Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Brigham City v. Stuart
126 S. Ct. 1943
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2006-05-22
- Topic
- general
holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require police “to wait until another blow render[s] someone ‘unconscious’ or ‘semi-conscious’ or worse before entering” | holding that emergency doctrine applied because the officers were confronted with violence then occurring within the home | holding that emergency doctrine applied because the officers were confronted with violence then occurring within the home | holding that-a warrantless police entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment where 'officers standing* outside' a house witnessed a fight between a juvenile and four adults inside | holding that a third factor listed in Cervantes, the officer’s subjective motivation for entering, is not constitutionally relevant | holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusively concerns whether the circumstances confronting officials provided an objectively reasonable basis for the action | holding that police may enter a home without a warrant to “prevent imminent destruction of evi dence” | holding that emergency doctrine applied because the officers were confronted with violence then occurring within the home | holding that as long as a search is objectively reasonable under the emergency aid doctrine, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment | holding that “law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant . . . to protect an occupant from imminent injury” | holding that police officers may enter a home to prevent serious injury to persons or property | holding that 4 the Fourth Amendment does not require police “to wait until 5 another blow render[s] someone ‘unconscious’ or ‘semi-conscious’ 6 or worse before entering” | holding that warrantless entry is justified when officers have a "reasonable basis" to believe that an injured person "might need help" or that "violence was just beginning" | holding that “[a]n action is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action’ ” | holding that Cervantes’s additional inquiry into the officer’s subjective motivation for entry is irrelevant | recognizing that are various exceptions to the unconstitutionality of a warrantless search of property | recognizing that the "ultimate touchtone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness'" and finding law enforcement's entry into a home without a warrant to offer assistance to an injured occupant was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment | noting that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ ” and concluding a warrantless entry was “plainly reasonable under the circumstances” | recognizing that the "ultimate touchtone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness'" and finding law enforcement's entry into a home without a warrant to offer assistance to an injured occupant was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment | holding that the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ ” | holding that the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’ ” | stating that no warrant is required for police to enter a residence “to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury” | stating that no warrant is required for police to enter a residence “to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury” | concluding that knocking on the front door would have been futile | concluding that knocking on the front door would have been futile | holding that a warrantless No. 15-3336 Smith v. City of Wyoming, et al. Page 11 police entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment where officers standing outside a house witnessed a fight between a juvenile and four adults inside | holding that officers lawfully entered a residence after hearing a “tumultuous” altercation, “thumping and crashing,” people yelling “stop, stop” and “get off me,” and after observing one person strike another “in the face, sending the [victim] to the sink spitting blood
Citator
- Cited by
- 844 opinions
BRIGHAM CITY v. STUART,547 U.S. 398(2006)
126 S.Ct. 1943
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH v. STUART ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH.
No. 05-502.
Argued April 24, 2006.
Decided May 22, 2006.
Because theFourthAmendment's ultimate touchstone is "reasonableness," the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. For example, one exigency obviating the requirement is the need to render emergency assistance to occupants of private property who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.Minceyv.Arizona, 437 U. S. 385,392. This Court has repeatedly rejected respondents' contention that, in assessing the reasonableness of an entry, consideration should be given to the subjective motivations of individual officers. Because the officers' subjective motivation is irrelevant,Bondv.United States,529 U. S. 334,338, n. 2, it does not matter here whether they entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence or toPage 399assist the injured and prevent further violence.Indianapolisv.Edmond,531 U. S. 32,46, andFloridav.Wells,495 U. S. 1,4, distinguished. Relying on this Court's holding inWelshv.Wisconsin,466 U. S. 740,753, that "an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made," respondents further contend that their conduct was not serious enough to justify the officers' intrusion into the home. This contention is misplaced. InWelsh, the "only potential emergency" confronting the officers was the need to preserve evidence of the suspect's blood-alcohol level, an exigency the Court held insufficient under the circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into the suspect's home.Ibid.Here, the officers were confronted withon-goingviolence occurringwithinthe home, a situationWelshdid not address.
The officers' entry here was plainly reasonable under the circumstances. Given the tumult at the house when they arrived, it was obvious that knocking on the front door would have been futile. Moreover, in light of the fracas they observed in the kitchen, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence was just beginning. Nothing in theFourthAmendment required them to wait until another blow rendered someone unconscious, semiconscious, or worse before entering. The manner of their entry was also reasonable, since nobody heard the first announcement of their presence, and it was only after the announcing officer stepped into the kitchen and announced himself again that the tumult subsided. That announcement was at least equivalent to a knock on the screen door and, under the circumstances, there was no violation of theFourthAmendment's knock-and-announce rule. Furthermore, once the announcement was made, the officers were free to enter; it would serve no purpose to make them stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence. Pp. 403-407.2005 UT 13,122 P. 3d 506, reversed and remanded.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion,post, p. 407.
I
This case arises out of a melee that occurred in a Brigham City, Utah, home in the early morning hours of July 23, 2000. At about 3 a.m., four police officers responded to a call regardingPage 401a loud party at a residence. Upon arriving at the house, they heard shouting from inside, and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. There, they observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. They entered the backyard, and saw — through a screen door and windows — an altercation taking place in the kitchen of the home. According to the testimony of one of the officers, four adults were attempting, with some difficulty, to restrain a juvenile. The juvenile eventually "broke free, swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face."2005 UT 13, ¶2,122 P. 3d 506,508. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. App. 40. The other adults continued to try to restrain the juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. At this point, an officer opened the screen door and announced the officers' presence. Amici the tumult, nobody noticed. The officer entered the kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly became aware that the police were on the scene, the altercation ceased.
The officers subsequently arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In the trial court, respondents filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that the warrantless entry violated theFourthAmendment. The court granted the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.
Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City argued that although the officers lacked a warrant, their entry was nevertheless reasonable on either of two grounds. The court rejected both contentions and, over two dissenters, affirmed. First, the court held that the injury caused by the juvenile's punch was insufficient to trigger the so-called "emergency aid doctrine" because it did not give rise to an "objectively reasonable belief that an unconscious, semiconscious,Page 402or missing person feared injured or dead [was] in the home."122 P. 3d, at 513(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the court suggested that the doctrine was inapplicable because the officers had not sought to assist the injured adult, but instead had acted "exclusively in their law enforcement capacity."Ibid.
The court also held that the entry did not fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. This exception applies, the court explained, where police have probable cause and where "a reasonable person [would] believe that the entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons."Id., at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the court stated, the potential harm need not be as serious as that required to invoke the emergency aid exception. Although it found the case "a close and difficult call," the court nevertheless concluded that the officers' entry was not justified by exigent circumstances.Id., at 515.
We granted certiorari,546 U. S. 1085(2006), in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the appropriateFourthAmendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation. CompareIn re Sealed Case 96-3167,153 F. 3d 759,766(CADC 1998) ("[T]he standard for exigent circumstances is an objective one"), andPeoplev.Hebert, 46 P. 3d 473, 480 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (considering the circumstances as they "would have been objectively examined by a prudent and trained police officer"), withUnited Statesv.Cervantes,219 F. 3d 882,890(CA9 2000) ("[U]nder the emergency doctrine, `[a] search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence'" (quotingPeoplev.Mitchell,39 N. Y. 2d 173,177,347 N. E. 2d 607,609(1976)), andStatev.Mountford,171 Vt. 487,492,769 A. 2d 639,645(2000) (Mitchelltest "requir[es] courts to find that the primary subjective motivation behind such searches was to provide emergency aid").Page 403
II
It is a `"basic principle ofFourthAmendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.'"Grohv.Ramirez,540 U. S. 551,559(2004) (quotingPaytonv.New York,445 U. S. 573,586(1980); some internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of theFourthAmendment is "reasonableness," the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.Flippov.West Virginia,528 U. S. 11,13(1999)(percuriam); Katzv.United States,389 U. S. 347,357(1967). We have held, for example, that law enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and investigate its cause,Michiganv.Tyler,436 U. S. 499,509(1978), to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,Kerv.California,374 U. S. 23,40(1963) (plurality opinion), or to engage in "`hot pursuit'" of a fleeing suspect,United Statesv.Santana,427 U. S. 38,42,43(1976). "[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless `the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under theFourthAmendment."Minceyv.Arizona,437 U. S. 385,393-394(1978).
One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. "`The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.'"Id., at 392 (quotingWaynev.United States,318 F. 2d 205,212(CADC 1963) (Burger, J.)); see alsoTyler, supra, at 509. Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.Mincey, supra, at 392; see alsoGeorgiav.Randolph, ante, at 118 ("[I]t would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering . . . to determinePage 404whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur").
Respondents do not take issue with these principles, but instead advance two reasons why the officers' entry here was unreasonable. First, they argue that the officers were more interested in making arrests than quelling violence. They urge us to consider, in assessing the reasonableness of the entry, whether the officers were "indeed motivated primarily by a desire to save lives and property." Brief for Respondents 3; see also Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers asAmicus Curiae6 (entry to render emergency assistance justifies a search "only when the searching officer is acting outside his traditional law-enforcement capacity"). The Utah Supreme Court also considered the officers' subjective motivations relevant. See122 P. 3d, at 513(search under the "emergency aid doctrine" may not be "primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Our cases have repeatedly rejected this approach. An action is "reasonable" under theFourthAmendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, "as long as the circumstances, viewedobjectively, justify [the] action."Scottv.United States,436 U. S. 128,138(1978) (emphasis added). The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant. SeeBondv.United States,529 U. S. 334,338, n. 2 (2000) ("The parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's actions violate theFourthAmendment . . .; the issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions");Whrenv.United States,517 U. S. 806,813(1996) ("[W]e have been unwilling to entertainFourthAmendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers");Grahamv.Connor,490 U. S. 386,397(1989) ("[O]ur prior cases make clear" that "the subjective motivations of the individual officers . . . ha[ve] no bearing on whether a particular seizure is `unreasonable' under theFourthAmendment").Page 405It therefore does not matter here — even if their subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled — whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence.
As respondents note, we have held in the context of programmatic searches conducted without individualized suspicion — such as checkpoints to combat drunk driving or drug trafficking — that "an inquiry intoprogrammaticpurpose" is sometimes appropriate.Indianapolisv.Edmond,531 U. S. 32,46(2000) (emphasis added); see alsoFloridav.Wells,495 U. S. 1,4(1990) (an inventory search must be regulated by "standardized criteria" or "established routine" so as not to "be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence"). But this inquiry is directed at ensuring that the purpose behind theprogramis not "ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control."Edmond,531 U. S., at 44. It has nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of the individual officer conducting the search.Id., at 48.
Respondents further contend that their conduct was not serious enough to justify the officers' intrusion into the home. They rely onWelshv.Wisconsin,466 U. S. 740,753(1984), in which we held that "an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made." This contention, too, is misplaced.Welshinvolved a warrantless entry by officers to arrest a suspect for driving while intoxicated. There, the "only potential emergency" confronting the officers was the need to preserve evidence (i. e., the suspect's blood-alcohol level) — an exigency that we held insufficient under the circumstances to justify entry into the suspect's home.Ibid.Here, the officers were confronted withongoingviolence occurringwithinthe home.Welshdid not address such a situation.Page 406
We think the officers' entry here was plainly reasonable under the circumstances. The officers were responding, at 3 o'clock in the morning, to complaints about a loud party. As they approached the house, they could hear from within "an altercation occurring, some kind of a fight." App. 29. "It was loud and it was tumultuous."Id., at 33. The officers heard "thumping and crashing" and people yelling "stop, stop" and "get off me."Id., at 28, 29. As the trial court found, "it was obvious that . . . knocking on the front door" would have been futile.Id., at 92. The noise seemed to be coming from the back of the house; after looking in the front window and seeing nothing, the officers proceeded around back to investigate further. They found two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. From there, they could see that a fracas was taking place inside the kitchen. A juvenile, fists clenched, was being held back by several adults. As the officers watch, he breaks free and strikes one of the adults in the face, sending the adult to the sink spitting blood.
In these circumstances, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning. Nothing in theFourthAmendment required them to wait until another blow rendered someone "unconscious" or "semiconscious" or worse before entering. The role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is not like a boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to stop a bout only if it becomes too one-sided.
The manner of the officers' entry was also reasonable. After witnessing the punch, one of the officers opened the screen door and "yelled in police."Id., at 40. When nobody heard him, he stepped into the kitchen and announced himself again. Only then did the tumult subside. The officer's announcement of his presence was at least equivalent to a knock on the screen door. Indeed, it was probably thePage 407only option that had even a chance of rising above the din. Under these circumstances, there was no violation of theFourthAmendment's knock-and-announce rule. Furthermore, once the announcement was made, the officers were free to enter; it would serve no purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah, and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.
Under these circumstances, the only difficult question is which of the following is the most peculiar: (1) that the Utah trial judge, the intermediate state appellate court, and the Utah Supreme Court all found aFourthAmendment violation on these facts; (2) that the prosecution chose to pursue this matter all the way to the United States Supreme Court; or (3) that this Court voted to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
A possible explanation for the first is that the suppression ruling was correct as a matter of Utah law, and neither trial counsel nor the trial judge bothered to identify the Utah Constitution as an independent basis for the decision becausePage 408they did not expect the prosecution to appeal.fn*The most plausible explanation for the latter two decisions is that they were made so police officers in Utah may enter a home without a warrant when they see ongoing violence — we are, of course, reversing the Utah Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary. But that purpose, laudable though it may be, cannot be achieved in this case. Our holding today addresses only the limitations placed by the Federal Constitution on the search at issue; we have no authority to decide whether the police in this case violated the Utah Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has made clear that the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to the privacy of the home than does theFourthAmendment. SeeStatev.DeBooy,2000 UT 32, ¶12,996 P. 2d 546,549. And it complained in this case of respondents' failure to raise or adequately brief a state constitutional challenge, thus preventing the state courts from deciding the case on anything other thanFourthAmendment grounds. See2005 UT 13, ¶12,122 P. 3d 506,510. "[S]urpris[ed]" by "[t]he reluctance of litigants to take up and develop a state constitutional analysis,"ibid., the court expressly invited future litigants to bring challenges under the Utah Constitution to enable it to fulfill its "responsibility as guardians of the individual liberty of our citizens" and "undertak[e] a principled exploration of the interplay between federal and state protections of individual rights,"id., at 511. The fact that this admonishment and request came from the Utah Supreme Court in this very case not only demonstrates that the prosecution selected the wrong case for establishing the rule it wants, but also indicates that the Utah Supreme Court would probably adopt the same rule as a matter of state constitutional law that we reject today under the Federal Constitution.Page 409
Whether or not that forecast is accurate, I can see no reason for this Court to cause the Utah courts to redecide the question as a matter of state law. Federal interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater protection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires. Indeed, I continue to believe "that a policy of judicial restraint — one that allows other decisional bodies to have the last word in legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to intervene — enables this Court to make its most effective contribution to our federal system of government."Michiganv.Long,463 U. S. 1032,1067(1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Thus, while I join the Court's opinion, I remain persuaded that my vote to deny the State's petition for certiorari was correct.Page 410
- Briefs ofamici curiaeurging reversal were filed for the State of Michigan et al. byMichael A Cox, Attorney General of Michigan,ThomasL. Casey, Solicitor General, byKym L. WorthyandTimothy Baughman, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:John W.Suthersof Colorado,M. Jane Bradyof Delaware,Mark J. Bennettof Hawaii,Lisa Madiganof Illinois,Tom Millerof Iowa,Phill Klineof Kansas,J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,Mike McGrathof Montana,JonBruningof Nebraska,Wayne Stenehjemof North Dakota,Hardy Myersof Oregon,Tom Corbettof Pennsylvania,William Sorrellof Vermont,RobMcKennaof Washington, andPatrick J. Crankof Wyoming; for the Fraternal Order of Police byLarry H. JamesandLaura MacGregor Comek;and for the National League of Cities et al. byRichard RudaandLawrence Rosenthal.Jonathan D. HackerandPamela Harrisfiled a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers asamicus curiaeurging affirmance.Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Richard Weintraub, andBernard J.Farberfiled a brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. asamici curiae. ↩
- Indeed, it was the prosecution that prepared the trial court's order granting respondents' motion to suppress. See2002 UT App. 317, ¶4,57 P. 3d 1111,1112. ↩