Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Day v. Day

510 U.S. 1

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1993-10-12
Topic
bankruptcy

How later courts describe this case

  • requiring petitioner to pay docketing fees for petitions for certiorari after filing 27 petitions within nine years
  • entering a filing restriction to prevent a pro se petitioner from filing repetitious and frivolous requests
  • noting that “no single factor is required”
  • language of § 2000e-2(b) does not reach sexual harassment

Citator

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Cited by
59 opinions
DAY v. DAY,510 U.S. 1(1993)
DAYv. DAY
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
No. 92-8788
Decided October 12, 1993fn*
Since this Court's Rule 39.8 was first invoked in June 1993 to denypro sepetitioner Day informa pauperisstatus, he has filed eight more petitions for certiorari, all of them demonstrably frivolous.Held: Day is denied leave to proceedin forma pauperisin the instant cases, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from him in noncriminal matters unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule33. This order will free the Court's limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who, unlike Day, have not abused the certiorari process.

Motions denied.
PER CURIAM.
Pro sepetitioner Roy A. Day requests leave to proceedin formapauperisunder Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Day is allowed until November 2, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance withPage 2this Court's Rule33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Day in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.

Day is an abuser of this Court's certiorari process. We first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Dayin forma pauperisstatus last June.See In reDay,509 U.S. 902(1993). At that time he had filed 27 petitions in the past nine years. Although Day was grantedin forma pauperisstatus to file these petitions, all were denied without recorded dissent. Since we first denied himin forma pauperisstatus last June, he has filed eight more petitions for certiorari with this Court — all of them demonstrably frivolous.

As we have recognized, [e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.In re McDonald,489 U.S. 180,184(1989) (per curiam). Consideration of Day's repetitious and frivolous petitions for certiorari does not promote this end.

We have entered orders similar to the present one on previous occasions to preventpro sepetitioners from filing repetitious and frivolous requests for certiorari,see Martin v. District of Columbia Court ofAppeals,506 U.S. 1(1992) (per curiam), and repetitious and frivolous requests for extraordinary relief.See In reSindram,498 U.S. 177(1991) (per curiam);In re McDonald, supra.

Day's refusal to heed our earlier warning requires us to take this step. His abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Day from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. But it will free this Court's limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.It is so ordered.Page 3
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Adhering to the views expressed in the dissenting opinions inBrown v.Herald Co.,,464 U.S. 928,931(1983),In re McDonald,489 U.S. 180,185(1989), andWrenn v. Benson,490 U.S. 89,92(1989), I would deny these petitions for writs of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motions to proceedin forma pauperis. In the future, however, I shall not encumber the record by noting my dissent from similar orders denying leave to proceedin forma pauperis, absent exceptional circumstances.Page 4
  1. Together with No. 92-8792,Day v. Bekiempis,No. 92-8888,Dayv. Heinrich et al., No. 92-8905,Day v. GAF Building Materials Corp., No. 92-8906,Day v. Clinton et al., No. 92-9018,Day v. Black et al., No. 92-9101,Day v. Deason et al., and No. 93-5430,Day v. Day, also on motions for leave to proceedin forma pauperis. ↩