Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Badders v. United States
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1916-03-06
- Topic
- bankruptcy
How later courts describe this case
- holding that Congress may forbid putting letters in the mail “in furtherance of a scheme it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not”
- recognizing that “there is no doubt that the law may make each putting of a letter into the postoffice a separate offence” when multiple mailings relate to the same scheme
- finding it sufficient for the mailing to be “incident to an essential part of the scheme”
- “intent may make an otherwise innocent act criminal, if it is a step in a plot”
- Eighth Amendment challenge to federal statute authorizing separate fines for separate mail fraud offenses rejected in single statement no ground existed for declaring the punishment unconstitutional
- “[TJhere is no doubt that the law may make each putting of a letter into the postoffice a separate offense.”
- separate postings of letters pursuant to one fraudulent scheme are separate offenses
- Whatever the limits to its power, Congress may forbid putting letters into the post office when such acts are “done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Badders v. United States. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 280 opinions
Headnotes
- General — Postal Power — Federal Criminal Jurisdiction The deposit of a letter into the United States mails is an overt act that Congress may regulate, and Congress may prohibit such a mailing made in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme that Congress regards as contrary to public policy, whether or not Congress has the power to forbid the scheme itself.
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Mens Rea Where an otherwise innocent act is a step in a plot, intent may render that act criminal, and acts found to have been done for the purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme are not too remotely connected with the scheme for the law to reach them.
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Separate Offenses The law may treat each separate mailing of a letter through the postal system as a distinct offense, so that each deposit constitutes a separate crime.
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Excessive Fines When a statute makes each mailing a separate offense, the imposition of a prison term on each count and a fine on each count does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment or an excessive fine.
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Constitutional Questions on Appeal Objections that are not of a kind to involve constitutional rights do not present a constitutional question for review merely because the argument gives them a constitutional turn; such technical complaints, including that the judge was absent during part of the grand jury's deliberations, afford no ground for reversal.
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is brought to this court from the District Court under § 238 of the Judicial Code, Act qf March 3,' 1911,- c. 231; 36 Stat. 1087, 1167, on the ground that it involves the construction and application of the Constitution of the United States, The plaintiff in error was indicted for placing letters in the mail for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud devised by him, in violation of § 215 of the Criminal Code, Act of March 4,1909, c. 321; 35 Stat. 1088, 1130. There were twelve counts, on seven of which, each relating to a different letter, he was found guilty. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment on each count, the periods being concurrent not cumulative, and also to a fine of $1,000 on each, or $7,000 in all. The grounds for coming to this court are first that § 215 of the Criminal Code is beyond the power of Congress as applied to what may be a mere incident of a fraudulent scheme that itself is outside the jurisdiction of Congress, to deal with; and second that if it makes the deposit of each letter a separate offence subject to such punishment as it received in this case it imposes cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines.
These contentions need no extended answer. The overt act of putting a letter into the postoffice of the United States is a matter that Congress may regulate. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727. Whatever the limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts done, in 'furtherance of a scheme that it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not. In re Rapier, *394 143 U. S. 110, 134. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 507. United States v. Stever, 222 U. S. 167, 173. See Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U. S. 321, 357. United States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 144. Intent may make an otherwise innocent act criminal, if it is a step in a plot. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396. The acts alleged have been found to have been done for the purpose of executing the' scheme, and there would be no ground for contending, if it were argued, that they were too remotely connected with the scheme for the law to deal with them. The whole matter is disposed of by United States v. Young, 232 U. S. 155; 161. As to the other point, there is no doubt that the law may make each putting óf a letter into the postoffice a separate offence. Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U. S. 625. In re Henry, 123 U. S. 372, 374. And there is no ground for declaring the punishment unconstitutional. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 126,135. Ebeling v. Morgan, supra.
The other matters discussed are before us only as incident to the constitutional questions upon which the case was brought here. As those questions merely attempt to reopen well established and familiar law It is not necessary to go beyond them. Brolan v. United States, 222 U. S. 215, 216, 222. There, is the more reason for declining further consideration iu the extravagant and unnecessary multiplication of exceptions and assignments of error that often has been condemned by this court. Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 509. . If there were anything in the objections to the indictment they are not of a kind to involve constitutional rights, Lamar v. United States, 240 U. S. 60, although the argument attempts to give a constitutional turn to them and to other technical complaints, such as that the judge was absent during a part of the deliberations of the grand jury. We find no error in this or the other particulars mentioned in argument. *395 Jones v. United States, 162 Fed. Rep. 417, 421. S. C., 212 U. S. 576. Commonwealth v. Bannon, 97 Massachusetts, 214, 220. See Brees v. United States, 226 U. S. 1, 11. As to the arraignment see Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S. 642, 646, 647. We deem it unnecessary to go into further detail.
Judgment affirmed.