportive of the supposed practice isBrutonv. United States,391 U.S. 123(1968), where we concluded that the Confrontation Clause of theSixth Amendmentforbids the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's facially incriminating confession in a joint trial, even where the jury has been given a limiting instruction. That decision was based, not upon the theory that this was desirable protection "beyond" what the Confrontation Clause technically required; but rather upon the self-evident proposition that the inability to cross-examine an available witness whose damaging out-of-court testimony is introduced violates the Confrontation Clause, combined with the conclusion that in these circumstances a mere jury instruction can never be relied upon to prevent the testimony from being damaging, seeRichardsonv.Marsh,481 U.S. 200,207-208(1987).

The United States also relies on our cases involving the question whether a State's procedure for appointed counsel's withdrawal of representation on appeal satisfies the State's constitutional obligation to "`affor[d] adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.'"Smithv.Robbins,528 U.S. 259,276(2000) (quotingGriffinv.Illinois,351 U.S. 12,20(1956)) InAndersv.California,386 U.S. 738(1967), we concluded that California's procedure governing withdrawal fell short of the constitutional minimum, and we outlined a procedure thatwouldmeet that standard. But as we made clear earlier this Term inSmith, which upheld a proceduredifferentfrom the oneAnderssuggested, the benchmark of constitutionality is the constitutional requirement of adequate representation, and not some excrescence upon that requirement decreed, for safety's sake, by this Court.Page 459

In a footnote, the United States directs our attention to certain overprotectiveFirst Amendmentrules that we have adopted to ensure "breathing space" for expression. SeeGertzv.Robert Welch,Inc.,418 U.S. 323,340,342(1974) (recognizing that inNew York Times Co. v.Sullivan,376 U.S. 254(1964), we "extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood" of public officials);Freedmanv.Maryland,380 U.S. 51,58(1965) (setting forth "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system" with respect to motion picture obscenity). In these cases, and others involving theFirst Amendment, the Court has acknowledged that in order to guarantee that protected speech is not "chilled" and thus forgone, it is in some instances necessary to incorporate in our substantive rules a "measure of strategic protection." But that is because the Court has viewed the importation of "chill" asitselfa violation of theFirst Amendment— not because the Court thought it could go beyond what theFirst Amendmentdemandedin order to provide some prophylaxis.

Petitioner and the United States are right on target, however, in characterizing the Court's actions in a case decided within a few years ofMiranda, North Carolinav.Pearce,395 U.S. 711(1969). There, the Court concluded that due process would be offended were a judge vindictively to resentence with added severity a defendant who had successfully appealed his original conviction. Rather than simply announce that vindictive sentencing violates the Due Process Clause, the Court went on to hold that "[i]n order to assure the absence of such a [vindictive] motivation, . . . the reasons for [imposing the increased sentence] must affirmatively appear" and must "be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."Id., at 726. The Court later explicitly acknowledgedPearce's prophylactic character, seeMichiganv.Payne,412 U.S. 47,53(1973). It is true, therefore, that thePage 460case exhibits the same fundamental flaw as doesMirandawhen deprived (as it has been) of its original (implausible) pretension to announcement of what the Constitution itself required. That is, although the Due Process Clause may well prohibit punishment based on judicial vindictiveness, the Constitution by no means vests in the courts "any general power to prescribe particular devices `in order to assure the absence of such a motivation,'"395 U.S., at 741(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black surely had the right idea when he derided the Court's requirement as "pure legislation if there ever was legislation,"ibid., although in truthPearce's rule pales as a legislative achievement when compared to the detailed code promulgated inMiranda.1

The foregoing demonstrates that, petitioner's and the United States' suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, what the Court did inMiranda(assuming, as later cases hold, thatMirandawent beyond what the Constitution actually requires) is in fact extraordinary. That the Court has, on rare and recent occasion, repeated the mistake does not transform error into truth, but illustrates the potential for future mischief that the error entails. Where the Constitution has wished to lodge in one of the branches of the Federal Government some limited power to supplement its guarantees, it has said so. See Amdt. 14, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"). The power with which the Court would endow itself under a "prophylactic" justification forMirandagoes far beyond what it has permitted Congress to do under authority of that text. Whereas we have insistedPage 461that congressional action under § 5 of theFourteenth Amendmentmust be "congruent" with, and "proportional" to, aconstitutional violation, seeCity of Boernev.Flores,521 U.S. 507,520(1997), theMirandanontextual power to embellish confers authority to prescribe preventive measures against not only constitutionally prohibited compelled confessions, but also (as discussed earlier) foolhardy ones.

I applaud, therefore, the refusal of the Justices in the majority to enunciate this boundless doctrine of judicial empowerment as a means of rendering today's decision rational. In nonetheless joining the Court's judgment, however, they overlook two truisms: that actions speak louder than silence, and that (in judge-made law at least) logic will out. Since there is in fact no other principle that can reconcile today's judgment with the post-Mirandacases that the Court refuses to abandon, what today's decision will stand for, whether the Justices can bring themselves to say it or not, is the power of the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on Congress and the States.
IV
Thus, while I agree with the Court that § 3501 cannot be upheld without also concluding thatMirandarepresents an illegitimate exercise of our authority to review state-court judgments, I do not share the Court's hesitation in reaching that conclusion. For while the Court is also correct that the doctrine ofstare decisisdemands some "special justification" for a departure from longstanding precedent — even precedent of the constitutional variety — that criterion is more than met here. To repeatJustice Stevens'cogent observation, it is "[o]bviou[s]" that "the Court's power to reverse Miranda's conviction restedentirelyon the determination that a violation of the Federal Constitution had occurred."Elstad,470 U.S., at 367, n. 9 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). Despite the Court's Orwellian assertion to the contrary, it is undeniable that later cases (discussedPage 462above) have "undermined [Miranda's] doctrinal underpinnings,"ante, at 443, denying constitutional violation and thus stripping the holding of its only constitutionally legitimate support.Miranda's critics and supporters alike have long made this point. See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to Attorney General on Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 97 (Feb. 12, 1986) ("The current Court has repudiated the premises on whichMirandawas based, but has drawn back from recognizing the full implications of its decisions");id., at 78 ("Michiganv.Tuckeraccordingly repudiated the doctrinal basis of theMirandadecision"); Sonenshein,Mirandaand the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 405, 407-408 (1982) ("Although the Burger Court has not overruledMiranda, the Court has consistently undermined the rationales, assumptions, and values which gaveMirandalife");id., at 425-426 ("Seemingly, the Court [inMichiganv.Tucker] utterly destroyed bothMiranda's rationale and its holding"); Stone,The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S.Ct. Rev. 99, 118 ("Mr. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that there is a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause only if a confession is involuntary . . . is an outright rejection of the core premises ofMiranda").

The Court citesPattersonv.McLean Credit Union,491 U.S. 164,173(1989), as accurately reflecting our standard for overruling, seeante, at 443 — which I am pleased to accept, even thoughPattersonwas speaking of overruling statutory cases and the standard for constitutional decisions is somewhat more lenient. What is set forth there reads as though it was written precisely with the current status ofMirandain mind:
"In cases where statutory precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the Court's shift in position has been the intervening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress. Where such changes havePage 463removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, . . . or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies, . . . the Court has not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision."491 U.S., at 173.


Neither am I persuaded by the argument for retainingMirandathat touts its supposed workability as compared with the totality-of-the-circumstances test it purported to replace.Miranda's proponents citead nauseamthe fact that the Court was called upon to make difficult and subtle distinctions in applying the "voluntariness" test in some 30-odd due process "coerced confessions" cases in the 30 years betweenBrownv.Mississippi,297 U.S. 278(1936), andMiranda. It is not immediately apparent, however, that the judicial burden has been eased by the "bright-line" rules adopted inMiranda. In fact, in the 34 years sinceMirandawas decided, this Court has been called upon to decide nearly60cases involving a host ofMirandaissues, most of them predicted with remarkable prescience by Justice White in hisMirandadissent.384 U.S., at 545.

Moreover, it is not clear why the Court thinks that the "totality-of-the-circumstances test . . . is more difficult thanMirandafor law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner."Ante, at 444. Indeed, I find myself persuaded byJustice O'Connor's rejection of this same argument in her opinion inWilliams,507 U.S., at 711-712(O'Connor, J., joined byRehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
"Miranda, for all its alleged brightness, is not without its difficulties; and voluntariness is not without its strengths. . . .
". . .Mirandacreates as many close questions as it resolves. The task of determining whether a defendant is in `custody' has proved to be `a slippery one.' And the supposedly `bright' lines that separate interrogationPage 464from spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a right from waiver, and the adequate warning from the inadequate, likewise have turned out to be rather dim and ill defined. . . .
"The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, on the other hand, permits each fact to be taken into account without resort to formal and dispositive labels. By dispensing with the difficulty of producing a yes-or-no answer to questions that are often better answered in shades and degrees,thevoluntariness inquiry often can make judicialdecisionmaking easier rather than more onerous." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)


But even were I to agree that the old totality-of-the-circumstances test was more cumbersome, it is simply not true thatMirandahas banished it from the law and replaced it with a new test. Under the current regime, which the Court today retains in its entirety, courts are frequently called upon to undertakebothinquiries. That is because, as explained earlier, voluntariness remains theconstitutionalstandard, and as such continues to govern the admissibility for impeachment purposes of statements taken in violation ofMiranda, the admissibility of the "fruits" of such statements, and the admissibility of statements challenged as unconstitutionally obtaineddespitethe interrogator's compliance withMiranda, see,e.g., Coloradov.Connelly,479 U.S. 157(1986).

Finally, I am not convinced by petitioner's argument thatMirandashould be preserved because the decision occupies a special place in the "public's consciousness." Brief for Petitioner 44. As far as I am aware, the public is not under the illusion that we are infallible. I see little harm in admitting that we made a mistake in taking away from the people the ability to decide for themselves what protections (beyond those required by the Constitution) are reasonably affordable in the criminal investigatory process. And I see much to be gained by reaffirming for the people the wonderful realityPage 465that they govern themselves — which means that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution" that the people adopted, "nor prohibited . . . to the States" by that Constitution, "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,"U.S. Const., Amdt. 10.2
* * *
Today's judgment convertsMirandafrom a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance. In imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original opinion at leastassertedthat it was demanded by the Constitution. Today's decision does not pretend that it is — and yetstillasserts the right to impose it against the will of the people's representatives in Congress. Far from believing thatstare decisiscompels this result, I believe we cannot allow to remain on the books even a celebrated decision —especiallya celebrated decision — that has come to stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and the States. This is not the system that was established by the Framers, or that would be established by any sane supporter of government by the people.

I dissent from today's decision, and, until § 3501 is repealed, will continue to apply it in all cases where there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was voluntary.Page 466
  1. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Jonathan L. Abram, Audrey J. Anderson, Steven R. Shapiro, Vivian Berger, Susan N. Herman, and Stephen Schulhofer; for the House Democratic Leadership by Charles Tiefer and Jonathan W. Cuneo; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Paul M. Smith, Deanne E. Maynard, Lisa B. Kemler, and John T. Philipsborn; for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association by Charles D. Weisselberg and Michelle Falkoff; for the Rutherford Institute by James Joseph Lynch, Jr., and John W. Whitehead; for Griffin B. Bell by Robert S. Litt, John A. Freedman, and Daniel C. Richman; and for Benjamin R. Civiletti by Mr. Civiletti, pro se, Kenneth C. Bass III, and John F. Cooney.

    Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of South Carolina et al. by Charles M. Condon, Attorney General of South Carolina, Treva Ashworth, Deputy Attorney General, Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Travey Colton Green, Assistant Attorney General; for the Maricopa County Attorney's Office by Theodore B. Olson, Douglas R. Cox, and Miguel A. Estrada; for Arizona Voices for Victims et al. by Douglas Beloof; for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives by Geraldine R. Gennet, Kerry W. Kircher, and Michael L. Stern; for the Center for the Community Interest et al. by Daniel P. Collins, Kristin Linsley Myles, and Kelly M. Klaus; for the Center for the Original Intent of the Constitution by Michael P. Farris; for Citizens for Law and Order et al. by Theodore M. Cooperstein; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger, Charles L. Hobson, and Edwin Meese III; for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents Association by Robert F. Hoyt; for the Fraternal Order of Police by Patrick F. Philbin and Thomas T. Rutherford; for the National Association of Police Organizations et al. by Stephen R. McSpadden, Robert J. Cynkar, and Margaret A. Ryan; for the National District Attorneys Association et al. by Lynne Abraham, Ronald Eisenberg, Jeffrey C. Sullivan, John M. Tyson, Jr., Grover Trask, Christine A. Cooke, John B. Dangler, and Richard E. Trodden; for Former Attorneys General of the United States William P. Barr and Edwin Meese III by Andrew G. McBride; for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. by Senator Hatch, pro se; and for Manning Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez by Davis J. Wilson.

    Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Bernard J. Farber filed a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. as amici curiae. ↩
  2. While our cases have long interpreted the Due Process and Self-Incrimination Clauses to require that a suspect be accorded a fair trial free from coerced testimony, our application of those Clauses to the context of custodial police interrogation is relatively recent because the routine practice of such interrogation is itself a relatively new development. See,e.g.,Miranda,384 U.S., at 445-458. ↩
  3. See also Davisv.United States,512 U.S. 452,457-458(1994);Withrowv.Williams,507 U.S. 680,690-691(1993) ("Miranda's safeguards are not constitutional in character");Duckworthv.Eagan,492 U.S. 195,203(1989);Connecticutv.Barrett,479 U.S. 523,528(1987) ("[T]heMirandaCourt adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise ofFifth Amendmentrights");Oregonv.Elstad,470 U.S. 298,306(1985);Edwardsv.Arizona,451 U.S. 477,492(1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result). ↩
  4. Our conclusion regardingMiranda's constitutional basis is further buttressed by the fact that we have allowed prisoners to bring allegedMirandaviolations before the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. SeeThompsonv.Keohane,516 U.S. 99(1995);Withrow,supra, at 690-695. Habeas corpus proceedings are available only for claims that a person "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Since theMirandarule is clearly not based on federal laws or treaties, our decision allowing habeas review forMirandaclaims obviously assumes thatMirandais of constitutional origin. ↩
  5. See384 U.S., at 445("The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody"), 457 (stating that theMirandaCourt was concerned with "adequate safeguards to protect preciousFifth Amendmentrights"), 458 (examining the "history and precedent underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause to determine its applicability in this situation"), 476 ("The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is . . . fundamental with respect to theFifth Amendmentprivilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation"), 479 ("The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in theFifth Amendmentthat an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself"), 481, n. 52 (stating that the Court dealt with "constitutional standards in relation to statements made"), 490 ("[T]he issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts"), 489 (stating that theMirandaCourt was dealing "with rights grounded in a specific requirement of theFifth Amendment of the Constitution"). ↩
  6. Many of our subsequent cases have also referred toMiranda's constitutional underpinnings. See,e.g.,Withrow, supra, at 691 ("`Prophylactic' though it may be, in protecting a defendant'sFifth Amendmentprivilege against self-incrimination,Mirandasafeguards a `fundamental trial right'");Illinoisv.Perkins,496 U.S. 292,296(1990) (describingMiranda's warning requirement as resting on "theFifth Amendmentprivilege against self-incrimination");Butlerv.McKellar,494 U.S. 407,411(1990) ("[T]heFifth Amendmentbars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation");Michiganv.Jackson,475 U.S. 625,629(1986) ("TheFifth Amendmentprotection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations");Moranv.Burbine,475 U.S. 412,427(1986) (referring toMirandaas "our interpretation of the Federal Constitution");Edwards,supra, at 481-482. ↩
  7. The Court of Appeals relied in part on our statement that theMirandadecision in no way "creates a `constitutional straightjacket.'" See166 F.3d 667,672(CA4 1999) (quotingMiranda,384 U.S., at 467). However, a review of our opinion inMirandaclarifies that this disclaimer was intended to indicate that the Constitution does not require police to administer the particularMirandawarnings, not that the Constitution does not require a procedure that is effective in securingFifth Amendmentrights. ↩
  8. Because no party to the underlying litigation argued in favor of § 3501's constitutionality in this Court, we invited Professor Paul Cassell to assist our deliberations by arguing in support of the judgment below. ↩
  9. Various other contentions and suggestions have been pressed by the numerousamici, but because of the procedural posture of this case we do not think it appropriate to consider them. SeeUnited Parcel Service, Inc. v.Mitchell,451 U.S. 56,60, n. 2 (1981);Bellv.Wolfish,441 U.S. 520,531-532, n. 13 (1979);Knetschv.United States,364 U.S. 361,370(1960). ↩
  10. As forMichiganv.Jackson,475 U.S. 625(1986), upon which petitioner and the United States also rely, in that case we extended to theSixth Amendment, postindictment, context theMiranda-based prophylactic rule ofEdwardsv.Arizona,451 U.S. 477(1981), that the police cannot initiate interrogation after counsel has been requested. I think it less a separate instance of claimed judicial power to impose constitutional prophylaxis than a direct, logic-driven consequence ofMirandaitself. ↩
  11. The Court cites my dissenting opinion inMitchellv.United States,526 U.S. 314,331-332(1999), for the proposition that "the fact that a rule has found `wide acceptance in the legal culture' is `adequate reason not to overrule' it."Ante, at 443. But the legal culture is not the same as the "public's consciousness"; and unlike the rule at issue inMitchell(prohibiting comment on a defendant's refusal to testify),Mirandahas been continually criticized by lawyers, law enforcement officials, and scholars since its pronouncement (not to mention by Congress, as § 3501 shows). InMitchell, moreover, the constitutional underpinnings of the earlier rule had not been demolished by subsequent cases. ↩