Brasfield v. United States

holding that the judge’s inquiry into the jury’s numerical division was improper due to the potential dangers of jury polling by relying on the Court’s supervisory powers | holding that the judge's inquiry into the jury's numerical division was improper due to the potential dangers of jury polling by relying on the Court's supervisory powers | holding that the judge’s inquiry into the jury’s numerical division was improper due to the potential dangers of jury polling by relying on the Court’s supervisory powers | concluding that such an “inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal” | concluding that such an “inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal” | holding it was reversible error for a federal district judge to ask a deadlocked jury the extent of its numerical division | finding that a trial court may not “inquir[e] of a jury, unable to agree, the extent of its numerical division” | holding under the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers that a federal judge's affirmative inquiry into how the jury was divided was per se coercive and required reversal | reversing judgment for plain error where the trial judge improperly inquired of a jury’s numerical division | finding that questioning by judge as to numerical division of jury was improper | reversing conviction where trial judge inquired and was informed how jury was divided numerically, without indication of which number favored conviction, and despite that defense counsel made no objection | reversing conviction where trial judge inquired and was informed how jury was divided numerically, without indication of which number favored conviction, and despite that defense counsel made no objection | reversing criminal conviction following judge’s inquiry as to the numerical division of the jury while the jury was deadlocked | reversing criminal conviction following judge's inquiry as to the numerical division of the jury while the jury was deadlocked | approving of the use of verdict-urging instructions in civil cases but warning of the inherent “danger of coercion” in their use | error to give Allen charge after inquiry as to whether there was “a pronounced majority” | “We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as grounds for reversal.” | "We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as grounds for reversal." | “We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial, that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal” | when jury has reported it is deadlocked, it is grounds for reversal for the trial court to inquire into the numerical division of the individual jurors | plain error review is particularly appropriate "where the error . . . affects the proper relations of the court to the jury." | “Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division” | court’s inquiry whether there was a pronounced majority held to be reversible error | trial judge may not inquire into numerical division of jury, even if judge does not ask how many jurors are for conviction | affirmative inquiry by a trial judge into how a jury was divided was coercive and required reversal | “[F]ailure of petitioners’ counsel to particularize an exception to the court’s inquiry does not preclude this Court from correcting the error.” | “[F]ailure of petitioners’ counsel to particularize an exception to the court’s inquiry does not preclude this Court from correcting the error.” | "Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division.... [I]n general its tendency is coercive.” | “the inquiry into the jury’s numerical division necessitated reversal because it was generally coercive and always brought to bear ‘in some degree, serious althoug