Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Bank v. Turnbull & Co.
Bank v. Turnbull & Co., 21 L. Ed. 296 (1873)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1873-02-10
- Topic
- general
granting the plaintiff's motion to remand because the proceeding was " 'merely auxiliary' to the original proceeding" in state court | questioning, where an enforcement action did not require process, pleas, or written response, whether “so informal a proceeding” should be considered “a suit, and not essentially a motion” | “Conceding it to be a suit, and not essentially a motion, we think it was merely auxiliary to the original action, a graft upon it, and not an independent and separate litigation.” | dispute with third party over prop erty levied by sheriff supplemental to original action | where a proceeding is “only auxiliary and incidental” to a state court action, it cannot be removed | remanding suit to enforce prior judgment
Citator
- Cited by
- 33 opinions
delivered the opinion of the court.
The bank recovered a judgment against Abijah Thomas for $4700, and interest, in the Circuit Court for the county
Upon examining the record we find'there was no process issued against the bank, no declaration filed by Turnbull &' Co., and no plea or other Written response by the bank. The record is a blank as to these things.
It.may well be doubted whether so informal a proceeding as that presented by this record is a “ suit ” within the mean
Conceding it to be a suit, and not essentially a motion, we thiuk it was merely auxiliary7 to the original action, a graft upon it, and not an independent and separate litigation. A judgment had been recovered in the original suit, final process was levied upon the property in question to satisfy it, the property was claimed by Turnbull & Co., and this proceeding, authorized by the laws of Virginia, was, resorted to to settle the question whether the property ought to he so applied. The contest could not have arisen but for the judgment and execution, and the satisfaction of the former would at once have extinguished the controversy between the parties. The proceeding was necessarily instituted in the court where the judgment was rendered, and whence the execution issued. No other court, according to the statute, could have taken jurisdiction. It was provided to enable the court to determine whether its process had, as was claimed, been misapplied, and what right and justice required should be done touching the property in the hands of its'officer. It was intended to enable the court, the plaintiff in the original action, and the claimant, to reach the final and proper result by a process at once speedy, informal, and inexpensive. That it was only auxiliary and incidental to the original- suit is, we think, too clear to require discussion. Ve shall content ourselves with referring to some of the leading authorities which bear upon the subject.†
The judgment of the.court below is reversed, and the cause will be remanded to that court with directions to enter a judgment of reversal, and then to remit the case to the Circuit Court for the county of Alexandria, whence it came.
West v. Aurora City, 6 Wallace, 142.
Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 Howard, 35; Freeman v. Howe, 24 Id. 460; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Peters, 1; Williams v. Byrne, Hempstead, 472.