Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Bolling v. Sharpe

74 S. Ct. 693

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1954-05-17
Topic
general

holding that the Fifth Amendment and § 1331 created a remedy for unconstitutional racial discrimination in the D.C. public school system | holding that the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause contains an implicit right to equal protection | holding that despite lack of explicit equal protection clause, “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process” | holding that the District of Columbia’s maintenance of segregated schools violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause | holding that the District of Columbia's maintenance of segregated schools violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause | holding that despite lack of explicit equal protection clause, "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process" | holding that equal protection principles are binding on the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause | holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains an equal protection component applicable to the federal government | holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to federal government action via the Fifth Amendment | holding that the District’s racially segregated school system violated the implied equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause | holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component | holding that Fifth Amendment prohibits racial segregation in public schools of the District of Columbia | recognizing that the Fifth Amendment contains the protections afforded by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment | holding that the Equal Protection Clause applies to federal government action via the Fifth Amendment | holding that the District of Columbia’s maintenance of segregated schools violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause | holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment places the same restrictions on actions by the federal government that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places on state governments | holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia | holding that "the concepts of equal protection and due process ... are not mutually exclusive.... [D]iscrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." | recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “‘equal protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness” than the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause | holding that “the concepts of equal protection and due process ... are not mutually exclusive.... [Discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” | holding that segregated schooling in the District of Columbia violated equal protection | holding that the principles embodied by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibited States from maintaining racially segregated schools were applicable in the District of Columbia by virtue of the Fifth Amendment due process clause | noting that it would be unthinkable for the same Constitution to impose a lesser duty on the Federal government than on state governments | holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment places the same restrictions on actions by the federal government that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places on state governments | noting that “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of [the] due process [clause of the Fifth Amendment.]” | stating that “the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive” | stating that "the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive" | explaining that the Fifth Amendment governs due process claims in the District of Columbia because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states | observing tha

Citator

Cited by
1075 opinions
BOLLINGv. SHARPE,347 U.S. 497(1954)
74 S.Ct. 693
BOLLING ET AL.v. SHARPE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
No. 8.
Argued December 10-11, 1952.
Reargued December 8-9, 1953.
Decided May 17, 1954.
Racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial to Negro children of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 498-500.
(a) Though the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the States, the concepts of equal protection and due process are not mutually exclusive. P. 499.
(b) Discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. P. 499.
(c) Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. Pp. 499-500.
(d) In view of this Court's decision inBrownv.Board of Education,ante, p. 483, that the Constitution prohibits the States from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. P. 500.
(e) The case is restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to the form of the decree. P. 500.
George E. C. HayesandJames M. Nabrit, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners on the original argument and on the reargument. With them on the briefs wereGeorge M. JohnsonandHerbert O. Reid, Jr. Charles W.Quickwas also on the brief on the reargument.Milton D. Kormanargued the cause for respondents on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs wereVernon E. West, Chester H. GrayandLyman J. Umstead.Page 498

By special leave of Court,Assistant Attorney GeneralRankinargued the cause on the reargument for the United States, asamicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief wereAttorney General Brownell, PhilipElman, Leon Ulman, William J. LamontandM. MagdelenaSchoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, andPhilip Elmanfiled a brief on the original argument for the United States, asamicus curiae, urging reversal.

Briefs ofamici curiaesupporting petitioners were filed byS. Walter Shine, Sanford H. BolzandSamuel B.Gronerfor the American Council on Human Rights et al.; byJohn LigtenbergandSelma M. Borchardtfor the American Federation of Teachers; and byPhineas Indritzfor the American Veterans Committee, Inc.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case challenges the validity of segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia. The petitioners, minors of the Negro race, allege that such segregation deprives them of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. They were refused admission to a public school attended by white children solely because of their race. They sought the aid of the District Court for the District of Columbia in obtaining admission. That court dismissed their complaint. The Court granted a writ of certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional question presented.344 U.S. 873.

We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.1The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhatPage 499different, however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.2

Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.3As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle "that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race."4And inBuchananv.Warley,245 U.S. 60, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his property to a person of another race was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of law.

Although the Court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for aPage 500proper governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.

In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.5We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

For the reasons set out inBrownv.Board of Education, this case will be restored to the docket for reargument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court.345 U.S. 972.It is so ordered.Page 501
  1. Page 498Brownv.Board of Education, ante, p. 483. ↩
  2. Page 499Detroit Bankv.United States,317 U.S. 329;Currinv.Wallace,306 U.S. 1,13-14;Steward Machine Co. v.Davis,301 U.S. 548,585. ↩
  3. Page 499Korematsuv.United States,323 U.S. 214,216;Hirabayashiv.United States,320 U.S. 81,100. ↩
  4. Page 499Gibsonv.Mississippi,162 U.S. 565,591. Cf.Steelev.LouisvilleNashville R. Co.,323 U.S. 192,198-199. ↩
  5. Page 500 Cf.Hurdv.Hodge,334 U.S. 24. ↩