Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
BUCKLEY v. VALEO, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
BUCKLEY v. VALEO, Sec’y OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1976-01-30
- Topic
- general
BUCKLEY v. VALEO, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 96 S.Ct. 612 BUCKLEY ET AL. v. VALEO, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THEDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 75-436.
Citator
- Authority status
- caution
BUCKLEYv. VALEO,424 U.S. 1(1976)
96 S.Ct. 612
BUCKLEY ET AL.v. VALEO, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
No. 75-436.
Argued November 10, 1975.
Decided January 30, 1976.fn*
1. This litigation presents an Art. III "case or controversy," since the complaint discloses that at least some of the appellants have a sufficient "personal stake" in a determination of the constitutional validity of each of the challenged provisions to present "a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.Haworth,300 U.S. 227,241. Pp. 11-12.
2. The Act's contribution provisions are constitutional, but the expenditure provisions violate theFirstAmendment. Pp. 12-59.
(a) The contribution provisions, along with those covering disclosure, are appropriate legislative weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions, and the ceilings imposed accordingly serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion. Pp. 23-38.
(b) TheFirstAmendment requires the invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling, its limitation on a candidate's expenditures from his own personal funds, and its ceilings on overall campaign expenditures, since those provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that theFirstAmendment cannot tolerate. Pp. 39-59.
3. The Act's disclosure and recordkeeping provisions are constitutional. Pp. 60-84.
(a) The general disclosure provisions, which serve substantial governmental interests in informing the electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process, are not overbroad insofar as they apply to contributions to minor parties and independent candidates. No blanket exemption for minor parties is warranted since such parties in order to prove injury as a result of application to them of the disclosure provisions need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals in violation of theirFirstAmendment associational rights. Pp. 64-74.
(b) The provision for disclosure by those who make independentPage 4contributions and expenditures, as narrowly construed to apply only (1) when they make contributions earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent to some person other than a candidate or political committee and (2) when they make an expenditure for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate is not unconstitutionally vague and does not constitute a prior restraint but is a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furtheringFirstAmendment values by public exposure of the federal election system. Pp. 74-82.
(c) The extension of the recordkeeping provisions to contributions as small as those just above $10 and the disclosure provisions to contributions above $100 is not on this record overbroad since it cannot be said to be unrelated to the informational and enforcement goals of the legislation. Pp. 82-84.
4. Subtitle H of the IRC is constitutional. Pp. 85-109.
(a) Subtitle H is not invalid under the General Welfare Clause but, as a means to reform the electoral process, was clearly a choice within the power granted to Congress by the Clause to decide which expenditures will promote the general welfare. Pp. 90-92.
(b) Nor does Subtitle H violate theFirstAmendment. Rather than abridging, restricting, or censoring speech, it represents an effort to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process. Pp. 92-93.
(c) Subtitle H, being less burdensome than ballot-access regulations and having been enacted in furtherance of vital governmental interests in relieving major-party candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions, in not funding candidates who lack significant public support, and in eliminating reliance on large private contributions for funding of conventions and campaigns, does not invidiously discriminate against minor and new parties in violation of the Due Process Clause of theFifthAmendment. Pp. 93-108.
(d) Invalidation of the spending-limit provisions of the Act does not render Subtitle H unconstitutional, but the Subtitle is severable from such provisions and is not dependent upon the existence of a generally applicable expenditure limit. Pp. 108-109.
5. The Commission's composition as to all but its investigative and informative powers violates Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. With respect to the Commission's powers, all of which are ripe for review,Page 5to enforce the Act, including primary responsibility for bringing civil actions against violators, to make rules for carrying out the Act, to temporarily disqualify federal candidates for failing to file required reports, and to authorize convention expenditures in excess of the specified limits, the provisions of the Act vesting such powers in the Commission and the prescribed method of appointment of members of the Commission to the extent that a majority of the voting members are appointed by the Presidentpro temporeof the Senate and the Speaker of the House, violate the Appointments Clause, which provides in pertinent part that the President shall nominate, and with the Senate's advice and consent appoint, all "Officers of the United States," whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, but that Congress may vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as it deems proper, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. Hence (though the Commission's past acts are accordedde factovalidity and a stay is granted permitting it to function under the Act for not more than 30 days), the Commission, as presently constituted, may not because of that Clause exercise such powers, which can be exercised only by "Officers of the United States" appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause, although it may exercise such investigative and informative powers as are in the same category as those powers that Congress might delegate to one of its own committees. Pp. 109-143.
No. 75-436, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172,519 F.2d 821, affirmed in part and reversed in part; No. 75-437,401 F. Supp. 1235, affirmed.Per curiamopinion, in the "case or controversy" part of which (post, pp. 11-12) all participating Members joined; and as to all other Parts of which BRENNAN, STEWART, and POWELL, JJ., joined; MARSHALL, J., joined in all but Part I-C-2; BLACKMUN, J., joined in all but Part I-B; REHNQUIST, J., joined in all but Part III-B-1; BURGER, C. J., joined in Parts I-C and IV (except insofar as it accordsde factovalidity for the Commission's past acts); and WHITE, J., joined in Part III. BURGER, C. J.,post, p. 235, WHITE, J.,post, p. 257, MARSHALL, J.,post, p. 286, BLACKMUN, J.,post, p. 290, and REHNQUIST, J.,post, p. 290, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
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