Crapo v. Kelly

Mr. Justice HUNT

delivered the opinion of the court.

The claim of Federal jurisdiction over this action.is based upon article 4, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States. It is there declared that “ full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records,- and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect *619 thereof.” In 1790 and in 1804 Congress passed laws prescribing that manner, and effect.' By the act of May 26th, 1790,* †after .prescribing .the forms of authentication, it is enacted.: “And'the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records are or shall be taken.” Under this statute it has been held in this court, from an early day, that th,e faith and credit spoken of are not limited to'the form.of the record, and are not satisfied by its admission as a record. It is held that the same effect is to be given to the record in the courts of the State where produced, as in the courts.of the State from which it is taken.†

The defendant in error insists in- reply that .the validity of the record of the court of probate and insolvency in the State of Massachusetts is not involved, and the faith and. credit due to it'.is not in question. This is based upon the argument that that record has never adjudicated upon the title or possession of the vessel in question, and that the same was res integra when this action was commenced in New York.

The ease of Green v. Van Buskirk, reported in 5th Wallace, p. 310, and also in 7th Id. p. 139, is relied upon as conclusive upon this point. In that case Bates, who lived in New York, executed and delivered to Yan Buskitk, who lived in the same State, a chattel mortgage on certain iron safes which were then in the city of Chicago. This was done on the 3d day of November, 1857. Two. days after this Green, who was also a citizen of New York, being ignorant of the existence of the mortgage, sued out a writ of attachment in the courts of Illinois, levied on the safes, and sold them in satisfaction of the judgment obtained in the attachment suit. There was no appearance or contest in defence of this attachment suit, and Van Buskirk was not *620 a party to it, although he had power to make himself -such party. It was conceded that by the .laws of Illinois, mortgages of personal property, until acknowledged and recorded, are void as against third persons. In this state of the affair Van Buskirk sued Green in the New York courts for the value of the safes mortgaged to him by Bates, and of which Green had thus received the proceeds. Green pleaded his, attachment suit in bar of the action. The courts of New York gave judgment in favor of Van Buskirk, holding that the law of New York was to govern, and not the law of Illinois, although the property was situated in the latter State, and that the title passed to him by the execution of the mortgage. The case first came betore this court on a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.* The motion .was maintained, on the ground that the record neither showed that the construction of any clause of the Constitution was drawn in question in the State court, nor that any right was claimed under such clause, or that any decision was made against such right. The only issue it was said was as to the right of property and possession at the time of such seizure. In the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Miller, after discussing the law applicable to- the general questions in the case, the conclusion on the' question of jurisdiction is thus stated: “ We do not here decide that the proceedings in the State of Illinois have there the effect which plaintiff claims for them, because that must remain to be decided after argument on the merits of the case. But-we hold that the effect which these proceedings have there by the law and usage of that State was a question necessarily decided by the New York courts, and that it was decided against.the claim set up by the plaintiff in error, under the constitutional provision aud statute referred to, and that the case is, therefore, properly here for review.” Without reference to whether he was right or wrong, the fact that Green claimed under the judicial record of Illinois, and that his claim was overruled, was held to give this court jurisdiction. *621 Without reference to whether Crapo was right or wrong, whether the question was res integra, ór res adjudícala, the fact that he claimed title under the Massachusetts record, and that his claim was overruled, gives the court jurisdiction of the. present case. The authority of Green v. Van Buskirk, in 5th Wallace, is clear to that point'.

The case as reported in 7 Wallace is to the same effect. In restating the argument of jurisdiction Mr. Justice Davis says: “ This court in denial of the motion to dismiss held that the Supreme Court of New York necessarily decided what effect the attachment proceedings in Illinois had by the law and usage in that State, and as it was decided against the effect that Green claimed for them, this court had jurisdiction under that clause’ of the Constitution” above quoted. Whether the Supreme Court of New York held correctly or otherwise was important when the case came before this court for a final hearing, but the fact simply that it had de-. cided against Green’s claim of the effect of the récords gave jurisdiction.

We think the jurisdiction of the court now to hear and decide the case is sufficiently clear.

Omitting all superfluous circumstances, the facts necessary to present the question on the merits are these: On the 23d of February, 1861, the insolvent court of Massachusetts appointed Crapo and others assignees in insolvency of Gibbs & Jenny, and the judge of that court executed and delivered to them an assignment of all the personal property of Gibbs & Jenny. At this date Gibbs & Jenny were the owners-of the ship Arctic, an American vessel registered at the port of Fairhaven, in the district of New Bedford, in the State of Massachusetts, which vessel was then on the high seas, to wit, in the Pacific Ocean. On the 30th day of the following April this vessel arrived'in the port of New York, and was at once seized as the property of Gibbs & Jenny, by an attachment issued at the suit of one Kobinson, a creditor of Gibbs & Jenny, residing in New York. On the next day but one'after the arrival of the vessel Crapo came to New *622 York and took possession of her, subject to the possession of Kelly, the sheriff. Crapo represents the title under the Massachusetts assignment, which then, and at all times since, he has sought to enforce. ' Kelly claims under the New York attachment.

The question is, which proceeding gave the better title.

Certain propositions relating to the question are not disputed.

1. If the assignment under which Crapo claims had been the personal act of Gibbs & Jenny, it would have passed the title to the vessel wherever she might have been at the time of its execution.

2. If the vessel at the time of the execution of the assignment had been within the territorial limits of Massachusetts, the assignment, although not the personal act of Gibbs & Jenny, would have divested their title and that ,of all persons claiming under them* provided diligence has been used to reduce the vessel to possession.

• 3. If the vessel had been in the port of New York at the time of the execution of the insolvent assignment (there being no personal assignment), and had subsequently been seized there under attachment proceedings by a New York creditor, such attachment proceeding would have held the vessel as against the prior insolvent assignment.

The first of these propositions results from the fact that personal property, wherever it may be, is under the personal control of its owner, and the title passes by his actual transfer. The second is based upon the idea that the property being actually present and under the control of the law, passes by act of the law. The third proposition assufnes that a transfer by legal proceeding possesses less solemnity than one made by the owner himself; that each nation is entitled to protect its own citizens, and that the remedy by law taken by its citizens having the actual possession of the-corpus, ought to prevail over a title by law from another State, which is not accompanied by such possession. This principle authorizes the Massachusetts assignee to hold the property when in Massachusetts, and the NevvYork creditor *623 to seize it when it is in New York, under the cii-cumstances stated.*

The present case is deficient in each of the elements necessary to bring the vessel within the range of the foregoing principles. She was not transferred by the personal act of the ownei’. She was not literally within the territory of Massachusetts when the insolvent-assignment took effect; and., thii’dly, she was'not in the port of New York.

The question then axuses, while thus upon the high seas w.as she in law within the territory of Massachusetts. If she was, the insolvent title will prevail.

It is not perceived that this vessel can be said to be upon United. States territory, or within United States jurisdiction, or subject to the laws of the United States x’egulating the transfer of pi'operty, if such' laws thex’e may be. Except for the pux’poses and to the extent to which these attributes have been tx’ausferred to. the United States, the State of Massachusetts possesses all the x’ights and powei’s of a sovereign State. By her own consent, as found in article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, she has abaixdoned her right to wage war, to coin money, to make treaties, and to do certain other acts thex’ein mentioned. None of the subjects thex’e mentioned'affect the question before us. The. third ax-ticle of that instrument extends the judicial power of the United States “to all cases of admiralty and mai’itime jurisdiction.” « This gives the power to the courts of the United States to try those eases in which ax’e involved questions arising out of rnaritime affairs,-and of crimes committed on the high • seas. To bring a transaction within that jux’isdictioix, it must be not simply a transaction which occurred at. sea, as the making of a. contract, but one in which the question itself is of a maritime nature, or arises out of á xnaritime affair, or it must be a tort or crime committed on the high seas. Over such cases the United States-courts have jurisdiction; that is, they are authorized to hear and deter *624 mine them. No rule of property is thereby established. This remains as it would have been had no such authority been given to the United States court.

To Congress is also given power .“to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and of-fences against the law of nations.” It will scarcely be claimed that the title to property could be affected by this provision. Nor does the circumstance that the Arctic sailed under the flag of the United States and was entitled to the protection of that government against insult or injury- from the citizens or ships of other nations, touch the present point. ’None of these instances are like that of the passage of a bankrupt law by the United States, which acts directly upon the property of all the citizens of all the States, wherever it may be. Had the claim of either party to this vessel been based upon a proceeding under that statute, the title would have been complete, if the property had been within the territory or jurisdiction of any of the States of the Union.

It is not perceived, therefore, that the relation of Massachusetts to the Union has any effect upon the title to this vessel. It stands as if that State were an independent sovereign State, unconnected with the other States of the Union, The question is the same as if this assignment had been made iu London by a-British insolvent court, adjudicating Upon the affairs of a British subject.

"We'are of the opiuion, for the purpose we are considering, that the ship Arctic was a portion of the territory of Massachusetts, and the assignment by the insolvent court of that State passed the title to her, In the same manner and with the like effect as if she had been physically within the. bounds of that State .when the assignment was executed.

The rule is thus laid down by Mr. Wheaton in his treatise on International Law:* “Both the public and private vessels of every nation on the high seas, and out of the territorial limits of any other State, are subject to the jurisdiction *625 of the state to which they belong. Vattel says that the domain of a nation extends to all its just possessions, and by its possessions we are not to understand its territory only, but all the rights it enjoys. And he also considers the vessels of a nation-on the high seas as portions of its territory. Grotius holds that sovereignty may be acquired over a portion of the sea.” As an illustration of the proposition that the ship is a portion of tha territory of the State, the author' proceeds: “Every state has an incontestable right to the service of all its members in the national defence, but it can give effect to this right only by lawful means. Its right to reclaim the military service of its citizens can be exercised only within its own territory, or in some place not subject to the jurisdiction of any other nation. The ocean is such a place, and any state may-unquestionably there exercise, -on board its own vessels, its right of compelling the military or naval services of its subjects.”

Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries,* says: “ The high seas are free and open to all the world, and the laws of every state or nation have there a full and perfect operation upon the persons and property of the citizens or subjects of such a state or nation.” “No nation has any right or jurisdiction a$ sea, except it be over the persons of its subjects, in its own public and private vessels; and so far territorial jurisdiction may be conceded as preserved, for. the vessels of a nation are in many respects considered as portions of its territory, and persons on board are protected and governed by the law of the country to which the vessel belongs.”

Wharton† says : “ A ship in the open sea is regarded by the law of nations as a part of the territory whose flag such ship carries.” By this (he says) may be explained several cases quoted as establishing the lex domicilii, though they are only sustainable on the ground that the ship at sea is part of the territory whose flag she bears. ... In respect to principle, ships at sea and the property in them, must be viewed as part of the country to which they belong.”

*626 The modern German law is to the same.point. Bluntschil, in his Moderne Volkerrect* says: “ Ships are to be regarded as floating sections of the land to which they nationally belorig, and whose flag they are entitled to carry.”

Bischof, in his Grundriss des positiven internatirfnalen Seerechts,† says: “ Every state is free on the seas, so that its ships are to be regarded as floating sections of its country, territorio, clausa; la continuation ou la prorogation du territoire, and those on board such ships in foreign waters are under their laws and protection. This even applies to children born to subjects on such ships.”

"Wildman, in his treatise on International Law,‡ says: “ Provinces and colonies, however distant, form a part of the territory of the parent state. So of the ships on the high seas. The rights of sovereignty extend to all persons and things not privileged, that are within the territory.”

The adjudicated cases in this country are to the same effect. In Plestoro v. Abraham,§ it was held that where a British subject, being indebted, left England, and while on his voyage to this country and before he arrived here, he was, under-the laws of Great Britain, declared a bankrupt, and provisional assignees were appointed, it was held that the assignment-to such assignees divested the title'of the bankrupt to the personal property brought with him to this country. In giving his opinion upon the motion to dissolve the injunction, Chancello!’ Walworth said: “In the case of Holmes v. Remsen,|| Chancellor Kent decided that an assignment by the commissioners of bankruptcy in England, operated as a legal transfer of the/personal property and choses in action of the bankrupt in this country. Even as against a subsequent attachment taken out here .by an American creditor, under the act against absconding and- absent debtors. It is doubtful whether that decision, to its full extent, can be sustained. It was strongly opposed and ably questioned by Platt, in a case between the same parties, which *627 subsequently came before the Supreme Court.* It also stands in opposition to the opinions of the State courts in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and in both of the Carolinas, . . . and to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Harrison v. Sterry,† and in Ogden v. Saunders.‡ But the case before me (he proceeds) steersj clear of all these decisions. In the'cases cited the contest was between foreign assignees and domestic creditors, claiming under the laws of the country where the property-was situated and where the suits were brought. The question in these cases was, whether the personal property was to be considered as having locality for the purpose of giving a remedy to creditors residing in countries where the property was in fact situated at the time of the foreign assignment. In this case the controversy is between the bankrupt aud his assignees and creditors, all residing in the country under whose laws the assignment was made. Even ■the property itself, at the time of the assignment* was constructively withiu the j urisdiction of that country, being on the high seas in the actual possession of a British subject. Under such circumstances the assignment had the effect to change the property and divest the title as effectually as if the same had been sold in England under an execution against him, or he had voluntarily conveyed the same to the assignee for the benefit of his creditors.”

The case was carried to the Court of Errors of the State of New York, that bodj^ being composed of the chancellor, the judges of the Supreme Court, the lieutenant-governor, and the members o’f the senate. The record did not show distinctly that the vessel which brought the goods was a British ship, and on this point the chancellor’s order was reversed. Marcy, justice, and Throop, lieutenant-governor, eminent men and able judges, held that the 'assignftient in Great Britain divested the title of the bankrupt to personal property in this country, and that his property in a vessel on the high seas was likewise transferred. Maynard, Oliver,

*628 and Stebbins held that, as to the personal property of the bankrupt in this country, the assignment did not effect a transfer of the same, even as between the assignee and the bankrupt. Maynard and Stebbins held that to produce the transfer, under such circumstances, of the property of a British bankrupt, which was on the high seas at the time of the assignment, it must distinctly appear that the vessel was a British vessel, and thus the property was within British jurisdiction. It is'fairly to be inferred that if it had appeared that the vessel was a British vessel the chancellor’s o.rder would have been sustained. Thus Mr. Ogden, who argued for the reversal of the order, said :* “ Had-the goods been on board a British vessel it would have been so averred. In the absence of such averment the fair conclusion is that the vessel in which they were embarked was American; and if so, the goods were as much within our jurisdiction as if landed in a storehouse at New York.” Senator Maynard, in his opinion,† repeats this statement. He says:. “The presumption was .as fair that it was on board of an American ship as that it was on a British ship; and if so, it was, at the -date of the assignment, within the jurisdiction of this country.” Stebbins, senator, says:‡ “ I hold, therefore, that if this property was laden on board an American vessel, and on the high seas at the time of the assignment, it was within the jurisdiction of the United States, and could no more pass by that assignment than if lodged in the custom-house in New York; and if laden on board a British vessel that fact should have been averred by the assignee as essential to his title.” The chancellor’s order was reversed, and apparently upon this ground, that it did not actually appear that the ship on which the goods were laden was a British ship. The principle of the decision was in accordance with the principle announced by the chancellor, as already quoted* to wit, that the presence of the goods in a British ship on the high seas, continued them within British jurisdiction. The limited application given to this decision *629 in Johnson v. Hunt,* is scarcely sustained by the facts. None of the other cases cited are cases of goods on the ship of the state or nation of the insolvent whose goods are the subject of the assignment. They are cases where the property was confessedly within another jurisdiction and hence the conflict.

Judge Story says,† upon this case: “ It is difficult to per-, ceive how the doctrine of the chancellor, as to the operation of the British bankrupt laws upon the British subjects and their property in transitu can be answered. The transfer must be admitted to be operative to divest the bankrupt’s title to the extent- of an estoppel as to his own personal claim in opposition to it, for the law of America, be it what it may, had not then operated upon it. It was not locally within our jurisdiction. No one could doubt the right of the assignee to personal property locally in England at the time of the assignment. In what respect does such a case differ from a case where it has not passed into another jurisdiction ? Is there any substantial difference between its being on board a British vessel and its being on board of an American vessel on the high seas?” No claim can be made that this vessel was within the jurisdiction of New York when the assignment was executed.

If the title passed to the insolvept assignees, it passed eo inslanii the assignment was executed. It took effect then or never. The return of the vessel afterwards to America, her arrival in the port of New York, her seizure and sale there did not operate to divest a title already complete.‡

Again, the owners of this vessel and the assignees in insolvency were citizens of Massachusetts, and subject to her laws. It is not doubted that a sale of property between them of.property on board of this vessel, or of the vessel itself, would be regulated, by the laws of Massachusetts. It is not doubted that the vessel was taxable in Massachusetts only, or that if Gibbs or Jenny had been on board of the *630 vessel, and had died before the vessel reached New York, his personal property on or in her would have passed under the laws of Massachusetts.*

If this véssel had never returned to the American shores but had gone to the bottom in the Pacific seas, after the assignment w7as complete, whose vessel would she have been at the time of such loss? There can be but one answer. The Massachusetts statute declares that this assignment vested in Crapo and his associates all the tiple and interest the insolvent had in this vessel. In other words it vested in them the absolute ownership. There was not then, pr for weeks afterwards, any- possible question of their title. The insurance-money upon the ship would have'been their property, and they would have been bound to collect it and distribute it among the creditors.

Personal property which has an established situs in another State, is no doubt governéd by the lex loci sites rei, so far that it will be governed in its distribution by the laws of the place where found, rather than the law of the domicile. This rule only applies where' such property has acquired an established situs. Until that occurs there can be no conflict of jurisdiction.

It is said, however, that the fact that the property on board a vessel at sea and the vessel itself, contracts respecting them ■and the distribution of the assets of the intestate, are regulated by the laws of Massachusetts, arises solely from the circumstance that the owner is a resident of that State; that jurisdiction of the parties it is, that gives the jurisdiction of these subjects. The authorities from Kent, Story, and Wheaton, aiid the continental authorities, the civil law be* fore cited, as w7ell as the decisions in Plestoro v. Abrahams, make the ship itself, under such circumstances, á part of the territory of the State to which its owner belongs. If he resides in Boston his property in the remotest county of the State is under the protection of its laws, as being upon and *631 within its territory. So his property on his ship, for the purpose we are considering, is legally and constructively within its territory. In each case it is true that the existence of an owner is necessary to call forth the exercise of the law,and the duty and power of the State. In.this sense, it is true, that the residence of the owner produces the result.' It is produced, however, not only by the existence and residence of the owner, but' by an extended State territory upon which his property remains, and where it is subject to State laws and entitled to the protection of the same laws.

Grotius* †holds that sovereignty may be acquired over a portion of the sea, rniione personarum.† Rutherford and others hold this to be an error, and that no nation has jurisdiction over the ocean itself. All agree that jurisdiction over the public and private vessels of a nation at sea, remains to the nation, and it is expressed in the lauguage already quoted.

In the celebrated Trent Case, occurring in 1862, Messrs.' Mason aud Slidell were removed from a British private vessel by Commodore Wilkes of the San Jacinto, a public Vessel of .the United States. Great Britain insisted that the rights of a neutral vessel not only had been violated, for which she demanded apology, bu't she insisted that these persons should be replaced and returned on board a British ship. This was done, and they were actually placed on board a .British vessel in or near the harbor of Boston. They were not British subjects, and their return could only have been demanded for the-reason that they had been torn from British soil, and the sanctity of British soil as represented by a British ship had been violated. Citizenship or residence had no influence upon the question.

■This vessel, the Arctic, was upon the.high seas at the time of the assignment. The status at that time decides the question of jurisdiction. The State of New York had no juris *632 diction over her until long afterwards. No conflict can, therefore, arise between the laws of New York and of Mas-, sachusetts. The United States had no jurisdiction over her for the purpose we are considering. We hold that she was subject to the disposition made by the laws of Massachusetts, aud that for the purpose aud to the extent that title passed to .the' assignees, the'vessel- remained a portion of the territory of that State.

• Judgment reversed, and the case remanded for further PROCEEDINGS.

1 Stat. at Large, 122.

Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 483; Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Peters, 317; United States v. Johns, 4 Dallas, 412.

5 Wallace, 310.

1 Parsons’s Maritime Law, 78, v. c. and n.; Abbott on Shipping, 6th American edition, 86 and n.; joy v. Sears, 9 Pickering, 4; Conard v. Atlantic In. Co., 1 Peters, 449.

Eighth edition, § 106, et seq.

Yol. i, p. 26.

Conflict of Laws, § 356.

See. 317.

Page 40.

Graz,' 1868; cited in Whiir ton’s Conflict of Laws, § 356, n.

1 Paige, 286.

4 Johnson’s Chancery, 460.,

20 Johnson, 229.

5 Cranch, 289.

12 Wheaton, 218.

3 Wendell, 644.

Id. 658.

Id. 667.

23 Wendell,'91.

Conflict of Laws, § 419.

Ib. § 391, and Thuret v. Jenkins, 7 Martin, 318, 353, 354.

Morgan v. Parham, supra, 471; Hoyt v. Commissioners, 23 New York, 224.

De Jure Belli, Book u, eh. iv, ?¿ 18.

Wheaton on International Law, \ 106.