Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Board of License Comm'rs of Tiverton v. Pastore
83 L. Ed. 2d 618
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1985-01-08
- Topic
- general
considering supplemental briefs and sworn statements by counsel after ordering the parties to address mootness | dismissing writ of certiorari as moot after liquor licensee challenging license revocation went out of business | noting counsel’s “continuing duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably affect the outcome of the litigation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) | dismissing writ of certiorari as moot after briefing and oral argument upon learning that liquor lounge had gone out of business, thus “depriving the Court of jurisdiction due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy” | granting certiorari to decide whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied in civil liquor license revocation hearings and holding that the case was moot because the liquor-serving establishment that had been searched had gone out of business | dismissing writ of certiorari as moot where establishment that had sought to challenge revocation of its liquor license had gone out of business, so that “no decision on the merits by this Court can now have an effect on the [establishment’s] liquor license” | closure of restaurant prevents court from reaching merits potentially affecting substantive rights of interested nonparties because issue is moot | “Consideration of new facts may even be KHRAPUNOV V. PROSYANKIN 15 mandatory, for example, when developments render a controversy moot and thus divest us of jurisdiction.” | ''[cjounsel have a continuing duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably affect the outcome of the litigation.” | respondent went out of business and no longer had any claim to press | respondent went out of business and no longer had any claim to press | “It is appropriate to remind counsel that they have a ‘continuing duty to inform the Court of any developments that may conceivably affect the outcome’ of the litigation” | "When a [post-appeal] development ... could have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy, that development should be called to the attention of the Court without delay." | “When a [post-appeal] development ... could have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy, that development should be called to the attention of the Court without delay.” | "When a [post-appeal] development ... could have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy, that development should be called to the attention of the Court without delay." | “When a development after this Court ... notes probable jurisdiction could have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy, that development should be called to the attention of the Court without delay.” | dismissing previously granted writ of certiorari as moot | “‘Such speculative contingencies afford no basis for our passing on the substantive issues the petitioner would have us de- cide’ in the absence of ‘evidence that this is a prospect of immedi- acy and reality.’” (alterations accepted) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49 (1969 | dismissing previously granted writ of certiorari as moot
Citator
- Cited by
- 41 opinions
We granted certiorari in this case, 468 U. S. 1216 (1984), to decide whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in civil liquor license revocation hearings. Some state courts have held that the exclusionary rule applies. See New York State Liquor Authority v. Finn’s Liquor Shop Inc., 24 N. Y. 2d 647, 249 N. E. 2d 440, cert. denied, 396 U. S. 840 (1969); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Leonardziak, 210 Pa. Super. 511, 233 A. 2d 606 (1967) (exclusionary rule applies in Liquor Control Board proceeding in which Board imposed fine, but could also have revoked license). Illinois, on the other hand, admits evidence obtained during a search pursuant to an invalid warrant on *239 the reasoning that the State can and does require consent to a warrantless search as a prerequisite to the issuance of a liquor license. Daley v. Berzanskis, 47 Ill. 2d 395, 269 N. E. 2d 716 (1971).
In proceedings below, the Tiverton Board of License Commissioners had considered evidence obtained during a search of the Attic Lounge, a local liquor-serving establishment, in deciding to revoke its license. A Rhode Island judge in related criminal proceedings subsequently ruled that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rhode Island v. Benoit, No. N2/77-51 (Super. Ct. Newport Cty., R. L, Jan. 16, 1978). The Attic Lounge then argued that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be admitted in a civil hearing to revoke its liquor license. The Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator reversed the decision of the Tiverton Commissioners on unrelated grounds, and directed that the license be reinstated. After losing an appeal to the State Superior Court, Civ. Action No. 78-2659 (Super. Ct., Providence Cty., R. L, Aug. 6, 1980), the Tiverton Commissioners obtained review in the Rhode Island Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari naming both the Attic Lounge and the Liquor Control Administrator as respondents. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to liquor license revocation hearings. 463 A. 2d 161 (1983).
After this Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, considered briefs on the merits, and commenced oral argument, we learned that the Attic Lounge has gone out of business. Counsel for both the Tiverton Board of License Commissioners and the respondent Liquor Control Administrator stated at oral argument that no decision on the merits by this Court can now have an effect on the Attic Lounge’s liquor license. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28, 31. The case is therefore moot. At oral argument counsel discussed some circumstances under which a decision on the merits *240 by this Court might conceivably affect substantive rights of interested parties. But as the Court noted in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 320, n. 5 (1974):
“ ‘[S]uch speculative contingencies afford no basis for our passing on the substantive issues [the petitioner] would have us decide,’ Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 49 (1969), in the absence of ‘evidence that this is a prospect of immediacy and reality.’ Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 109 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941).”
It is appropriate to remind counsel that they have a “continuing duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably affect the outcome” of the litigation. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring). When a development after this Court grants certiorari or notes probable jurisdiction could have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction due to the absence of a continuing case or controversy, that development should be called to the attention of the Court without delay. See this Court’s Rules 34.1(g) (petitioner’s statement of the case shall contain all that is material to the issues); 34.2 (respondent’s brief may correct any omission from petitioner’s statement); and 35.5 (parties may file supplemental briefs after briefs on the merits to point out intervening matters not contained in the merits briefs).
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as moot.
It is so ordered.