Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Bowles v. Russell
127 S. Ct. 2360
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2007-06-14
- Topic
- general
concluding that party’s “failure to file his notice of appeal in accordance with the statute therefore deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction” | holding that statutory time limits for taking an appeal are jurisdictional based on their “longstanding treatment” as such by the Supreme Court | holding that the statutory time for the taking of an appeal from a district court decision is jurisdictional | holding that the statutory time for the taking of an appeal from a district court decision is jurisdictional | holding that time limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) for filing appeals in civil case is jurisdictional | holding that time limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) for filing appeals in civil case is jurisdictional | holding that the filing requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b), Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B | holding that district court’s mistaken advice about jurisdictional deadline for filing notice of appeal did not excuse appellant’s failure to meet deadline | holding that, because the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a | holding that, because the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a | holding that because the authority for extending the notice-of-appeal period was statutory under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c | concluding that the time limit for appealing from a district court to a court of appeals is “mandatory and jurisdictional” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) | concluding that the time limit for appealing from a district court to a court of appeals is “mandatory and jurisdictional” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) | holding that the statutory time limit for filing a notice of appeal from a civil case brought in federal district court is jurisdictional and hence not susceptible to equitable extension | holding that the statutory time limit for filing a notice of appeal from a civil case brought in federal district court is jurisdictional and hence not susceptible to equitable extension | holding that “timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement” | holding that “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement” | recognizing that “the courts of appeals routinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction” | holding that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement in a civil case | holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a Notice of Appeal is not permitted | holding that federal courts have "no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements" such as the "timely filing of a notice of appeal" | holding that because the authority for extending the notice-of-appeal period was statutory under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c | recognizing that “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement” | holding that the 30-day deadline to appeal set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) is jurisdictional | holding that timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2 | holding that the time limit for filing a notice of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional” | holding that the statutory time for the taking of an appeal from a district court decision is jurisdictional | holding that the time limit of Rule 4(a)(1) for commencing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional | holding that the statutory limit on the time to file a notice of appeal from a district court to a court of appeal is jurisdictional | holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a Notice of Appeal is not permitted | recognizing that “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement” | holding that “unique circumstances” doctrine may not excuse untimely filing of appeal in civil case | holding that “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a j
Citator
- Cited by
- 1661 opinions
(a) The taking of an appeal in a civil case within the time prescribed by statute is "mandatory and jurisdictional."Griggsv.Provident Consumer Discount Co.,459 U. S. 56,61(percuriam). There is a significant distinction between time limitations set forth in a statute such as § 2107, which limit a court's jurisdiction, see,e.g.,Kon-trickv.Ryan,540 U. S. 443,453, and those based on court rules, which do not, see,e.g.,id., at 454.Arbaughv.Y H Corp.,546 U. S. 500,505, andScarboroughv.Principi,541 U. S. 401,314, distinguished. Because Congress decides, within constitutional bounds, whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. SeeUnited Statesv.Curry, 6 How. 106, 113. And when an "appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." Id., at 113. The resolution of this case follows naturally from thisPage 2reasoning. Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period in § 2107(c), Bowles' failure to file in accordance with the statute deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction. And because Bowles' error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he cannot rely on forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance. Pp. 4-8.
(b) Bowles' reliance on the "unique circumstances" doctrine, rooted inHarris Truck Lines, Inc.v.Cherry Meat Packers,Inc.,371 U. S. 215(per curiam)and applied inThompsonv.INS,375 U. S. 384(percuriam), is rejected. Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the doctrine is illegitimate.Harris Truck LinesandThompsonare overruled to the extent they purport to authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule. Pp. 8-9.432 F. 3d 668, affirmed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.Page 1
In recent years, however, we have tried to clean up our language, and until today we have been avoiding the erroneous jurisdictional conclusions that flow from indiscriminate use of the ambiguous word. Thus, although we used to call the sort of time limit at issue here "mandatory and jurisdictional,"United Statesv.Robinson,361 U. S. 220,229(1960), we have recently and repeatedly corrected that designation as a misuse of the "jurisdiction" label.Arbaugh,supra, at 510 (citingRobinsonas an example of improper use of the term "jurisdiction");Eberhartv.United States,546 U. S. 12,17-18(2005)(per curiam)(same);Kontrick,supra, at 454 (same).
But one would never guess this from reading the Court's opinion in this case, which suddenly restoresRobinson's indiscriminate use of the "mandatory and jurisdictional" label to good law in the face of three unanimous repudiations ofRobinson's error. Seeante, at 4. This is puzzling, the more so because our recent (and, I repeat, unanimous) efforts to confine jurisdictional rulings to jurisdiction proper were obviously sound, and the majority makes no attempt to show they were not.1
The stakes are high in treating time limits as jurisdic-tional. While a mandatory but non-jurisdictional limit is enforceable at the insistence of a party claiming its benefit or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it may be waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitablePage 3discretion. But if a limit is taken to be jurisdictional, waiver becomes impossible, meritorious excuse irrelevant (unless the statute so provides), andsua sponteconsideration in the courts of appeals mandatory, seeArbaugh,supra, at 514.2As the Court recognizes,ante, at 5-6, this is no way to regard time limits set out in a court rule rather than a statute, seeKontrick,supra, at 452 ("Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction"). But neither is jurisdictional treatment automatic when a time limit is statutory, as it is in this case. Generally speaking, limits on the reach of federal statutes, even non-temporal ones, are only jurisdictional if Congress says so: "when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as non-jurisdictional in character."Arbaugh,546 U. S., at 516. Thus, we have held "that time prescriptions, however emphatic, 'are not properly typed "jurisdictional,"'"id., at 510 (quotingScarboroughv.Principi,541 U. S. 401,414(2004)), absent some jurisdictional designation by Congress. Congress put no jurisdictional tag on the time limit here.3Page 4
The doctrinal underpinning of this recently repeated view was set out inKontrick:"the label 'jurisdictional' [is appropriate] not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority."540 U. S., at 455. A filing deadline is the paradigm of a claim-processing rule, not of a delineation of cases that federal courts may hear, and so it falls outside the class of limitations on subject matter jurisdiction unless Congress says otherwise.4Page 5
The time limit at issue here, far from defining the set of cases that may be adjudicated, is much more like a statute of limitations, which provides an affirmative defense, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.8(c), and is not jurisdictional,Dayv.McDonough,547 U. S. 198,205(2006). Statutes of limitations may thus be waived,id., at 207-208, or excused by rules, such as equitable tolling, that alleviate hardship and unfairness, seeIrwinv.Department ofVeterans Affairs,498 U. S. 89,95-96(1990).
Consistent with the traditional view of statutes of limitations, and the carefully limited concept of jurisdiction explained inArbaugh,Eberhart, andKontrick, an exception to the time limit in28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) should be available when there is a good justification for one, for reasons we recognized years ago. InHarris Truck Lines, Inc.v.Cherry Meat Packers,Inc.,371 U. S. 215,217(1962)(per curiam), andThompsonv.INS,375 U. S. 384,387(1964)(percuriam), we found that "unique circumstances" excused failures to comply with the time limit. In fact, much like this case,HarrisandThompsoninvolved district court errors that misled litigants into believing they had more time to file notices of appeal than a statute actually provided. Thus, even back when we thoughtlessly called time limits jurisdictional, we did not actually treat them as beyond exemption to the point of shrugging at the inequity of penalizing a party for relying on what a federal judge had said to him. Since we did not dishonor reasonable reliance on a judge's official word back in the days when we uncritically had a jurisdictional reason to be unfair, it is unsupportable to dishonor it now, after repeatedly disavowing any such jurisdictional justificationPage 6that would apply to the 14-day time limit of § 2107(c).
The majority avoids clashing withHarrisandThompsonby overruling them on the ground of their "slumber,"ante, at 9, and inconsistency with a time-limit-as-jurisdictional rule.5But eliminating those precedents underscores what has become the principal question of this case: why does today's majority refuse to come to terms with the steady stream of unanimous statements from this Court in the past four years, culminating inArbaugh's summary a year ago? The majority begs this question by refusing to confront what we have said: "in recent decisions, we have clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, 'are not properly typed "jurisdictional."'"Arbaugh,546 U. S., at 510(quotingScarborough,541 U. S., at 414). This statement of the Court, and those preceding it for which it stands as a summation, cannot be dismissed as "some dicta,"ante, at 4, n. 2, and cannot be ignored on the ground that some of them were made in cases where the challenged restriction was not a time limit, seeante, at 6. By its refusal to come to grips with our considered statements of law the majority leaves the Court incoherent.
In ruling that Bowles cannot depend on the word of a District Court Judge, the Court demonstrates that no one may depend on the recent, repeated, and unanimous statements of all participating Justices of this Court. Yet more incongruously, all of these pronouncements by the Court, along with two of our cases,6are jettisoned in aPage 7ruling for which the leading justification isstare decisis, seeante, at 4 ("This Court has long held . . .").
Thompson filed his post-trial motions late and the District Court was mistaken when it said they were timely; here, the District Court made the error out of the blue, not on top of any mistake by Bowles, who then filed his notice of appeal by the specific date the District Court had declared timely. If anything, this distinction ought to work in Bowles's favor. Why should we have rewarded Thompson, who introduced the error, but now punish Bowles, who merely trusted the District Court's statement?8
UnderThompson, it would be no answer to say that Bowles's trust was unreasonable because the 14-day limit was clear and counsel should have checked the judge's arithmetic. The 10-day limit on post-trial motions was no less pellucid inThompson, which came out the other way. And what is more, counsel here could not have uncovered the court's error simply by counting off the days on a calendar. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure4(a)(6) allows a party to file a notice of appeal within 14 days of "the date when [the district court's] order to reopen is entered." See also28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)(2) (allowing reopening for "14 days from the date of entry"). The District Court's order was dated February 10, 2004, which revealsPage 9the date the judge signed it but not necessarily the date on which the order was entered. Bowles's lawyer therefore could not tell from reading the order, which he received by mail, whether it was entered the day it was signed. Nor is the possibility of delayed entry merely theoretical: the District Court's original judgment in this case, dated July 10, 2003, was not entered until July 28. See App. 11 (District Court docket). According to Bowles's lawyer, electronic access to the docket was unavailable at the time, so to learn when the order was actually entered he would have had to call or go to the courthouse and check. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56-57. Surely this is more than equity demands, and unless every statement by a federal court is to be tagged with the warning "Beware of the Judge," Bowles's lawyer had no obligation to go behind the terms of the order he received.
I have to admit that Bowles's counsel probably did not think the order might have been entered on a different day from the day it was signed. He probably just trusted that the date given was correct, and there was nothing unreasonable in so trusting. The other side let the order pass without objection, either not caring enough to make a fuss or not even noticing the discrepancy; the mistake of a few days was probably not enough to ring the alarm bell to send either lawyer to his copy of the federal rules and then off to the courthouse to check the docket.9This would be a different case if the year were wrong on the DistrictPage 10Court's order, or if opposing counsel had flagged the error. But on the actual facts, it was reasonable to rely on a facially plausible date provided by a federal judge.
I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of the merits.Page 224
- The Rule was amended, effective December 1, 2005, to require that notice be pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.77(d). The substance is otherwise unchanged. ↩
- Griggsand several other of this Court's decisions ultimately rely onUnited Statesv.Robinson,361 U. S. 220,229(1960), for the proposition that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. As the dissent notes, we have recently questionedRobinson's use of the term "jurisdictional."Post, at 2 (opinion of SOUTER, J.) Even in our cases criticizingRobinson, however, we have noted the jurisdictional significance of the fact that a time limit is set forth in a statute, seeinfra, at 5-6, and have even pointed to § 2107 as a statute deserving of jurisdic-tional treatment.Infra, at 6. Additionally, because we rely on those cases in reaching today's holding, the dissent's rhetoric claiming that we are ignoring their reasoning is unfounded.
Regardless of this Court's past careless use of terminology, it is indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century. Consequently, the dissent's approach would require the repudiation of a century's worth of precedent and practice in American courts. Given the choice between calling into question some dicta in our recent opinions and effectively overruling a century's worth of practice, we think the former option is the only prudent course. ↩ - At least one federal court of appeals has noted thatKontrickandEberhart"called . . . into question" the "longstanding assumption" that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement.United Statesv.Sadler,480 F. 3d 932,935(CA9 2007). That court nonetheless found that "[t]he distinction between jurisdictional rules and inflexible but not jurisdictional timeliness rules drawn byEberhartandKontrickturns largely on whether the timeliness requirement is or is not grounded in a statute."Id., at 936. ↩
- The dissent minimizes this argument, stating that the Court understood § 2101(c) as jurisdictional "in the days when we used the term imprecisely."Post, at 4, n. 4. The dissent's apathy is surprising because if our treatment of our own jurisdiction is simply a relic of the old days, it is a relic with severe consequences. Just a few months ago, the Clerk, pursuant to this Court's Rule 13.2, refused to accept a petition for certiorari submitted by Ryan Heath Dickson because it had been filed one day late. In the letter sent to Dickson's counsel, the Clerk explained that "[w]hen the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in a civil case . . . has expired, the Court no longer has the power to review the petition." Letter from William K. Suter, Clerk of Court, to Ronald T. Spriggs (Dec. 28, 2006). Dickson was executed on April 26, 2007, without any Member of this Court having even seen his petition for certiorari. The rejected certiorari petition was Dickson's first in this Court, and one can only speculate as to whether denial of that petition would have been a foregone conclusion. ↩
- The Court thinks my fellow dissenters and I are forgetful of an opinion I wrote and the others joined in 2003, which referred to the 30-day rule of28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) as a jurisdictional time limit. Seeante, at 5 (quotingBarnhartv.PeabodyCoal Co.,537 U. S. 149,160, n. 6 (2003)). But that reference inBarnhartwas a perfect example of the confusion of the mandatory and the jurisdictional that the entire Court has spent the past four years repudiating inArbaugh,Eberhart, andKontrick. My fellow dissenters and I believe that the Court was right to correct its course; the majority, however, will not even admit that we deliberately changed course, let alone explain why it is now changing course again. ↩
- The requirement that courts of appeals raise jurisdictional issuessua spontereveals further ill effects of today's decision. Under § 2107(c), "[t]he district court may . . . extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause." By the Court's logic, if a district court grants such an extension, the extension's propriety is subject to mandatorysua spontereview in the court of appeals, even if the extension was unopposed throughout, and upon finding error the court of appeals must dismiss the appeal. I see no more justification for such a rule than reason to suspect Congress meant to create it. ↩
- The majority answers that a footnote of our unanimous opinion inKontrickv.Ryan,540 U. S. 443(2004), used § 2107(a) as an illustration of a jurisdictional time limit.Ante, at 6 ("[W]e noted that § 2107 contains the type of statutory time constraints that would limit a court's jurisdiction.540 U. S., at 453, and n. 8"). What the majority overlooks, however, are the post-Kontrickcases showing that § 2107(a) can no longer be seen as an example of a jurisdictional time limit. The jurisdictional character of the 30-(or 60)-day time limit for filing notices of appeal under the present § 2107(a) was first pronounced by this Court inBrowderv.Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill.,434 U. S. 257(1978). But in that respectBrowderwas undercut byEberhartv.United States,546 U. S. 12(2005)(per curiam), decided afterKontrick.EberhartcitedBrowder(along with several of the other cases on which the Court now relies) as an example of the basic error of confusing mandatory time limits with jurisdictional limitations, a confusion for whichUnited Statesv.Robinson,361 U. S. 220(1960), was responsible. Compareante, at 4 (citingBrowder,Griggsv.Provident Consumer Discount Co.,459 U. S. 56(1982)(percuriam), andHohnv.United States,524 U. S. 236(1998)), withEberhart,supra, at 17-18 (citing those cases as examples of the confusion caused byRobinson's imprecise language).Eberhartwas followed four months later byArbaughv.Y H Corp.,546 U. S. 500(2006), which summarized the body of recent decisions in which the Court "clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, are not properly typed jurisdictional,"id., at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted). This unanimous statement of all Members of the Court participating in the case eliminated the option of continuing to accept § 2107(a) as jurisdictional and it precludes treating the 14-day period of § 2107(c) as a limit on jurisdiction. ↩
- The Court points out that we have affixed a "jurisdiction" label to the time limit contained in § 2101(c) for petitions for writ of certiorari in civil cases.Ante, at 6-7 (citingFederalElection Comm'nv.NRA Political Victory Fund,513 U. S. 88,90(1994); this Court's Rule 13.2). Of course, we initially did so in the days when we used the term imprecisely. The status of § 2101(c) is not before the Court in this case, so I express no opinion on whether there are sufficient reasons to treat it as jurisdictional. The Court's observation that jurisdictional treatment has had severe consequences in that context,ante, at 7, n. 4, does nothing to support an argument that jurisdictional treatment is sound, but instead merely shows that the certiorari rule, too, should be reconsidered in light of our recent clarifications of what sorts of rules should be treated as jurisdictional. ↩
- With no apparent sense of irony, the Court finds that "'[o]ur later cases . . . effectively repudiate theHarris Truck Linesapproach.'"Ante, at 9 (quotingHoustonv.Lack,487 U. S. 266,282(1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); omission in original). Of course, those "later cases" wereBrowderandGriggs, seeHouston,supra, at 282, which have themselves been repudiated, not just "effectively" but explicitly, inEberhart. See n. 3,supra. ↩
- Three, if we includeWolfsohnv.Hankin,376 U. S. 203(1964)(per curiam). ↩
- As a member of the Federal Judiciary, I cannot help but think that reliance on our orders is reasonable. See O. Holmes, Natural Law, in Collected Legal Papers 311 (1920). I would also rest better knowing that my innocent errors will not jeopardize anyone's rights unless absolutely necessary. ↩
- Nothing inOsterneckv.Ernst Whinney,489 U. S. 169(1989), requires such a strange rule. InOsterneck, we described the "unique circumstances" doctrine as applicable "only where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly done."Id., at 179. But the point we were making was thatThompsoncould not excuse a lawyer's original mistake in a case in which a judge had not assured him that his act had been timely; the Court of Appeals inOsterneckhad found that no court provided a specific assurance, and we agreed. I see no reason to takeOsterneck's language out of context to buttress a fundamentally unfair resolution of an issue theOsterneckCourt did not have in front of it. Cf.St. Mary's Honor Centerv.Hicks,509 U. S. 502,515(1993) ("[W]e think it generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the United States Code"). ↩
- At first glance it may seem unreasonable for counsel to wait until the penultimate day under the judge's order, filing a notice of appeal being so easy that counsel should not have needed the extra time. But as Bowles's lawyer pointed out at oral argument, filing the notice of appeal starts the clock for filing the record, see Fed. Rule App. Proc.6(b)(2)(B), which in turn starts the clock for filing a brief, see Rule 31(a)(1), for which counsel might reasonably want as much time as possible. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. A good lawyer plans ahead, and Bowles had a good lawyer. ↩