Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Beazell v. Ohio

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1925-11-23
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that one way in which the ex post facto provision of the Constitution can be violated is by applying a law that makes more burdensome the punishment of a crime after its commission
  • stating that the prohibition on ex post facto laws "does not apply to changes in modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance."
  • stating that any statute that “makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission . . . is prohibited as ex post facto”
  • holding that the former law afforded jointly indicted defendants separate trials as a matter of right, but the new law only afforded separate trials subject to the trial judge's discretion; held, no ex post facto violation because the law did not affect a substantial right of the accused
  • noting that the admission of testimony by a particular witness at trial does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws even though the witness was precluded from testifying at the time of the crime
  • noting that the ex post facto clause prohibits "any statute which ... makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed " (emphasis added)
  • Ex Post Facto Clause does not limit "legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance"
  • ex post facto clause not intended to "limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance"

Citator

Beazell v. Ohio has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 18 S. Ct. 620 (overruled by Collins v. Youngblood). Read them before relying on it. 944 later decisions cite it.

Authority status
caution
Cited by
944 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto The constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws reaches any statute that punishes as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when done, makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission, or deprives a person charged with crime of a defense available at the time the act was committed. 269 U.S. 167, 169-170
  2. Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto The ex post facto prohibition rests on the principle that laws which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive, because the criminal quality of an act—whether by legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of punishment—should not be altered by legislative enactment after the fact to the disadvantage of the accused. 269 U.S. 167, 170
  3. Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto A statute that affects only the manner in which the trial of jointly accused persons is conducted, without depriving the accused of any defense previously available, affecting the criminal quality of the act charged, or changing the legal definition of the offense or the punishment, is not an ex post facto law; the quantum and kind of proof required to establish guilt, and all questions considered by court and jury in determining guilt or innocence, remain the same. 269 U.S. 167, 170-171
  4. Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto Statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence that do not deprive the accused of a defense, and that operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited as ex post facto laws, even though such changes may occur after the commission of the offense. 269 U.S. 167, 171
  5. Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto The ex post facto prohibition was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, not to limit legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure that do not affect matters of substance; just what alterations of procedure are of sufficient moment to transgress the prohibition cannot be embraced within a formula, the distinction being one of degree. 269 U.S. 167, 171
  6. Constitutional Law — Ex Post Facto An Ohio statute requiring joint trial of persons jointly indicted for a felony, unless the court for good cause shown orders separate trials, is not an ex post facto law as applied to persons indicted after, for an offense committed before, the amendment's effective date, because the legislation merely restores a mode of trial deemed appropriate at common law with discretionary power in the court to direct separate trials, and is not harsh or oppressive nor does it affect any right or immunity more substantial than statutes changing juror qualifications or granting the State an appeal. 269 U.S. 167, 171
BEAZELLv. OHIO,269 U.S. 167(1925)
46 S.Ct. 68
BEAZELLv. OHIO ET AL.
CHATFIELDv. OHIO ET AL.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO.
Nos. 247, 248.
Motions to dismiss or affirm submitted October 5, 1925.
Decided November 16, 1925.
1. The constitutional provision (Art. I. Sec. 10) forbidding the States to passex post factolaws was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance. P. 171. 2. An Ohio law providing that when two or more persons were jointly indicted for a felony, on application to the court each should be tried separately, was amended so as to require a joint trial, unless the court should order otherwise for good cause shown.Heldthat the amendment was not anexpost factolaw, within the constitutional restriction, as applied to persons who were indicted after,Page 168for an offense alleged to have been committed before, the date of the amendment. P. 170.111 Ohio St. 838;Id. 839, affirmed.
ERROR to judgments of the Supreme Court of Ohio affirming
convictions of embezzlement. The cases are disposed of here on
motions to dismiss or affirm.
Messrs. John Wilson Brown, Charles S. Bell, Nelson Schwab, andLouis Schneider, for the State of Ohio.Messrs. Province M. Pogue, Harry M. HoffheimerandThomasL. Pogue, for Beazell.Mr. Frank F. Dinsmore, for Chatfield.

The following authorities were cited and relied upon in the arguments for plaintiffs in error.Berginv.State,31 Ohio St. 113; 12 C.J. § 803;Thompsonv.Utah,170 U.S. 343;Duncanv.Missouri,152 U.S. 378;Ex parte Medley,134 U.S. 160;Kringv.Missouri,107 U.S. 221;Malletv.NorthCarolina,181 U.S. 589;Societyv.Wheeler, 2 Gall. 139;Statev.Morrow,90 Ohio St. 202;Crainv.United States,162 U.S. 624; Cooley's Const. Lim'ns. 373;Frisbyv.UnitedStates,13 App.D.C. 22;Statev.Barlow,70 Ohio St. 363;Hoptv.Utah,110 U.S. 574.
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiffs in error were jointly indicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, for the crime of embezzlement, a felony. On February 13, 1923, the date of the offense as charged, Ohio General Code, § 13,677, provided: "When two or more persons are jointly indicted for a felony, on application to the court for that purpose, each shall be separately tried." In April of the same year, before the indictment, which was returned on October 25, this section was amended (110 Ohio Laws, 301) so as to provide:Page 169

"When two or more persons are jointly indicted for a felony, except a capital offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court for good cause shown, on application therefor by the prosecuting attorney, or one or more of said defendants order that one or more of said defendants shall be tried separately."

By another section, the amended Act was made applicable to trials for offenses committed before the amendment.

The defendants severally made motions for separate trials on the ground that their defenses would be different; that each would be prejudiced by the introduction of evidence admissible against his co-defendant, but inadmissible as to him; and that they were entitled to separate trials as a matter of right, specifically charging that, as applied to their own indictment and trial, "the amendment to the Statutes of Ohio making the granting of said application for a separate trial discretionary with the trial court, is anex post factolaw within the restrictions imposed by Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States," which provides that "No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law."

Both motions were denied; the joint trial and conviction of the defendants followed; and in proceedings duly had in which the constitutional question was raised, their conviction was sustained by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The case comes before this court on motions to dismiss the writs of error or to affirm the judgment below.

It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited asex postPage 170facto. The constitutional prohibition and the judicial interpretation of it rest upon the notion that laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive, and that the criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused.

But the statute of Ohio here drawn in question affects only the manner in which the trial of those jointly accused shall be conducted. It does not deprive the plaintiffs in error of any defense previously available, nor affect the criminal quality of the act charged. Nor does it change the legal definition of the offense or the punishment to be meted out. The quantum and kind of proof required to establish guilt, and all questions which may be considered by the court and jury in determining guilt or innocence, remain the same.

Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. SeeCalderv.Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390;Cummingsv.State ofMissouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326;Kringv.Missouri,107 U.S. 221,228,232. And there may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition.Kringv.Missouri,107 U.S. 221;Thompsonv.Utah,170 U.S. 343. But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlargesPage 171the class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not anex post factolaw.Hopt. v.Utah,110 U.S. 574. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously held inadmissible.Thompsonv.Missouri,171 U.S. 380; or which changes the place of trial,Gutv.TheState, 9 Wall. 35; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. SeeDuncanv.Missouri,152 U.S. 377,382.

Just what alterations of procedure will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced within a formula or stated in a general proposition. The distinction is one of degree. But the constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, seeMalloyv.South Carolina,237 U.S. 180,183, and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance. SeeGibsonv.Mississippi,162 U.S. 565,590;Thompsonv.Missouri,supra, 386;Mallettv.North Carolina,181 U.S. 589,597.

The legislation here concerned restored a mode of trial deemed appropriate at common law, with discretionary power in the court to direct separate trials. We do not regard it as harsh or oppressive as applied to the plaintiffs in error, or as affecting any right or immunity more substantial than did the statute which changed the qualification of jurors, upheld inGibsonv.Mississippi, supra;or the statute which granted to the State an appeal from an intermediate appellate court, upheld inMallettv.North Carolina, supra. Obviously the statute here is less burdensome to the accused than those involved inHoptv.Utah, supra, andThompsonv.Missouri, supra.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio isAffirmed.Page 172