Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
18 L. Ed. 2d 661
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1967-05-22
- Topic
- general
holding that Congress could deem gay men excludable “as afflicted with a . . . psychopathic personality” under the plenary-power doctrine | concluding that the legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 “indicated beyond a shadow of a doubt that Congress ended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include homosexuals.” | concluding that the legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 “indicated beyond a shadow of a doubt that Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include homosexuals.” | concluding that the legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 “indicate[d] beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase ‘psychopathic personality’ to include homosexuals” and labeled homosexuals “ill” | where exaction of obedience to rule or standard is so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all | to violate due process, a statute must be “so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all” | “It has long been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.” | homosexual individual could be denied admission to United States on ground that homosexuality is a “psychopathic personality” | “It is true that this Court has held the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions.” | “It is true that this 57 Court has held the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions.” | where exaction of obedience to rule or standard is so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all | “The constitutional requirement of fair warning has no applicability to standards . . . for admission of aliens to the United States.” | a challenge to a court decision applying strict liability rather than a negligence standard to pit bull owners whose dog injures another | "It has long been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden." | “The section imposes neither regulation of nor sanction for conduct. In this situation, therefore, no necessity exists for guidance so that one may avoid the applicability of the law.” | "To find a civil statute void for vagueness, the statute must be 'so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all.'" (quoting Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 123) | void for vagueness doctrine applies to both civil and criminal statutes | void for vagueness doctrine applies to both civil and criminal statutes | "Vagueness challenges to statutes outside the First Amendment are nearly impossible.” | regulation which would result in deportation | 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) challenged | vague statutory language excluding homosexuals | rejecting vagueness on the merits
Citator
- Cited by
- 101 opinions
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, an alien, has been ordered deported to Canada as one who upon entry into this country was a homosexual and therefore “afflicted with psychopathic personality” and excludable under § 212 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a)(4).* Petitioner's appeal from the
I.
Petitioner, a Canadian national, was first admitted to this country on June 22, 1955, at the age of 21. His last entry was in 1959, at which time he was returning from a short trip to Canada. His mother and stepfather and three of his brothers and sisters live in the United States. In 1963 he applied for citizenship and submitted to the Naturalization Examiner an affidavit in which he admitted that he was arrested in New York in October 1959, on a charge of sodomy, which was later reduced to simple assault and thereafter dismissed on default of the complainant. In 1964, petitioner, at the request of the Government, submitted another affidavit which revealed the full history of his sexual deviate behavior. It stated that his first homosexual experience occurred when he was 14 years of age, some seven years before his entry into the United States. Petitioner was evidently a passive participant in this encounter. His next episode was at age 16 and occurred in a public park in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Petitioner was the active participant in this affair. During the next five years immediately preceding
The 1964 affidavit was submitted to the Public Health Service for its opinion as to whether petitioner was ex-cludable for any reason at the time of his entry. The Public Health Service issued a certificate in 1964 stating that in the opinion of the subscribing physicians petitioner “was afflicted with a class A condition, namely, psychopathic personality, sexual deviate” at the time of his admission. Deportation proceedings were then instituted. ‘‘No serious question,” the Special Inquiry Officer found, “has been raised either by the respondent [petitioner here], his counsel or the psychiatrists [employed by petitioner] who have submitted reports on the respondent as to his sexual deviation.” Indeed, the officer found that both of petitioner’s psychiatrists “concede that the respondent has been a homosexual for a number of years but conclude that by reason of such sexual deviation, the respondent is not a psychopathic personality.” Finding against petitioner on the facts, the issue before the officer was reduced to the purely legal question of whether the term “psychopathic personality” included homosexuals and if it suffered illegality because of vagueness.
II.
The legislative history of the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Congress intended the phrase “psychopathic personality” to include homosexuals such as petitioner.
“The provisio[n] of S. 716 [one of the earlier bills not enacted] which specifically excluded homosexuals and sex perverts as a separate excludable class does not appear in the instant bill. The Public Health Service has advised that the provision for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality or a mental defect which appears in the instant bill is sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts. This change of nomenclature is not to he construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates.” (Emphasis supplied.) S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 9.
Petitioner stresses that only persons afflicted with psychopathic personality are excludable. This, he says, is “a condition, physical or psychiatric, which may be manifested in different ways, including sexual behavior.” Petitioner’s contention must fall by his own admissions. For over six years prior to his entry petitioner admittedly followed a continued course of homosexual conduct. The Public Health Service doctors found and certified that at the time of his entry petitioner “was afflicted with a class A condition, namely, psychopathic personality, sexual deviate . . . .” It was stipulated that if these doctors were to appear in the case they would testify to this effect and that “no useful purpose would be served by submitting this additional psychiatric material [furnished by petitioner’s doctors] to the United States Public Health Service . . . .” The Government clearly established that petitioner was a homosexual at entry. Having substantial support in the record, we do not now disturb that finding, especially since petitioner admitted
III.
Petitioner says, even so, the section as construed is constitutionally defective because it did not adequately warn him that his sexual affliction at the time of entry could lead to his deportation. It is true that this Court has held the “void for vagueness” doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions. See Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U. S. 233, 239 (1925). However, this is where “the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard . . . was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all. . . .” In short, the exaction must strip a participant of his rights to come within the principle of the cases. But the “exaction” of § 212 (a) (4) never applied to petitioner’s conduct after entry. The section imposes neither regulation of nor sanction for conduct. In this situation, therefore, no necessity exists for guidance so that one may avoid the applicability of the law. The petitioner is not being deported for conduct engaged in after his entry into the United States, but rather for characteristics he possessed at the time of his entry. Here, when petitioner first presented himself at our border for entrance, he was already afflicted with homosexuality. The pattern was cut, and under it he was not admissible.
The constitutional requirement of fair warning has no applicability to standards such as are laid down in § 212 (a) (4) for admission of aliens to the United States. It has long been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden. See The Chinese Exclusion Case,
But petitioner says that he had no warning and that no interpretation of the section had come down at the time of his 1955 entry. Therefore, he argues, he was unaware of the fact that homosexual conduct engaged in after entry could lead to his deportation. We do not believe that petitioner’s post-entry conduct is the basis for his deportation order. At the time of his first entry he had continuously been afflicted with homosexuality for over six years. To us the statute is clear. It fixes “the time of entry” as the crucial date and the record shows that the findings of the Public Health Service doctors and the Special Inquiry Officer all were based on that date. We find no indication that the post-entry evidence was of any consequence in the ultimate decision of the doctors, the hearing officer or the court. Indeed, the proof was uncontradicted as to petitioner’s characteristic at the time of entry and this brought him within the excludable class. A standard applicable solely to time of entry could hardly be vague as to post-entry conduct.
Affirmed.
“Sec. 212. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
“(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect . . . .”
Section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(1), provides that: “Any alien in